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The central theme of the thesis is legal intervention in the
lives of children. The underlying question is whether such
intervention should be regarded as a violation of children's rights,
as claimed by child-libertarians, or whether it is more appropriate
to view it as a furthering of interests, in the manner of the
advocates of protectionism. A coherence of theory and practice is
regarded throughout as a necessary condition of achieving justice for
children. Rights and analyses of rights are examined briefly as a
preliminary step towards articulating a framework for a theory of
children's rights. It is argued that such a theory must necessarily
invoke children's interests. The concept of interests is examined
in some depth and it is shown how any substantive theory of the
interests of children must accommodate both "want-regarding" and
"ideal-regarding" considerations. Such a view is held to gain
considerable support from an analysis of actual reasoning about
interests. The discussion now turns to an examination of the
Scottish Children's Hearings System as illustrative both of the
conceptual points already elucidated, and of the complexities involved
in decision-making in a system in which interests are considered to be
the paramount concern. In conclusion, the thesis examines the
relevance of principles of justice in a setting which has now been
characterised as necessarily open to dispute. Some practical
implications are presented by way of a final 'testing' of the
theoretical conclusions.
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It is a sad reflection on the circumstances of many children
in contemporary societies that it is so often necessary to invoke
their rights and to compel action in their interests. Children are
born into families or at least into a setting which one likes to
imagine is characterised by:
"... the continual rendering of services, kindnesses,
attention and concerns beyond what is obligatory
between persons whose lives are intimately and
enduringly connected ... Good parents, children and
families submerge the performance of their
obligations to one another in ways of life whose
continuity, familiarity and at times power to
irritate are in no way obligatory".
The passage continues with a statement which highlights the focal
theme of this thesis:
"... we do not see the relationship between children
and those who rear them as more than partially and
regrettably adversarial".
This thesis concentrates precisely on those areas which are or at
least may become "adversarial", in an attempt to provide a
framework and guidelines for their resolution. The focus will be
on the child. However, this should in no way be regarded as a
denial of parental rights and interests but rather as recognition
of the fact that in cases of severe conflict, children are nearly
1. Onora O'Neill and Win. Ruddick (eds.) Having Children
(Oxford University Press, New York, 1979), Introduction, p.7«
2. ibid.,
2
always in a weaker bargaining position than their parents and other
adults with competing interests, and that in addition, recent
attempts to remedy this often seem misguided.
The cause of juvenile justice is currently being championed
from two apparently conflicting directions, which have unfortunately
come to be known as the "welfare" view and the "justice" view. It
will become clear below (p. 7 ) that the terms "welfarism" and
"legalism" are regarded as much more appropriate shorthand
descriptions of the two ideologies. However since the debate in
the literature is nearly always presented as a dispute between
"welfare" and "justice", these labels will be used for the moment.
Exponents of "welfare" see children as peculiarly vulnerable and in
need of special protection. This standpoint is clearly reflected in
the statute book. Laws regarding the criminal responsibility of
children, introduced at a time when children were subjected to all
the same penalties as adults, are the outcome of this view; so too
is labour legislation introduced when children were forced to work
long hours in appalling conditions in mines, factories and on the
land. The establishment of compulsory education, ultimately making
it impossible for children to enter the workforce, provides a further
example. The Children's Hearing System in Scotland is a product of
the same underlying philosophy of childhood.
The exponents of "justice" have a radically different outlook.
The child liberationists in the United States and (rather less
consistently) the "Justice for Children" movement in the United
Kingdom, are protesting at the injustices perpetrated against
children through measures taken 'for their own good' and demanding
recognition of the fact that in many areas, differences between
adults and children are quite irrelevant to the ascription of rights.
The liberationists claim that the arguments for extending equal
rights to children are similar to those for extending them to women,
blacks and any other oppressed groups. One writer states:
"The only people in our society who are incarcerated
against their will are criminals, the mentally ill
and children in school". (3)
It is the disturbing belief that both views can be plausibly defended
and equally plausibly attacked, that forms the starting point of this
thesis. As a member of a Scottish children's panel, I am occasionally
alarmed at the attempts made to persuade children that their removal
from home, for example, is in their best interests. Some children do
indeed need protection from their protectors. As an observer in a
juvenile court in California, I was equally disturbed to see five
lawyers haggling over the case of a thirteen year old offender in the
process of upholding his constitutional rights. It seemed dubious to
say the least, whether these rights were worth having, particularly
when it was pointed out to me that no young offender could come into a
court and apologise for his behaviour, for to do so would be to lose
the constitutional protection against self-incrimination.
Perhaps attempts to squeeze the facts of childhood into a unified
theory are misguided in that the complexities of reality are being
denied for the sake of consistent theory. It could be that the
developmental nature of childhood makes it an inappropriate subject for
3. Hichard Farson, Birthrights (Penguin, USA, 1978), p.96.
k.
a single coherent theory. There may be a need for a system of
juvenile justice to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate
conflicting theories to achieve justice for children, instead of
denying the conflicts of childhood to achieve a coherent philosophy.
It may also be that the Scottish system has the potential to achieve
the necessary flexibility.
In a recent article on the Scottish system, it was asserted that:
"It is not a weakness of the system that it contains
different approaches but rather the very purpose
for which it exists". (*+)
This is perhaps not what was originally intended, but it is becoming
increasingly apparent that some of the so-called "inconsistencies"
and "conflicts" of the system are inevitable. The real need is to
articulate them clearly and to explain the underlying issues which
make them inevitable.
Rights and Interests
It must be said from the start that implicit in the two views or
models of "welfare" and "justice" sire theories of both rights and
interests. Firstly there axe analytical questions concerning the
nature of rights and what it means for an individual to have a right.
Secondly there are questions of moral and political substance
concerning the actual rights to be ascribed to different individuals
b. Phyllida Parsloe, 'The Boundaries Between Legal and Social Work
Concerning the Hearing System' in D. Houston (ed.) Social Work in
the Children's Hearing System, Glasgow/Edinburgh Joint Committee
for Further and Advanced Training 1975, p.27.
and their ranking in any cases of conflict. Disagreements can arise
at either or even both levels. Both the "welfare model" and the
"justice model" can agree that a denial of that to which an individual
has a right, constitutes an injustice, as would the implementation of
a mistaken order of priorities. However, the "welfare" view is tied
to a particular analytic theory of rights in a way in which the
"justice model" is not. A system which assumes the legitimacy of
acting towards children 'for their own good' cannot (barring unlikely
coincidences) accommodate a theory of rights entirely divorced from
an account of interests, for any course of action acknowledged to be
in a child's interest within a welfare system, might then involve a
violation of the child's rights. If it transpired that this was in
fact the case, it would indeed be necessary to choose between "justice"
and "welfare". The "justice model" is not faced with this problem for
it can accommodate theories of rights and interests which sire quite
independent of one another, and argues strongly that in any potential
or actual conflict, rights should take priority. It therefore seems
crucial to provide an account of both rights and interests as a first
step towards assessing the competing models of juvenile justice.
Two ideal types of justice characterised by David Miller are
regarded as useful in providing a framework for the whole thesis.
The next part of the introduction will present a brief account of
Miller's views. In addition, it seems that much of the current debate
relies heavily on medical analogies which are thought here to have only
limited application. It therefore seems appropriate to provide a
discussion of these analogies before proceeding further. It is hoped
that the relevance of both Miller's ideal types and the excursus on
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the medical analogies will become clearer as the thesis develops.
The introduction will conclude with an explanatory note on the
methodology adopted here and a brief overview of the subsequent
chapters.
Legal Justice and Social Justice
The distinction made by Miller is that between "legal justice"
and "social justice". The concern of the former is said to be:
"... the punishment of wrongdoing and the compensation
of injury through the creation (and enforcement) of a
public set of rules (the law)..." (5)
By contrast, social justice is concerned with:
"... the distribution of benefits and burdens
throughout a society, as it results from the major
social institutions ..." (6)
It is suggested that the criteria of justice are not necessarily the
same in the two areas, although they share certain common elements,
such as a preoccupation with the nature of the rights possessed by
the individual and the fact that the law clearly falls within the
scope of each. Hence:
"... the separation of the two ideas is made for
purpose of analysis, rather than from a conviction
that legal and social justice have nothing to do





The significance of the distinction in the present context, lies in
the fact that the dispute between "justice" and "welfare" or legalism
and welfarism in the area of juvenile justice seems to be,at its most
fundamental level, an argument about these two types of justice.
The so-called "justice model" rests its case on an account of what
Miller would term "legal justice", while underlying the "welfare
model" is the assumption that, at least with respect to children, it
is primarily the concerns of social justice which should determine
outcomes and policies.
It is further pointed out by Miller that in making actual
decisions within different systems of justice, weight is given to at
least three competing principles which exemplify three interpretations
of the formal principle of justice: "to each his due". These
principles (each with its well-known exponents) are as follows:
(1) to each according to his rights
(2) to each according to his deserts
(3) to each according to his needs.
It is held that (l) and (2) and (l) and (3) are only contingently in
conflict, while (2) and (3) are necessarily in conflict, barring
unlikely accidents. Thus one might:
"... strive for a social order in which each man has a
right to that (and only that) which he deserves, or
to that (and only that) which he needs (but) no society
can distribute its goods both according to desert and
according to need. (It can of course distribute part
of its goods according to desert and part according to
need) ..." (8)
8. David Miller, op.cit., p.28.
8.
A system of social justice might give primacy to either the principle
of desert or the principle of need, but in practice (as Miller
illustrates) often attempts to accommodate both principles and
therefore necessarily experiences conflict and displays inconsistencies.
It will become clear that the appeal of the "justice model" of juvenile
justice, lies in the fact that it makes a clear distinction between
those juveniles whose cases are to be adjudicated on the basis of
desert (offenders) and those whose cases are to be adjudicated on the
basis of need (the abused, neglected or deprived). The weakness of
this position lies in the fact that it chooses to ignore that many
young offenders have already been dealt with on the basis of desert
prior to their appearance in court or at a hearing (see p. 223) and
more importantly that many clearly meet all the criteria of those
children deemed to be "in need". Unless advocates of this position
are prepared to argue that offending per se should be the grounds of
forfeiture of all claims to be treated on the basis of need, not a
suggestion that has appeared in the literature cited here, they will
still be faced with the inevitable conflict between principles of
desert and principles of need. The "justice model" more than the
"welfare model" would thus seem to be guilty of denying the complexities
of reality for the sake of consistent theory. Such a Procrustean
approach is viewed as unacceptable in a thesis which regards as central
the need for theory and practice to be informed by one another and to
exhibit coherence in any actual system of justice.
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Welfare and Treatment : The Use and Abuse of Medical Analogies
"Treatment" is a term often used to characterise the disposals
and resources available in welfare systems, hence medical analogies
abound in the literature on juvenile justice. The Kilbrandon Report
on Children and Young Persons ,in particular flakes extensive use of
medical terminology. The Report employs words like "symptom" and
"diagnosis" as well as arguing for a "treatment model" and making
comparisons between medical practice and its own policy recommendations.
"The doctor prescribes a course of treatment and
observes the patient's response to it ... On the
basis of his observations he continues the
treatment or prescribes a different course, more
drastic or less, as the situation appears to him
to require ..." (9)
Again at a later point in the Report it is claimed that:
"... in a great many delinquents a degree of
maladjustment, of malfunction personal to the
individual, has always been observable". (10)
These and similar assertions have led critics of the welfare model
to make the following kind of accusation:
"In essence, 'misconduct' is seen as a medical
problem, a social illness, which can be made the
subject of 'diagnosis', 'treatment' and 'cure'". (ll)
9. Report of the Committee on Children and Young Persons,
Scotland (Kilbrandon Committee 196*0 Cmnd. 3065» HMSO, referred
to hereafter as the Kilbrandon Report, paragraph 5*+ (*0.
10. Kilbrandon Report, paragraph 77-
11. Allison Morris et al., Justice for Children (Macmillan,
London 1980), p.3^.
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In other words, certain children axe viewed as sharing
"pathological conditions" which make them fundamentally different
from other children. If this really were an accurate account of
the underlying assumptions of the welfare model, the way would indeed
be open for a concerted attack. It could be pointed out that little
is in fact known about the immediate causes of crime and delinquency
and that such a view of children in trouble would mean that social
realities can be ignored. Thus Allison Morris writes:
"By treating 'misconduct' as a problem of individual
adjustment rather than, for example, a problem
arising out of the social (economic and political)
position and condition of adolescents, subsequent
action is both determined and delimited. Not only
does the choice of cause affect the choice of
treatment, it also affects the adequacy of that
treatment". (12)
However valid such observations may be, further reading of the
Kilbrandon Report and other expositions of the welfare model, make it
clear that they aire made with reference to a straw man. There is no
sustained claim in the literature that children in trouble axe all,
in some sense, ill. As David Watson writes:
"Most of our clients are personally quite well,
though their relationships leave a lot to be
desired". (13)
In writing of the children who appear in courts for whatever reason,
Kilbrandon states:
12. ibid., pp.35-36.
13. David Watson, 'Welfare Before Liberty : Justice for Juveniles?'
in R. Brown and T. Bloomfield (eds.) Legality and Community
(Aberdeen People's Press, Aberdeen 1979)» p«29.
"The distinguishing factor is their common need for
special measures of education and training, the
normal upbringing processes for whatever reason
having failed or fallen short". (1*0
The confusion has arisen because the term "treatment" can be applied
in at least two ways. It is used widely as in: 'She treats
children with respect' and in a more restricted way as in: 'She
treats children for asthma*. Extending these two uses to the realm
of juvenile justice, it can be seen that the first (wide) application
of the term is quite compatible with punishment, whilst the second
(restricted use) is directly opposed to it. The Kilbrandon Report
states:
"... punishment might be good treatment for the
particular person concerned in his particular
circumstances: but punishment would be imposed
for its value to the purpose of treatment, not
for its own sake as some sort of reward for ill-
The myth that punishment is viewed as irrelevant with respect to
juvenile offenders has ironically been created by advocates of
welfarism as well as its critics and is the direct outcome of
accepting the restricted use of "treatment" as its central application.
This myth has, regrettably, become a cause for misplaced pride within
the system and gives rise to misunderstanding and confusion. In
addition, it is this misleading picture that has led to the kind of
doing". (15)
I1)-. Kilbrandon Report, paragraph 252 (l).
15. ibid., paragraph 53*
of critique cited above, for "treatment" in the restricted sense
is of very limited relevance in the field of juvenile justice. How
does this argument affect the debate on the validity of the
distinction between compulsory treatment and punishment?
Compulsory treatment in the restricted 'medical' sense is clearly
distinguishable from punishment. However, in the wider non-medical
application it might be punishment but need not be so. In neither
case does the fact that it is perceived as such by the recipient make
it so, but the fact that it is or would be perceived as such might
justify a modification of the compulsory measures involved. The child
sent to bed with a temperature (a legitimate use of medical analogy)
might be offered comfort in the form of tasty dishes, a new book or
whatever, whereas where a child is sent to bed as a punishment, the
unpleasantness involved is essential to the action rather than an
unfortunate side-effect. This remains true regardless of whether or
not the children involved grasp the distinction. However, a recent
claim that children in England regularly prefer detention orders
(a punitive disposal) to care orders to the extent that some children
have even been known to commit additional offences specifically to
achieve this end, must raise considerable doubts about the content and
efficacy of care. There is a danger here of misapplying a medical
analogy by asserting that, just as in the medical sphere, even if
children regard hospitalisation as equivalent to incarceration, this
may be unfortunate, but does not detract from any justification one
16. D.H. Thorpe, D. Smith, C.J. Green and J.H. Paley, Out of Care : The
Community Suoport of Juvenile Offenders (Allen and IJnwin, London
1980J, pp.125-6.
might give for the existence of hospitals, so too in the case of
social intervention, the child's perceptions are irrelevant. In
other words, regardless of children's perceptions of them, Children's
Homes, residential schools and so on, can carry on with the job they
were intended to do. This is not the case. If 'care' holds such
terrors for children, it seems highly unlikely that it can achieve its
aims. There is a need to make explicit the aims and objectives of any
care order in terms of the interests it is aimed to further, so that
(
assessment of its success or failure can be made accordingly. To give
a very simplistic example: if a young child is taken into care because
her parents refuse to send her to school and if at the end of some
specified period (six months perhaps) she has made no educational
progress and is far unhappier than at the time of her first appearance
in court, the disposal was almost certainly the wrong one. In the
terms of the analysis provided in Chapter 3* the intrinsic interest
which was the focus of concern (education) will not have been secured
and another interest (in security) will have been damaged. There is of
course room for discussion as to how long one might persist in this
course of action, how long a child needs to 'settle* in a new
environment, but if such a situation were to continue for a substantial
time, say more than a year, then it would seem to be indistinguishable
from punishment and unjust punishment at that. There is a need to
explain to children what is happening to than and why, so that they and
others can assess the rationality and effectiveness of any chosen
disposal. As David Watson writes:
l*f.
"If the child sees the disposal as a means to his
ends he is less likely to find that means
unpleasant, or at least the unpleasantness of the
means will be offset by the pleasantness of the
end". (17)
This account seems to point to a need for separate institutions for
those on sentence and those in care (as recommended in the concluding
chapter). It is clear that a non-offender sent to a List D school
(formerly an Approved School) for education and unhappy about the
disposal, will feel unfairly treated if an offender 'gets out' after
six months or a year and s/he has to remain there until his/her
sixteenth birthday. Such feelings will almost certainly serve to
lessen any value the experience might otherwise have. Compulsory
intervention to promote welfare, and punishment, are indeed distinct,
irrespective of the perceptions of their recipients, but if they are
to achieve their aims within the context of a system of juvenile
justice, it would seem important that the distinction be grasped as
far as possible by those on the receiving end. Medical analogies are
almost dysfunctional here, for much unpleasant treatment (an injection
or operation for example) can be entirely successful regardless of any
of the patient's feelings, perceptions and opinions of the diagnosis
and the most appropriate cure. This is not the case with social
intervention in the lives of children. However, there remains one
further area where one might usefully apply medical analogies and
where they have not been employed.
17. David Watson, 'The Underlying Principles : A Philosophical
Comment' in F.M. Martin and Kathleen Murrey (eds.)
Children's Hearings (Edinburgh, Scottish Academic Press, 1976)
p.203.
Several critics of the Scottish system have accurately
observed that hearings tend to move from disposals involving either
no intervention (a discharge) or minimal intervention (an adjournment)
at a first hearing, to ever-increasing degrees of intervention (home
supervision followed by residential supervision), at subsequent
appearances. This has then been submitted as evidence for the
existence of a tariff, said to be characteristic of punitive
institutions and alien to welfare systems. Increased intervention is
here equated with increasing severity of sanction. In this area it
would indeed seem helpful to elucidate the nature of the chain of
events by making a comparison with treatment in medical contexts. A
diagnosis of tonsillitis, for example, is not immediately followed by
surgical treatment. An attempt will be made to cure the condition with
antibiotics and only when this is thought to have failed, will the
tonsils be removed. In other words, where the less drastic remedy is
sufficient to achieve a cure, the more drastic will not be employed.
This is presumably, at least in part, because of the attendant risks
and possible complications associated with the more radical procedure.
In exactly the same way, where a twelve year old, for example, fails to
attend school, a hearing should examine all the possible alternatives
and opt for the least restrictive first, that is for the disposal which
might achieve the desired end, whilst causing minimal disruption to
other areas of the child's life. A subsequent recognition of failure
followed by increased intervention is no more indicative of punishment
18. See for example Allison Morris et al., op.cit., pp.
Allison Morris and Mary Mclsaac, Juvenile Justice? (Heinemann,
London, 1978), pp.131-133-
than resorting to surgery where medication has failed. However,
just as the risks of surgery sometimes prove to have been too high
(those mythical operations that are said to have been successful
although the patient diedi) so too the price of securing certain
interests for certain children may prove unacceptable. The reasons
for this will become clear as the thesis progresses. It seemed
important by way of a preliminary exercise, to indicate the way in
which medical analogies may serve both to clarify and to obscure
issues in the field of juvenile justice. It is hoped that any
application of such analogies in this thesis will serve to illuminate
rather than to obfuscate.
Methodology and Outline of the Argument
The methodology adopted throughout this thesis can perhaps best
be understood as a variation of what has been termed "the method of
wide reflective equilibrium". This method is presented by John
(19)
Bawls as an appropriate procedure in the field of moral theory.
At the most basic level it can be explained as consisting of the
mutual adjustment of individual moral beliefs and intuitions with both
moral and non-moral principles until a "harmonious fit" is achieved.
An article by Norman Daniels has analysed and described this method in
some detail as:
19. John Bawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1972), pp.^6-53«
"... an attempt to produce coherence in an ordered
triple of sets of beliefs held by a particular
person, namely,
(a) a set of considered moral judgements,
(b) a set of moral principles and
(c) a set of relevant background theories". (20)
The procedure involves taking individual moral judgements as the
starting point and then moving on to an examination of alternative
sets of moral principles and the degree to which they "fit" the
initial judgements. These judgements, together with the principles
may themselves be modified in the process. In the final stage, the
principles are "tested" against some set of relevant background
theories and mutual adjustment continues between the three sets until
an equilibrium is reached. It is very important to realise from the
outset that nothing remains necessarily fixed in such a process, no
single factor is considered immune from revision. However as
Daniels rightly observes, there is considerable reluctance to give up
certain judgements and such judgements take on the status of
"provisional fixed points". Thus:
"Since all considered judgements are revisable, the
judgement: 'It is wrong to inflict pain gratuitously
on another person', is too. But we can also explain
why it is so hard to imagine not accepting it, so hard
that some treat it as a necessary moral truth. To
imagine revising such a provisional fixed point we must
imagine a vastly altered wide reflective equilibrium
that nevertheless is much more acceptable than our own.
For example, we might have to imagine persons quite
unlike the persons we know". (21)
20. Norman Daniels 'Wide Beflective Equilibrium and Theory




Presumably principles too and even background theories, may take
on a similar status of "provisional fixed points". Moreover the
method of wide reflective equilibrium does not seem to preclude taking
any one of the three sets (considered moral judgements, moral principles
and background theories) as a starting point in the balancing process
and subjecting them to "exhaustive review", as well as testing them
against one another. This is precisely the procedure adopted here
with one crucial addition, namely the introduction of a relevant body
of practice into the whole process. Practice is viewed here as a
fourth "set" which must necessarily be accommodated in achieving a
"harmonious fit". This need arises from the central concern of the
thesis with decision-making and action in a specific context, a concern
which differentiates it sharply from the focal theme of "A Theory of
Justice" and hence applies the method of reflective equilibrium to a
quite different enterprise. Underlying this enterprise is the
assumption shared by what Ronald Dworkin has termed the "constructive
model" for elucidating the coherence characteristic of reflective
equilibrium, namely:
"... that men and women have a responsibility to fit
the particular judgement on which they act into a
coherent programme of action, or, at least, that
officials who exercise power over other men have
that sort of responsibility". (22)
It is held here that the method of reflective equilibrium will prove
helpful in formulating such a "programme of action" even if it were
to be ultimately rejected as a model for justification in ethics or
22. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard, Cambridge,
1978), p.160.
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for making progress in moral argument. Indeed Dworkin states
specifically that the so-called "constructivist model" remains neutral
with respect to moral ontology. It is said to be consistent with but
not to presuppose the existence of an objective morality. Whilst
this claim remains highly debatable, it is nevertheless held here that
the coherence intrinsic to reflective equilibrium is required for
"independent reasons of political morality", in particular the:
"... assumption that it is unfair for officials to
act except on the basis of a general public theory that
will constrain them to consistency, to provide a public
standard for testing or debating or predicting what they
do, and not allow appeals to unique intuitions that
might mask prejudice or self-interest in particular
cases". (23)
(.2k)At least one critic has rejected the method of reflective
equilibrium as a key to moral progress and moral knowledge, whilst
leaving quite open the separate question of whether or not it may serve
as a useful procedure for formulating a programme of action. It
should be clear that inasmuch as the main concern of this thesis is to
provide a framework for making just decisions about children who come
face to face with the law, it is to be regarded primarily as a "complex
proposal" concerning the most appropriate way of achieving this aim,
rather than as a moral theory or an empirical account. The success
or failure of the method of reflective equilibrium in the following
chapters, therefore lies in the extent to which the thesis achieves its
23. Dworkin, op.cit., pp.162-163*
2k. Joseph Raz, 'The Claims of Reflective Equilibrium', Inquiry 25
(1983) pp.307-330.
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main aim, namely the acceptance of a "complex proposal". In a quite
different context, Eugene Kamenka has outlined the relevant criteria
for assessing such a proposeil:
"It is to be judged by its internal coherence and
logical consistency, by the truth of its associated
empirical claims and its relation to relevant
empirical material, that it may or may not take up
and in the last resort, by its relation and that of
its consequences and implications to our own moral
beliefs". (25)
Several individual chapters in the following pages aim to
achieve an equilibrium in a given related area, but the chapters are
not to be judged in isolation from one another but rather as
contributing to a proposed coherence of theory and practice in the
field of juvenile justice. Chapter 1 provides a summary account of
different theories of rights, concentrating in particular on those
areas which seem of relevance to questions concerning the nature and
existence of children's rights. General issues are raised and the
more detailed argument takes as its starting point the "provisional
fixed points" that 'rights talk' is meaningful and that where there are
rights, children as well as adults are to be regarded as right-holders,
hence any theory of rights which excludes children from the class of
right-holders is to be rejected accordingly. After further
elucidation of the concept of rights and what it is to have a right,
the choice theory is presented as a theory which not only fails to
"fit" a firmly held conviction that if there are rights, then children
as well as adults are to be viewed as right-holders, but in addition
25. Eugene Kamenka, 'The Anatomy of an Idea' in E. Kamenka and
Alice Erh-Soon Tay (eds.) Human Rights (Arnold, London, 1978)
p.12.
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cannot be 'squared' with what are often regarded as the most
fundamental human rights. Moreover the "interest theory" can be
shown to "fit" both of these firmly held moral beliefs and is adopted
accordingly. However to conclude that both children and adults have
rights, is to leave open the question of whether or not the same rights
should be ascribed to each group. Chapter 2 is concerned with this
question and again uses the method of reflective equilibrium to reach
a conclusion. Three alternative theories of children's rights (each
in itself compatible with the interest theory which can therefore be
excluded from the balancing process at this point), are tested against
a series of empirical problems whose resolution appears to be
intuitively obvious. The examples are set out together with their
practical solutions and the theories are "tested" against these
solutions. "Protectionism" in a modified form is shown to produce the
most "harmonious fit". At this point, the validity of the conclusion
rests entirely on the assumption that the examples themselves acre
uncontroversial. However the case for "modified protectionism" is
subsequently strengthened by elucidating what seem to be relevant
differences between children and adults in the ascription of rights and
by showing how such a theory seems to "fit" best with decisions made
about children in various legal contexts. Such decisions and indeed
the suggested solutions to the practical problems at the beginning of
the chapter all rest on a prior notion of what constitutes a child's
interests. Since rights have already been said to be intimately
connected with the concept of interest, and given that the guiding
principle in many legal settings where decisions are taken with respect
to children is to "act in the best interests of the child", it would
seem essential to elucidate the concept of interest before proceeding
any further with prescriptions regarding juvenile justice. Chapter 3
provides such an elucidation. A purely "want-regarding" account is
rejected as failing to explain the interests of the very young and
others without articulated wants, and as providing only a partial
account of the interests of other individuals. The identification of
the interests of children is shown to be problematic in a way that
discovering the interests of adults is not. The principle of making
decisions "in the best interests of the child" must be modified
accordingly. Chapter k is primarily a descriptive account and is used
to show that in marked contrast to the principle, practice has already
been modified in at least one setting (the Scottish Children's Hearing
System) to accommodate a reality that is far more complex than the
principle would seem to indicate. Indeed in some instances the
principle is shown to have been abandoned entirely or at least modified
to such a degree that it is no longer an independent criterion of just
decision-making. A detailed account is provided of actual decision¬
making in the interests of children in a specific legal context, in
order to indicate both the degree to which practice is sometimes forced
to abandon the principle and rather more importantly the limitations
intrinsic in the principle as a guide to decision-making. These
limitations are explored further in Chapter 5 which attempts to show how
the evaluative reasoning which characterises discussions about interests
can proceed to a conclusion in a coherent way. Chapter 6 explores the
nature, relevance and application of principles of justice in a setting
that has now been characterised as necessarily open to dispute. The
need for empirical findings to be taken into account if there is to be
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a coherence between theory and practice is explored in some detail.
The last chapter presents a number of practical implications in order
to provide a final "testing" of the principles which have now been
formulated as providing the most appropriate framework for a system
of juvenile justice. They are not to be viewed merely as a list of
policy recommendations arising from the thesis, but as proposals whose
adoption would 'square' with the principles advocated and which thus
exhibit the possibility of the coherence of theory and practice which




Rights and Analyses of Rights
"... any genuine right must involve some normative
direction of the behaviour of persons other than
the (right) holder".
(R. Martin and J.W. Nickel, 'Recent Work on the
Concept of Rights', American Philosophical Quarterly 17,
3, (1980) p.167)
"... a right is ... a legally (or ... quasi-legally)
protected or furthered interest".
(T.D. Campbell, The Left and Rights (RKP, London
1983) p.27)
"To be sincere, reliable, fair, kind, tolerant,
unintrusive, modest in my relations with my fellows
is not due them because they have made brilliant or
even passing moral grades, but simply because they
happen to be fellow members of themoral community ..."
(G. Vlastos, 'Justice and Equality' R.3. Brandt (ed.)
Social Justice (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1962) p.^7)
Rights, in marked contrast to requests, pleas, kindnesses, favours
and charitable deeds, carry with them the notion of what is due to the
right-holder; they are thus intimately connected on the one hand with
notions of respect and dignity (as exemplified by the quotation from
Vlastos above), and on the other hand with the concept of justice. One
view of the relationship between rights and justice has been summarised
in the following way:
"... charity turns into justice when the needs of the
beneficiaries are widely recognized in a society as
moral claims. No one has a right to charity, but
once the benefit which the needy lack is regarded as
something due to all, as something to which all have
a right, it passes out of the domain of charity into
that of justice". (l)
1. D.D. Raphael, Justice and Liberty (Athlone, London 1980) p.88.
On this account, the Welfare State, for example, is not a charity
organisation but an institution which can be seen to satisfy certain
requirements of justice in society.
The observations above should be viewed as signposts to the
direction of the discussion of rights to be presented here.
Together with the quotations heading the chapter, they presuppose some
answers to certain key questions concerning rights. In particular:
Are there any rights? What are rights? What does it mean to have a
right? Who has rights? These questions are clearly interrelated
and in some instances answers to one will settle them all. It is
undoubtedly the case that 'rights' talk' is not a misuse of language
and that although many accounts of rights are stipulative or
persuasive (or both), attempts at elucidation can bring about an
increased understanding of important human concerns. The account
given here is not intended to be exhaustive, but serves rather as a
stepping stone towards theories of children's rights and children's
interests which appear to be consistent with the view of juvenile
justice advocated in later chapters and should be judged accordingly.
(2)In a recent survey article, the authors point out that there
sire three different aspects on which the various characterisations of
rights can and do focus. These three aspects are reflected in the
quotations heading the chapter. Ihrst there is what Martin and Nickel
have termed the "normative element", which describes rights in terms
of their constitutive "normative categories" such as second-party
duties, claims, liberties, immunities and so on. Second there are
2. B. Martin and J.W. Nickel, 'Becent Work on the Concept of
Bights' , American Philosophical Quarterly 17, 3 (1980), pp.163-178.
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descriptions and assumptions concerning the function of rights,
that is, what can be done with them. They have been viewed variously
as protective of particular interests, as conferring control over a
particular state of affairs and as creating an area of inviolability
for the right-holder. Thirdly characterisations of rights may
involve justificatory theories in terms of individual interests and
needs or (as shown in the quotation from Vlastos, heading the chapter),
of human dignity. These aspects are interdependent. They cannot
be completely isolated from one another. Indeed the authors view the
"multi-level" approach as a fruitful line of inquiry. However, for
purposes of elucidation and analysis of the competing theories, it
would seem helpful to maintain the categorisation of the three aspects
of •rights' talk* as a means of assessing the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the different accounts.
Legal Rights and Moral Bights
It has been pointed out by Jeremy Waldron, that although the
"pioneering work" in this area focuses primarily on legal rights, it
would be a mistake to conclude (as did Bentham) that talk of rights in
extra-legal contexts is meaningless. It is indisputable, as Waldron
observes, that where a statute explicitly grants a right, its existence
is unequivocal. However even within a legal framework, rights are
often matters of dispute to be contested in terms of:
"the logical relations we recognize between the
concepts of right, duty, offence and rule". (3)
3. J. Waldron, Forthcoming volume on Rights in Oxford Readings in
Philosophy, Introduction, p.5.
It is accurately asserted that:
"... the same issues arise when we move from
positive law to the critical standards of
morality".
The difference is that in the case of morals, unlike that of law,
the standards themselves are nearly always contested in a way that
legal rules are not.
"Unless it is proposed that we should give up
critical moral evaluation altogether, it is
difficult to see the case for confining talk of
rights ... to the context of positive law".
A related point has been put most forcefully as follows:
"Ehr from feeling obliged to attempt to settle
questions about rights by plunging into full-scale
controversy about ethical theories, we might with
equal plausibility adopt the reverse procedure.
Since the rights of individuals appear to be
important elements in many moral situations, one
criterion according to which the adequacy of an
ethical theory is to be judged, is its ability to 4
take account of this important moral concept".
It is precisely by adopting this kind of procedure that some authors
most notably Neil MacCormick, reject one account of rights in favour
of another. The starting point of his argument is as follows:
b, J.-'Wa^-dron, op.cit., p.5«
5. ibid., p.6.
6. Colin Wringe, Children's Rights (RKP, London, 198l) p.35.
"... at least from birth, every child has a right
to be nurtured, cared for, and, if possible, loved,
until such time as he or she is capable of caring
for himself or herself. When I say that, I intend
to speak in the first instance of a moral right.
I should regard it as a plain case of moral blindness
if anyone failed to recognize that every child has
that right". (7)
If this is indeed the case, then amy theory of rights which excludes
children from the class of right-holders either explicitly or
implicitly, can be rejected accordingly. The discussion will
return to this theme later. The quotation is used here simply to
point out (as indicated in the Introduction)that certain theories can
be rejected because they neglect to provide a satisfactory account of
rights and that rejection on such grounds (where the basis for the
rejection is clearly articulated), seems to be a move with at least
the same procedural validity as a denial of the existence of rights,
because their acceptance is inconsistent with a given theory. The
following discussion will be concerned with both moral and legal
rights and should be judged in that light.
A Classification of Rights
It is widely acknowledged (not least by the authors already cited
here) that a good starting point for any discussion of rights is the
detailed classification provided by W.N. Hohfeld.* He regarded rights:
7. Neil MacCormick, 'Children's Rights : a Test Case for Theories
of Right', Archiv filr Recht-und Sozialphilosophie LXII (1976)
P.305.
Footnote: * The original classification is set out in Wesley N.
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning (.Yale, 1919J. Both Martin and Nickel
and Campbell and Waldron (cited above) provide useful
summaries and discussions of the original.
"... as devices for the parcelling out of legal
advantage and disadvantage to individuals, in
four distinct patterns". (8)
He identified four types of rights, each of which may exist on its
own or in combination with the others and each with its own second-
party correlatives. The four kinds are as follows: "legal claim
rights" with the "legal duties" of some second party as their
correlative; "legal privileges" often termed "liberties", to perform
X are matched by the lack of a claim on the part of others that X not
be done, a so-called "no right"; "legal powers" to do X, enabling
the right-holder to alter existing legal arrangements in some way,
have "legal liabilities" as their correlative and finally there are
"legal immunities" correlated with a lack of power or "disability" on
the part of others to perform the action in question. Using
Hohfeldian terminology one can 'unpack* notions such as "the right to
trade" in the following manner:
"What people mean by 'I have a right to trade' is
that in carrying on my business, I do no man any
legal wrong. As against every other person, each of
my trading activities is privileged; as regards each
such activity every person hats a no-right that I shall
not do it. From that nothing follows about my rights
regarding other people's actions. ... From my
privilege to trade, it does not follow that I have a
right that X shall not commit a certain act even if
that act makes it more difficult for me to trade ..." (9)
8. B. Martin and J.W. Nickel, op.cit., Footnote 5»
9. J.W. Harris, Legal. Philosophies (Butterworths, London, 1980)
P-78.
Moral rights can be classified and analysed in a similar manner.
The four legal categories all have equivalents in the realm of
morality. It is possible to speak of a "claim right" to freedom;
of the "privilege" or more usually the "liberty" to dress as one
pleases; of the "power" to change moral relations by making a
promise and of the "immunity" from being bound by obligations entered
into by others (without authorisation) on my behalf, all without
recourse to the legal sphere. The distinguishing mark of such
discourse is not its legal or moral character but rather that it takes
place within the framework of a system of rules and/or norms. Bights
exist, if they exist at all, within normative orders:
"a right which does not guide anyone's behaviour is
no right at all". (10)
However one is still left with the question of what it is that these
different concepts, that is, claim rights, privileges or liberties,
powers and immunities have in common. By virtue of what are they all
called "rights"? Is there a single common factor or is it simply that
this is an example of a concept embracing what Wittgenstein termed
"family resemblances", with no single factor common to all the
various applications? For present purposes, attempts to provide a
unitary theory can be broadly placed in two groups. First there are
those accounts which focus on a single "normative element" said to be
contained in all rights, of which Joel Feinberg's elucidation of
10. B. Martin and J.W. Nickel, op.cit., p.l67«
11. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (translated by
G.E.M. Anscombe, KLacEwelT7^Scford^~1^3T^r"67 •
"valid claims" is regarded here as the most promising. Second
theories concerning the alleged functional unity of rights, in
particular Herbert Hart's view of rights as conferring sovereignty
on the right-holder within a limited domain, Neil MacCormick's view
of rights as securing goods or interests within a normative order,
Dworkin's account of rights as trumps over collective goals and
Haksar's view that:
"... talk of rights is linked with demands, or claims,
or complaints, that can validly be made by the person
who has the right, or by those who speak on his
behalf". (12)
The latter approach is intimately connected with Feinberg's theory of
rights as "valid claims". The following discussion will first
examine Feinberg's arguments and then proceed to offer a brief
critical account of the "will" or "choice theory" of rights as
contrasted with the "interest theory". It will be argued that
Feinberg's view that:
"... to have a right is to have a claim against
someone whose recognition as valid is called for
by some set of governing rules or moral principles", (13)
together with the interest theory as expounded by MacCormick, offer
the most promising prospect of a theory of rights which has equal
application in the field of juvenile justice and in the normative
regulation of adult life.
12. V. Haksar, 'The Nature of Sights', Archiv ftlr Becht-und
Sozialphilosophie LXIV (1978), p.18T.
13. J. Feinberg, 'The Nature and Value of Bights' in Bights
Justice and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton, 1980), p.155.
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Rights and Claims
The starting point of Feinberg's account as presented in one of
(1*0
many articles is a "thought experiment". The reader is asked
to imagine a world in which no one at all, or at most only a very small
minority, has rights. The people can be kind, gentle, compassionate,
and generous, and even act out of a sense of duty, with respect to
actions that are required by law for example. People treat each other
well and there might even be a system of rewards for services.
Moreover one can introduce what Feinberg terms a "sovereign right-
monopoly" in order to achieve a system of ownership, contracts,
marriages and so on. Any obligations incurred will now be to the
sovereign and not to promisees, creditors and so on. The only wronged
party where breaches of the rules occur, is the sovereign. There is
an analogy here with the view of marriage (adopted by some religious
thinkers) as involving three parties, for the vows are seen as being
made between each partner and God. Marital duties aire thus owed to
God alone, only God holds the relevant rights. In the hypotheticail
"sovereign right-monopoly", rights would similarly vest in the
sovereign, there would be no other right-holders. The key question is
what would be missing from such a world. How would it differ from the
world as we know it? Feinberg answers as follows: the inhabitants
of such a world have no idea that anything is due to them. The
hallmark of rights, which also explains their centrality in much moral
and legal thought, is that:
I**. ibid., pp.1^3-^.
"Bights are not mere gifts or favours, motivated by-
love or pity, for which gratitude is the sole fitting
response. A right is something a man can stand on,
something that can be demanded and insisted upon
without embarrassment or shame. When that to which
one has a right is not forthcoming, the appropriate
reaction is indignation; when it is duly given there
is no reason for gratitude, since it is simply one's
own or one's due that one receives. A world with
claim rights is one in which all persons, as actual
or potential claimants are dignified objects of
respect, both in their own eyes and in the view of
others. No amount of love and compassion, or
obedience to higher authority, or noblesse oblige,
can substitute for those values". (15)
These "values" can be summed up in the Kantian concept "respect for
persons as ends in themselves" and as already pointed out, are
reflected in the quotation from Vlastos, heading this chapter.
They form the basis of a justificatory theory of rights. The
discussion will for the present confine itself to Feinberg's
"normative account".
The "thought experiment" is used to illustrate that the activity
of claiming is central to the concept of rights. It is "claim-
rights" rather than liberties, powers and immunities that must be
seen as the paradigm case of rights. Feinberg provides a detailed
analysis of the activity of claiming, pointing out the difference
between "making claim to" which he terms the "performative" sense
and "claiming that", referred to as the "propositional sense" and
contrasting both with what it is to "have a claim" and the
relationship of this to rights. It is suggested that:
15. J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey,
1973), PP.58-39:
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"... having a claim consists in being in a
position to claim ... to make a claim to or claim
that ..." (16)
Moreover there are both valid and invalid claims and only the former
are to be regarded as rights. On this view claims may vary in degree
but not so rights. The other crucial difference between claims and
rights is that, according to Feinberg, mere entitlements or "claims"
to something in the absence of a corresponding claim against some
specified individual or individuals are not to count as rights except
in an attenuated or "manifesto sense".
"... claims, based on need alone, are *permanent
possibilities of rights', the natural seed from
which rights grow". (17)
The same point is reflected in the quotation from Baphael above (p. 2k)
and explains why it is possible, but nevertheless inaccurate, to speak
of a universal right to education or work for example. Such
assertions are prescriptive and point to the claims which ought to be
recognised in the future in the pursuit of social justice. However
it has been suggested that equating such entitlements with rights:
"seems subject to Bentham's critical dictum that
hunger is not bread". (18)
16. J. Feinberg, 'The Nature and Value of Bights', op.cit.,
p.151.
17. J. Feinberg, 'The Nature and Value of Bights', op.cit.,
p.153.
18. B. Martin and J.W. Nickel, op.cit., p.170.
Where rights are regarded as possessions of the right-holder,
generating at least in the present, no more than duties of non¬
interference on the part of the rest of society, it becomes impossible
to explain their centrality and importance in moral and legal thought.
It is almost as though once we have all assented, for example, to the
injured man's right to medical treatment and have not actually
prevented him from getting help but simply proceeded on our way, we have
not wronged him. If this were indeed the case, and it is strongly
asserted here that this is not the case, the nature of rights would at
most assume the characteristics of liberties and as such could not form
the basis of prescriptions concerning the behaviour of others towards
right-holders, in anything more than a negative way. But in many
instances, rights function in a far more positive way and are indeed
the grounds of directives to both individuals and governments regarding
what is required of them within the framework of prevailing moral and
legal norms. It is this feature that is so well captured by Feinberg's
conclusion that:
"To have a right is to have a claim against someone,
whose recognition as valid is called for by some
set of governing rules or moral principles". (19)
It might be suggested that this analysis is of no relevance in
elucidating the nature of liberties, powers and immunities and hence
refers to only a sub-class of what are usually termed rights. Such a
criticism is not well-founded in that the activity of claiming seems
to have relevance within these categories too, although it plays a
19. J. Feinberg, 'The Ifeture and Value of Rights', op.cit., p.l55»
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slightly different role. The actual exercise of a liberty does
not involve a claim against others, but the infringement of a liberty,
or power or immunity by another party does indeed give rise to such a
claim for some form of remedy, compensation or redress. In the
absence of any such claims, there are no guarantees at all regarding
the relevant rights and hence it is not at all clear what having such
rights might mean. This idea is reflected in MacCorraick's assertion:
"That there is a realm of secured normative liberty
i3 what is essential to there being rights to act
or refrain from acting". (20)
Further on in the same article the argument continues as follows:
"What is being stressed is that primary rights
require remedial rights and remedial rights are
characteristically ones which do have corresponding
duties - the duty to afford the remedial action.
That a claim for a justified remedy is itself a
justified claim gets on for being a tautology". (21)
It would seem that the activity of claiming is central to the concept
of rights, although claims stand in a different relation to the various
kinds of rights. Such an account of the relationship between claims
and rights seems to underlie a recent warning advanced against
equating claims and rights on the grounds that such an equation gives
rise to confusion. Tom Campbell argues:
20. D.N. MacCormick, 'Bights, Claims and Remedies', Law and
Philosophy 1, 2 (1982), p.33^»
21. ibid., p.355-
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"Rights can serve to justify certain claims or demands,
hence their close association, particularly where
rights are being violated. It is easy, therefore, to
think of rights as species of claims. But this too
confuses the claim with its possible justification.
A right is not a justified claim, but it may justify
a claim". (22)
This criticism seems to rest on the recognition of the fact that one
may have a claim to something, because one has a right to it. In
other words, the right may be prior to the claim. However this
point could be conceded by Feinberg without weakening his central
observation that to have a right is to have a particular kind of claim.
Indeed, as Campbell points out, Feinberg himself observes the dangers
of circularity in defining rights and claims in terms of one another
and rather uses the analysis of the activity of claiming as a means of
elucidating the notion of what it is to have a right. With regard to
defining the two concepts in terms of each other, Feinberg states:
"... if we are after a 'formal definition' of the
usual philosophical sort, the game is over before it
has begun and we can say that the concept of a right
is a 'simple, undefinable, unanalysable primitive'.
Here as elsewhere in philosophy this will have the
effect of making the commonplace seem unnecessarily
mysterious. We would be better advised not to
attempt a formal definition of either 'right* or
'claim' but rather to use the idea of a claim in
INFORMAL ELUCIDATION * of the idea of a right". (23)
This seems to meet the criticism put forward by Campbell and
(2if)elsewhere by Alan White, and is the position adopted here.
22. T. Campbell, The Left and Rights (RKP ? London 1983) p.22
23. J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy, op.cit., p.6^.
A.R. White, 'Rights and Claims', Law and Philosophy 1, 2 (1982)
pp.315-336.
Footnote: * My capitals.
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However, the underlying unity of rights is perhaps best understood
not by reference to a common "normative element", but rather by
examining the role they play within the normative orders in which
they exist. Two theories will be contrasted here: the "choice
theory" and the "interest theory".
The Choice Theory
The choice theory of rights has been elucidated in a number of
articles by H.L.A. Hart. The articles all focus on the degree of
control conferred on the right-holder and see such control as a
necessary condition of having a right. Thus he writes:
"... to have a right entails having a moral
justification for limiting the freedom of another
person and for determining how he should act ...", (25)
and again in a later article:
"... what is sufficient and necessary is that he
(the right-holder) should have at least some measure
of the control ... over the correlative
obligation ..." (26)
One of the main criticisms levelled against such an account, is
that it automatically excludes those incapable of exercising such
control, from the class of right-holders. Hart acknowledges this
25. H.L.A. Hart, 'Are There Any Natural Bights?' Philosophical
Review (1955) p.183.
26. H.L.A. Hart, 'Bentham on Legal Bights' in A.W.B. Simpson (ed.)
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Second Series (Clarendon,
Oxford, 1973), P.196.
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point and his response to it has been modified over the years.
In the first article cited above, he states that it is misleading:
"... to extend to animals and babies whom it is
wrong to ill-treat the notion of a right to proper
treatment ..." (27)
The same ,one assumes, is the case with the sick and the temporarily
or permanently handicapped: they have no rights although others have
duties towards them. It was presumably unease with such a conclusion
that led Hart to qualify this position as follows:
"Where infants or other persons not sui juris have
rights, such powers and the correlative
obligations aire exercised on their behalf by
appointed representatives and their exercise may be
subject to approval by a court. But since (a) what
such representatives can and cannot do by way of
exercise of such power is determined by what those
whom they represent could have done if sui juris and
(b) when the latter become sui juris they can
exercise these powers ... the powers are regarded as
belonging throughout to than ..." (28)
This account is more satisfactory in relation to children than the
alternative cited above. However, it still fails to recognise
that there is an important distinction to be made between adults who
may be temporarily incapacitated from exercising their rights and
children who because of their limited capacities, have never
exercised any rights, but who will, one hopes, grow into adults
capable of doing so. Exercise of rights on behalf of the former
27. H.L.A. Hart, 'Are There Any Natural. Sights?* op.cit.,
p.l8l.
28. H.L.A. Hart, 'Bentham on Legal Sights' op.cit., pp.192-3,
Footnote 86.
to.
should be by reference to what is known about the way in which they
would choose if fit to do so, exercise of rights on behalf of children
is impossible on this criterion, for they have yet to make the relevant
choices. It would seem that the only factors to be considered are the
necessary conditions of becoming adults capable of exercising such
choice - such factors cannot be viewed as grounds of rights on the
choice theory. This is one of the main arguments for proposing an
alternative theory of rights. However, before discussing the
alternative account, there is a second criticism of the choice theory
which would seem to highlight its inadequacies even further, for it is
made with respect to what sire often considered the most fundamental
rights of both adults and children. This will be explained below.
If "choice" or the exercise of a measure of autonomy are viewed as
necessary conditions of the existence of a right, then in any
situations forbidding such a choice, there can be no rights. The
point has been well illustrated as follows:
the law relating to assault prohibits any person
from offering or inflicting physical interference or
harm on another. A had a duty not to interfere with
B. So far as concerns the 'will theory', B has a
•right not to be harmed' only if and insofar as he, B,
can in some way regulate A's duty not to interfere
with him. That seems all very well; in relation to
minor interference, or manly sports or bona-fide
surgical operations, B can waive A's duties. So for
the 'will theory', B has a right not to be trivially
assaulted, or assaulted in the course of manly sports,
or assaulted by a sturgeon conducting an operation.
Yet in relation to serious assaults, or 'unmanly'
pastimes .... or operations by unqualified persons,
no valid consent can be given which releases the
assaulting party from the duty of non-interference.
kl.
It is rather bewildering to suppose that none of
us has a right not to be thus grievously assaulted,
simply because ... the law denies us the power to
consent to these grave interferences with our
physical security". (29)
There are many more examples where such a strange conclusion would
follow. It is compulsory to vote in Australia. Children in most
jurisdictions are required to attend school. In socialist states, as
pointed out by Campbell, there is an enforceable duty to work, indeed
(30)
most so-called "socialist rights" are "non-waivable". According
to Hart's analysis it would follow that Australians have a duty, but
no right to vote; that children similarly have a duty but no right to
receive education, that the people in the relevant countries do not
have a right to work and so on. Hart's response to these
observations is to acknowledge that:
"... the notion of a legally respected individual
choice, cannot be taken as exhausting the notion,
of a legal right ..." (31)
Immunities or immunity rights are seen as falling outwith the scope
of his analysis. Hart claims that he has not provided a theory of
relevance to the whole field of rights, but rather:
"... a general theory in terms of the notion of a
legally respected individual choice which is
satisfactory only at one level - the level of the
lawyer concerned with the working of the 'ordinary'
law". (32)
29. D.N. MacCormick, 'Rights in Legislation' in P.M.S. Hacker and
J. Raz (eds.) Law, Morality and Society (Clarendon, Oxford,
1977) p-197.
30. Tom Campbell, op.cit., p.190.
31. H.L.A. Hart, 'Bentham on Legal Rights', op.cit., p.l97«
32. ibid., p.201.
It is believed here that a theory which could be "satisfactory" at
this and further levels and which in particular could provide a
more adequate account of the rights of children, would on these
grounds alone, be a sounder theory. It is also believed that the
interest theory provides just such an account.
The Interest Theory
A very general summary of the interest theory has been provided
in the following terms:
"... to ascribe to all members of a class C a right
to treatment T is to presuppose that T is, in all
normal circumstances, a good for every member of C,
and that T is, a good of such importance that it
would be wrong to deny it to or withhold it from any
member of C. That as for moral rights: as for
legal rights I should say this: when a right to T
is conferred by law on all members of C, the law is
envisaged as advancing the interests of each and
every member of C on the supposition that T is a
good for every member of C, and the law has the
effect of making it legally wrongful to withhold T
from any member of C". (33)
Such an account not only embraces all the Hohfeldian categories but
in addition, the choice theory as presented above, for within the
framework of the interest theory, freedom of choice can be
recognised as a good or an interest, but it is a good among others
and as such may come into conflict with them and in certain cases
be overridden. Here lies the resolution of the apparent paradox
posed by the choice theory, namely that a non-waivable right is not
a right at all. Under the interest theory, compulsory work can be
accurately described as a right:
33. D.N. MacCormick, 'Children's Rights : A Test Case for Theories
of Right', op.cit., p.311.
... insofar as it enables the individual to develop
himself ..." (3*0
As with the duty to work, so too with compulsory education, which
can be defended in terms of the child's right to self-fulfilment.
Since the areas of legal compulsion are far greater with respect to
the child than the adult, the law may be seen as reflecting the view
that freedom of choice is a less desirable good with respect to
children than with respect to adults. The grounds for this view
will be discussed further in the next chapter. It is sufficient to
point out here that freedom of choice is no good at all to those
incapable of exercising such choice. It is one of the advantages of
the interest theory that it clearly elucidates how and why such
individuals may nevertheless be said to have rights. The main
problems for such an account are first the identification of the
relevant interests and second the inevitability of conflict between
such secured interests. The nature of interests is the theme of
Chapter 3 but it may be helpful to say a little here about interests
and their relationship to rights within the framework of the interest
theory.
At the most general level rights can be regarded as high priority
interests or needs (the two are regarded as interchangeable for the
present), which are of such importance that they axe protected by moral
and legal rules. The actual interests protected in this way may vary
from one society to another and within a society with respect to
different classes of right-holders, in particular, in the context of
3^. Tom Campbell, op.cit., p.188.
this thesis, with respect to children and adults. The point has
already been alluded to briefly. Few would deny that all humans
have an interest in health and an interest in freedom of choice.
However inasmuch as the law allows adults fair wider discretion with
respect to harming their health than it accords children, a child's
right to health is implicitly regarded as more important than the child's
right to freedom of choice. Whether or not such a distinction with
respect to children and adults is justified, will be discussed in the
next chapter. The important point to note here is that there is scope
for disagreement at two different levels; first in identifying the
interests embraced by actual or potential rights and second in ranking
them in the event of a conflict. It is held here that much of the
confusion within the field of juvenile justice stems from the fact that
in taking actual decisions about children, these two processes
(identification and ordering) are carried out almost unconsciously and
are only rarely made explicit, so that the real grounds of disagreement
are seldom revealed. These points are explored further in Chapter 5-
In conclusion it will perhaps be helpful to summarise the theory of
rights adopted throughout the following chapters.
The unity of rights reflected in the interest theory has been
(35)
analysed by MacCormick, in terms of five common features, the first
three of which are equally applicable to the choice theory, which has
been rejected here partly on the grounds that it excludes certain
individuals, particularly children, from the class of right-holders,
and partly because it cannot, without contradiction, explain the
35- D.N. MacCormick, 'Rights, Claims and Remedies', op.cit.,
^5.
existence of non-waivable rights. The five common elements in the
order presented by MacCormick are as follows: first, rights exist,
if they exist at all, within normative orders. Second, "rights vest
in individuals" (including collectivities such as trade unions,
schools etc.). Third, the rules relevant to the ascription of rights
apply to individuals "severally" but are nevertheless universal or
general in character. Fourth, rights axe seen as relating to
"individual goods, in the sense of 'things' which
are normally considered good for normal
individuals". (36)
Such an assessment depends partly on individual wants and partly on
more objective evaluations of the needs of individuals. * Finally,
only the interests or 'goods' secured under the miles or principles of
the relevant normative order can be termed rights. Other acknowledged
goods fall outwith the class of rights. It is therefore important to
understand the ways in which the relevant interests are secured. Four
ways are identified in MacCorraick's account: first of all there must
be clear statements of what it is wrong to do and hence by implication
of what one may freely do without censure or disapprobation. Second
in some contexts, the securing of the relevant interests involves the
exercise of a "normative power". In such cases, the normative order
acts to ensure that such exercise is respected. Third, rights are
36. ibid., p.338.
Footnote: "MacCormick's account seems marginally deficient here in
that he regards interests as solely "want-regarding".
It will be argued in Chapter 3 that in the case of the very
young this is impossible and that even in the case of adults
able to articulate their wants fully, interests cannot and
should not be defined solely by reference to such wants.
secured by imposing duties on others to act or refrain from acting
in specified ways. Fourth, if rights are to be effective at all
in guiding actions, there must be restrictions on the ability to make
unilateral changes with respect to "the norms under which rights are
constituted".
It has been noted repeatedly that one of the attractions of such
an account is that both adults and children can be seen to be equally
well qualified candidates for the class of right-holders. However,
even under such a theory it remains an open question whether or not the
two groups can be said to hold the same rights. There are at least
three possible approaches to the resolution of this issue and they form
the subject matter of the next chapter. It is one of the strengths of
the interest theory of rights that it is consistent with the adoption
of any one of the three alternatives.
CHAPTER 2
Towards a Theory of Children's Rights
"... that the right to form one's child's values,
one's child's life plan and the right to lavish
attention on that child are extensions of the
basic right not to be interfered with in doing
these things for oneself ..."
(C. Pried, Right and Wrong (Harvard, Cambridge, 1978)
p.152)
"We are not speaking of children, or of young persons
below the age which the law may fix as that of
manhood or womanhood. Those who sire still in a
state to require being tsiken care of by others, must
be protected against their own actions as well as
against external injury".
(J.S. Mill, On Liberty in Everyman Edition (Dent,
London, 1%^, p.73)
"The incapacity of the child in infancy should only
mean that extra steps must be taken to guarantee the
protection of his rights".
(R. Hhrson, Birthrights (Penguin, U.S.A. 1978),
p.73)
The quotations heading this chapter reflect three different
perspectives on the status of childhood, giving rise to three
corresponding theories of children's rights. These theories will
be termed "parentalist", "protectionist" and "child-libertarian"
respectively. It should be noted that of the three authors cited
above, only Ihrson is concerned specifically with questions about
children and children's rights. However the views of each are taken
as representative of a different school of thought relating to children.
In addition Pried, Mill and Parson have similar views of the adult
individual as a rational, self-determining, autonomous agent, to whom
respect is due "as end in himself."The quotations are seen as
1. See X.Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, in
H.J. Paton, The Moral law (hutchxnson, London, l^eA) especially
pp.100-102.
providing the framework for a theoretical discussion of children's
rights, in particular (as explained in the Introduction) for
addressing the questions of whether children and adults have the same
rights or distinct sets of rights or whether there is an area of
overlap, and of how such rights are to be identified and articulated.
These questions form the subject matter of the first part of the
chapter. The second part will attempt to increase understanding
of these themes by approaching the issue of children's rights from a
quite different direction, namely the law relating to children.
This section will focus primarily on descriptive questions: What
rights does the law (primarily in Scotland) accord to children? How
do the civil and criminal law compare in this area? Do the different
branches of the law vary in their views of childhood in the manner of
the quotations at the beginning of the chapter? In other words, do
they enshrine different approaches towards children? In order to
limit the discussion in advance, three areas of law will be singled
out: compulsory education; the criminal law as it applies to young
offenders dealt with by the courts; and thirdly custody and access
in matrimonial disputes. The aim is not to provide an overview of
the law relating to children, but rather to indicate how the
theoretical arguments might be applied to provide for greater
consistency and coherency in the law. It is hoped that after
approaching the subject from these two perspectives an "equilibrium"
can be reached and hence a contribution made towards articulating a
theory of children's rights that will serve both to resolve some
current disputes and to suggest a basis for more effective provision
for juvenile justice in the future.
The Theoretical Arguments
Parentalism, protectionism and child-libertarianism are seen
here as the starting point for a discussion of the theoretical and
conceptual issues relating to the rights of children. It has
already been stated (p. V?) that all three share a common conception
of what it means to be a person. It would seem from this that they
must also share a minimal conception of those rights which have been
(2)
termed "passive negative rights". These include the right not to
be tortured, enslaved, degraded or exploited and do not rely in any
way on merit. They are regarded as unforfeitable and "non-
conflictable", that is they cannot conflict with each other and take
precedence when conflicting with other kinds of right. They have
their origin in a conception of what it means to be human and are in
a sense "groundless". Evidence for the existence of such rights lies
in the well-worn example that when someone is seen drowning, onlookers
do not stop to inquire into the individual's moral, intellectual and
social standing before attempting a rescue, and if they did, most
people would agree that the individual in question had been wronged.
It seems self-evident that if all human beings have these rights,
children have them too. It is at this point that the parting of the
ways occurs for the parentalists, protectionists and child-
libertarians .
The parentalists acknowledge that children have rights to care,
protection and education in their own interests, but provided there
is no violation of the human rights described above, it is parents who
2. J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1973)
p.83.
can and should identify the relevant interests. Child-libertarians
on the other hand argue that children have no special rights arising
from their perceived helplessness and dependency. On the contrary,
children have or should have exactly the same rights as adults. No
distinction should be made between the two groups. Both views are
problematic. The first assumes that a child's interests are knowable
and in addition largely ignores the fact that from a very early age
the child has a distinct character and viewpoint of his own which
cannot be simply ignored whenever it conflicts with parental desires
and opinions. The second view rejects as irrelevant the fact that a
child's capacities are not yet fully developed and fails to recognise
that the right to develop these capacities may conflict irreconcilably
with the rights it advocates, such as the right to choose whether or
not to receive formal education. The confusions in both views raise
several theoretical and empirical issues. Bie following discussion
will attempt to examine some of the problems arguing that a modified
protectionism offers the possibility of reconciling the positive
aspects of each position.
It has been noted (p.^9) that Fried, Mill and Farson have similar
views of the individual as a rational, self-determining, autonomous
agent. It is hard to see how a child could ever become such a person
on the first view. Where a child is regarded more or less as an
extension of its parents (as in the quotation heading this chapter)
how is the transition from dependent to independent individual ever to
be achieved? This is a conceptual as well as a practical problem.
At the practical level it is very unclear how anyone who had had a
"life plan" drawn up on his/her behalf and had never made decisions
concerning him/herself could ever learn to do so. Conceptually
it remains perplexing that one should argue from the facts of
biological reproduction and unquestioned helplessness to an
existence sis an extension of one's natural parents smd a right of
total control (within the limits set by the human rights outlined
above). It suggests a picture of the child as some kind of robot -
it can act on its own but only when programmed to do so. It would
be unfair in the extreme to attribute such a view to Fried but the
central question which he,and indeed Mill avoid is: 'What rights
(freedoms for Mill), if any, belong to a developing individual?1
Fried and Mill do not discuss this problem, while Ehrson seems to
regard it as almost irrelevant; the child (for Farson) has the same
rights as an adult and because of his/her limitations may need to have
them protected in the same way as an adult who has fallen ill or is in
some other way temporarily incapacitated. In other words Ehrson does
not regard children's limited abilities as in any way relevant in
determining their rights.
It is interesting to note that the relevance or otherwise of the
developmental nature of childhood is a key factor in the controversy
between the advocates of the "welfare model" (who support a treatment
ideology), and the champions of the right to punishment or "justice
model" in the sphere of juvenile justice. The welfare view regards
the 'immaturity* of juveniles as the key factor in determining how to
deal with than, the opposition claims that this is of no relevance at
all and that measures taken should be based on the principle of
•equality before the law* which should be applicable to all offenders
irrespective of age. Thujas indicated in the Introduction (p. 5), the
former regard children's rights as definable in terms of specific
objective needs and interests, while the latter claim that basing
decisions on such dubious criteria is a violation of generally
acknowledged moral rights which are being systematically denied to
children. How, if at all, can the conflict be resolved? An
attempt will be made to approach the problem with reference to a
number of examples concerning behaviour that is central to growing
up and which can be either morally neutral or a key part of an
individual's value-system, the case of eating habits. It is hoped
that the cases will prove useful since they exemplify a number of
different types of conflict between adults and children in an area
that assumes significance from birth. The only indisputable fact is
that children need food to grow into adults, how much and what kind
of nourishment is well beyond the scope of this discussion. Several
cases will be outlined and comments will be made on what seems
intuitively obvious in them, in the belief that they will shed some
light on the question of children's rights. In each case an attempt
will also be made to assess what 'parentalists' like Fried or
'protectionists* like Mill and 'child-libertarians' like Farson might
say.
CASE 1
A two year old who decides to stop eating altogether and starts to lose
weight.
Comment:
The child cannot be allowed to persist even if prevention
means hospitalisation. This presents no problems at all
for parentalists and protectionists and libertarians would
undoubtedly not favour self-destruction but would somehow
need to explain that though 'free' the child is not free to
do that. It is debatable whether an adult should be
allowed to act in this way.
CASE 2
A six year old diabetic who declares that her pocket money is hers to
spend as she wishes and she intends to spend it all on sweets.
Comment:
There seems no doubt that any measure short of violation of
•passive negative rights* would be legitimate to stop this
child from carrying out her intention. As in Case 1, this
presents no problem for parentalists or protectionists, but
is highly problematic for libertarians who think that
children of all ages should have the same earning and spending
power as adults.
CASE 3
A two year old (my son!) who wants a diet of breakfast cereal, milk,
bread, fresh fruit and an occasional egg yolk.
Comment:
Assuming that the child is growing (as he did) and that there
are no gross deficiencies in the diet (as there are not) he
should be allowed to choose to eat in this unorthodox way.
There are no pragmatic grounds against this. It doesn't,
for example, create difficulties for the cook. In practice,
all efforts at persuasion to enjoy other equally delicious
foods will be (and indeed were) counterproductive. Finally,
although the child may not have adopted a reasoned position,
what he wants is clearly not unreasonable. Parentalists and
protectionists might well recommend taking measures to
achieve a more balanced diet, libertarians would allow the
child total freedom of choice.
CASE k
A two year old who announces that meat is horrible and she is a
vegetarian although (a) it is clear she does not know the difference
between meat and vegetables and (b) she has in fact never tasted meat.
Comment:
It seems clear that there are no grounds at all for
accommodating this child's declared preferences and it
would not be unreasonable to feed her meat and tell her
that one had done so after she obviously enjoyed it.
Parentalists and protectionists would clearly adopt this
view. Libertarians again would have difficulty in
justifying behaviour that failed to respect the child's
position.
CASE 5
A four year old who wants to be vegetarian because she thinks that it
is cruel to kill animals.
Comment:
Where this child is a member of a meat-eating family it
seems that once the family has put the argument against
vegetarianism it would be wrong to force her to eat meat.
She may well come to change her views in the future but
once again (as in Case 3) the position is not unreasonable
and is certainly reasoned to a degree. One might question
it where the same child was seen pulling wings out of flies!
Parentalists and protectionists might adopt this attitude.
Libertarians might well consider it an infringement of
liberty to even attempt to dissuade the child.
CASE 6
A child (of any age) born into a strictly vegetarian family announces
she wants to eat meat.
Comment:
There can be no doubt that if the rest of the family consider
meat eating to be wrong, they are under no obligation to
accede to her wishes. However, a question still remains
about the times she eats away from home - this is certainly
something subject to only very limited control (in school
perhaps) and it is highly controversial. Parentalists and
protectionists would clearly recommend strict control and
libertarians complete freedom of choice. It could be argued
(not by libertarians) that the age of the child should
prompt different responses. What if the family regard
meat eating as dangerous to the child's spiritual well-
being as sugar is to the physical well-being of the
diabetic? This example raises the whole issue of
parental rights.
CASE 7
A 13 year old in a non-orthodox but practising Jewish family wants
to adhere rigidly to the dietary laws that the family has rejected.
Comment;
This example is not intended as an opening for prolonged
theological disputation but merely to point out that it
can be forcefully argued that the parents should agree to
the request despite the considerable inconvenience involved,
because the child is in fact adopting their value-system
and adhering to it more rigidly than they are. Parents
cannot reasonably send their children to Hebrew school where
one is taught (among other things) the dietary laws and then
refuse to allow the child to comply with them.
Parentalists and protectionists might well think that the
child's view should be ignored, libertarians would want to
respect it, but only because it is the child's view, not
because it is the direct outcome of parental teaching.
The seven cases outlined above seem to indicate quite clearly
that neither the parentalist nor the protectionist (who like the
parentalist sees children in need of special care and protection and
articulates specific rights in terms of needs and interests but
independently of parental rights) nor the child-libertarian (who makes
no distinction between adults and children with respect to rights) can
give fully a satisfactory account of children's rights. The
protectionist fails to take into consideration firstly, that from a
very early age a child may have a very distinct viewpoint of its own
which ought to be taken into consideration unless it is obviously
detrimental to its development (as in the case of the hunger-striker
(Case l) and Case 2 of the diabetic)and secondly that except in such
extreme cases, very little is known about what in fact constitutes a
child's needs and interests. This could hardly be more clearly
illustrated than in the case of food. The more orthodox child care
books declare: 'children need a balanced diet' and proceed to
recommend daily doses of vitamins, protein and so on. Repeated
experiments (cited by Dr Spock for example) ^ show clearly that
children left to choose their meals from a wide selection of "wholesome
foods" will in fact 'balance their diet* over a period of time. They
may eat bananas for a week and then proceed to eggs and apples, but
when left alone with a choice, most children take what they need.
One suspects that the same may be the case in areas other than food!
The child-libertarians would extend the analogy to all spheres but it
is here that they appear to ignore at least two important points.
First the undeveloped capacities of a child do seem relevant in the
ascription of rights to children, although perhaps not to the degree
claimed by the protectionists. Secondly, children are not born into
some kind of vacuum but into families with their own values and
viewpoints, which is not merely a contingent factor. As Fried says:
"The child's most intimate values and determinants ...
must come from somewhere. The child cannot choose
them - rather, they choose the child". (*0
3. Benjamin Spock, Baby and Child Care (New English Library,
London, 1969), pp.253-255.
k, Co Fried, Right and Wrong (Harvard, Cambridge, 1978), p.15^.
In other words, values cannot be placed on a table like different
varieties of food. Even if one were to remove children at birth and
allow them to grow up communally in an identical environment, it is
impossible to conceive of what it would mean to allow them to grow up
with complete freedom of choice. How is a child to choose between
Christianity, Judaism and Atheism if it has not experienced any of
than? What would it mean to allow it to experience all three? The
most that 'free choice* can mean in this area, is a freedom to reject
what has been experienced and to attempt to live other religions or
none at all, it cannot mean a choice from an initially neutral
position. This argument can be extended to the whole sphere of
education. Farson feels that this too should be entirely optional.
While quite prepared to concede that much of what goes on in the name
of 'compulsory education* is antithetical to any kind of learning, it
seems a mistake to argue from here to advocacy of an entirely voluntary
system. To allow a child not to learn to read for example ,seems to
deny it implicitly many of the other rights Farson supports, namely:
the right to information, the right to vote, the right to economic
power - these rights seem to have very limited application in a modern
technological society if it does not ensure that its members can read.
Can these reflections be documented in a more rigorous way to form a
coherent theory of children's rights?
In the discussion of rights in the previous chapter, it was
suggested (p. 30) that at their most general level rights can be viewed
as generating different obligations. It has been argued that the
relationship between rights and obligations can be defined in at least
two different ways:
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Cl) "'A* has a right to 'X* implies everyone has an obligation
not to interfere with A's obtaining or exercising X"
or
(2) "'A' has a right to 'X' implies someone has an obligation
to help A obtain or exercise X". (5)
It is proposed by Cohen that under (2) the individual(s) obligated
and the extent of the obligation must be specified for each right.
Cohen suggests that:
"... while non-interference Cl) and performance (2)
may provide some sort of continuum of obligations,
there are many cases in which the obligations attending
the right go well beyond stepping aside". (6)
To return briefly to the case of food - to say that a baby has a
right to food is clearly absurd where (l) is considered the central
*
definition of a right (as with the Choice Theory summarised in
Chapter l), it has quite different implications where (2) is
adopted as the relevant account of a right. Moreover both (l) and
(2) can be applied to those 'goods' which adherents of the Choice
Theory would themselves acknowledge as rights. Thus Cohen points out
that the right to defence at a trial for example has been interpreted
in the past as what he calls a right of "non-interference", a right
to prepare a defence unimpeded, and more recently as a right of
"performance" that is the provision of a defence for those unable to
secure one. Cohen suggests that it might be advantageous to grant
5. Howard Cohen, 'Children and Privacy' in R. Bronaugh (ed.)
Philosophical Law (Greenwood, Westport, 1978), pp.195-6.
6. ibid., p.196.
Footnote: * Choice Theory could however accommodate (2) above with
respect to most adults.
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children rights as rights of performance wherever there is a
(justified) reluctance to grant them the same rights as adults.
Thus to cite his own example:
"... to say that a child has a right to privacy is
to say that someone has an obligation to help the
child exercise it ... It ought to be someone who
does not have a conflict of interest with the child
and who is committed to using the occasion of the
exercise of a right to develop the child's
capacities for self-determination". (7)
criterion for Cohen in ascribing rights to children is
or not such an ascription will increase (or at least not
their ability to exercise the rights they will have as
"In short, children ought to learn to exercise those
rights in becoming adults that they will later
exercise as adults - so long as doing this improves
rather than retards the capacities in question". (8)
Hence children have firstly "passive negative rights" (not argued
by Cohen, but he too would undoubtedly agree that torture for example
is not a permissible way of "developing capacities" even where it is
claimed to do so) and secondly they hold all the rights that adults
have as "non-interference rights" as "performance rights". This
appears an attractive solution, the only problem is that it is one
to which the protectionists and the child-libertarians would both
happily agree. There no longer seems to be a dilemma. Is this a








The protectionists would point out (accurately) that Cohen is
saying that rights should be granted to children whenever this does
not impede their development into self-determining adults. If
giving rights to children actually enhances their development then
their exercise should be positively encouraged. The child-
libertarians would stress that Cohen acknowledges that development is
advanced by experience, for than the relevant experience seems to be
precisely granting equal rights to children and adults. The force of
the two arguments now appears to rest on empirical premisses. Hie
protectionists are prepared to give rights provided they are conducive
to development. The child-libertarians see all rights as conducive
to development. It remains only to examine children raised in the
context of the two approaches and to assess which are the more
autonomous, mature, responsible adults. Or does it? A central
argument put forward by the child-libertarians against the
protectionists is that growing up is not a problem but a dilemma.
Problems are amenable to solution, not so dilemmas. Farson cites one
Abraham Kaplan:
"Rearing a child is like having a romance, it is
not a set of problems to be solved, but a
relationship to be experienced". (9)
A relationship moreover where all involved have something to learn
and something to teach. In contrast the protectionists view
'growing up* as a problem whose solution if not known, is at least
9. R. Farson, Birthrights (Penguin, IJSA, 1978) p.29.
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knowable. Children have specific needs and interests and once
these have been established they must form the basis of adults'
behaviour towards them.
Farson states:
"It is time to admit that no one knows how to grow
people". (10)
If it is time to admit also that no one ever could know "how to grow
people", that part of what it means to be a person, is precisely
that there could never be a set formula or recipe for successful
maturation (the term is used advisedly, for 'growing older* unlike
'maturation' remains inevitable), the protectionists can be accused
of committing a category mistake, not only do children's needs and
interests beyond the most basic food and care remain unknown, the
search for further knowledge in this sphere is misguided. In support
of this claim, the child-libertarians can point out that some of the
world's most revered people have had the most appalling childhood
experiences and that often those from caring, loving environments
grow into dissatisfied and irresponsible adults. To give a more
specific example from the Scottish hearing system: it was recently
revealed by the deputy principal of one of the roughest schools in
Edinburgh, that in a recent year (1980) well under 150 children had
been referred to the Reporter as possibly in need of compulsory
measures of care and that under 50 were in fact deemed to be so. *
10. Farson, op.cit., p.29.
Footnote: * These figures were given in confidence. It is therefore
inappropriate to cite the name of the school.
62.
There are almost 1,000 children in the schoolj it is located in an
area of multiple deprivation, with high unemployment, a high rate of
crime, alcoholism, violence and marital break-up. This should not
be taken as a recommendation for studied neglect, but rather as
evidence for the view that many (the child-libertarians might say
most) children seem to develop into fairly responsible people despite
the adults most immediately involved with their well-being and not
because of them. However, if this is indeed so, the child-
libertarians' case is at most 'not proven'. These observations seem
to attest to nothing more than the resilience of many children. They
do not explain why the undisputed differences between adults and
children sure morally irrelevant. Furthermore, part of the force of
the child-libertarian claim lies in a quite different assertion, namely
that:
"Only in being given responsibility can children
become mature adults and not simply grow older". (ll)
But this is a claim of the very same kind that has previously been
rejected on the grounds that child-rearing is not among the category
of knowable techniques or arts. If it could indeed be shown that
children mature by being given responsibility, the protectionists
would advocate the ascription of the relevant rights as readily as the
child-libertarians. Where the disagreement is seen to rest on
empirical grounds it can be resolved. However it should now be
apparent that the conflict is essentially one about the status of
11. B. Farson, op.cit., p.173*
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childhood. The protectionists rest their case on the undisputed
dependency of the very young and view this as the most important
factor in dealing with children for most of their formative years.
The child-libertarians, while in no way denying the initial
dependency of infants regard this state as an argument for providing
extra safeguards to achieve equal rights. Protectionists would argue
that at least some rights, to liberty for example, are ascribed only
to self-determining autonomous individuals and are therefore
inappropriate to the status of childhood, but that the young have
special rights to care and protection which are not accorded to
independent adults. Reflections on day to day dealings with children
such as those presented in the examples on eating habits, seem to lend
considerable support to the protectionist argument, but the central.
dilemma still remains: if different rights are accorded to the
dependent and the independent and if childhood is seen as a journey
from dependency to independence, how can one decide which rights are to
be ascribed to children? The child-libertarian view avoids this
question altogether, but it should be clear that by doing so, it also
avoids the reality of childhood. Perhaps the starting point for a
more constructive approach should be a detailed examination of what are,
or at least might be considered, the relevant differences between
adults and children in the ascription of rights. 'Dependency' is not
only too vague a term, it is often used to support differential
treatment in a manner that begs the whole question at issue. A recent
(12)
book by Laurence Houlgate has highlighted some important aspects
12. Laurence Houlgate, The Child and the State (John Hopkins,
Baltimore, 1980).
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of this particular approach to according a different status to children
and adults. Houlgate's central concern is with the legal rights and
claims of children but much of his argument is equally applicable to
the moral sphere.
Houlgate examines five arguments for the ascription of different
rights to children and adults, in some detail. First the argument
from "actual moral agency"; second the argument from "potential moral
agency"; third the argument from "social contract"; fourth the
argument from "beneficence" and fifth the argument from "utility".
The first two view the child's lack of autonomy as the grounds for
denying certain rights to children, the other three consider the lack
of capacity for rational choice as the key factor. The second
capacity certainly seems a necessary condition of autonomy, but since
it may exist where the latter is absent, the discussion will follow
Houlgate in examining the two separately.
The argument from moral agency relies on the views expounded,
among others, by Kant and Locke. Locke in particular argues that
certain unique characteristics of moral agents are of peculiar
relevance to the ascription of rights. These include the ability to
reason and the abilities to be "self-determining" and "self-
legislating". Locke is quite certain that children do not possess
these abilities and therefore do not have the corresponding rights to
liberty and property. These views are clearly set down in "Of Paternal
Power".
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"The freedom, then, of man, and liberty of acting
according to his own will, is grounded on his
having reason which is able to instruct him in
that law he is to govern himself by and make him
know how far he is left to the freedom of his own
will. To turn him loose to an unrestrained
liberty before he has reason to guide him is not the
allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free,
but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and abandon
him to a state as wretched and as much beneath that
of a man, as theirs". (13)
It is clear that Locke felt it was inappropriate to talk of a child's
moral right to liberty primarily because he did not regard the child
as a moral agent. Houlgate points out that this claim is not at all
self-evident:
"... there is ample evidence to prove that even very
young children possess the capacity to formulate
plans and to execute them independently ..." (1*0
Moreover studies of moral development show that children round 13 years
of age can apply moral rules. Thus even if the very young sire not
moral agents, children well below the age of majority should be (and
often are) regarded as such. Secondly, the connection between
autonomy and moral rights remains unclear. There may be some rights
which require autonomy as a precondition, but Feinberg's "passive
negative rights" (see p. ^9) for example, fall outside this scope.
Autonomy is not considered a condition of the right not to be tortured
or enslaved. It is not a morally relevant factor in distinguishing
13. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government
(Blackwell, Oxford, 19%) pp.31-32.
1^. L. Houlgate, op.cit., p.53.
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adults and children here, how can it be so in other areas? When
(if at all) does it become relevant? In addition it might be noted
that few adults are fully autonomous, that is, acting in accordance
with self-accepted principles, but this on its own is never regarded
as sufficient grounds for denying them moral rights, so why should it
be so in the case of children? Is the argument from "potential moral
agency" more useful in articulating a morally relevant difference
between adults and children?
Houlgate suggests that one might wish to argue that since children:
"... uniquely possess the potential for developing
into beings with autonomous will ..." (15)
one might wish to ascribe to them:
"... the right to be provided the conditions that
will allow them to become beings who are self-
determining and self-legislating". (16)
Does potentiality provide the necessary criterion for ascribing
different moral rights to adults and children? There are several
weaknesses to be considered here. Firstly (as Houlgate observed)
mere potential is not usually considered sufficient grounds for the
provision of conditions to fulfil that potential. What of the potential
sadist? Is the argument confined to potential moral agency? Houlgate
feels uneasy since this might become an argument against all forms of
abortion and contraception. The point is hardly conclusive. Perhaps
15. L. Houlgate, op.cit., p.56.
16. ibid.,
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"potential moral agency" is not a sufficient condition for the right
to development, but it is certainly a necessary condition of any such
right and may well provide the relevant difference that needs to be
established in defining specific rights for children. Ihe case must
ultimately rest on some kind of description of what it means to be a
moral agent and to reach maturity. This will necessarily rest on
perfectionist considerations which will indicate the kind of potential
that bestows a right to its fulfilment, as well as on empirical
observations on development. Arguments appealing to children's lack
of moral development remain inconclusive and in need of further
examination. First, however, a brief look at the relevance of the
"capacity for rational choice". Children's assumed lack of this
capacity is the basis for denying them rights accorded to adults in
the arguments from beneficence, utility and social contract. It will
be shown that this capacity on its own cannot serve as a basis for a
separate theory of juvenile rights but this conclusion in no way
eliminates the need for such a theory.
Two questions are rightly regarded as central by Houlgate. First
it is necessary to indicate what it means to say that a person or class
of people has or lacks the capacity for rational choice. Second one
must examine the evidence for asserting that children lack this
capacity. Houlgate points out the need to distinguish between "correct"
and "reasonable" choices. The reasonable choice is not necessarily
the correct one and the correct one may in certain circumstances even
appear unreasonable. Houlgate adds further that although adults and
children are often in possession of the same evidence, children seem
to
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"attach incorrect evaluative weights to the
relevant facts". (17)
Consider the child who wants to wear summer clothes in the snowi
An assessment of the claim that children lack the capacity for rational
choice must involve decisions on the choices that reasonable people
would make in different situations, but this in turn is dependent on
a whole evaluative framework providing (once again) a view of ideal
development and the goals it is reasonable and desirable for people to
attain. In the absence of any such theory, Houlgate declares that at
least some things must command almost universal assent as "reasonable
(l8 )
to pursue" and suggests that "survival" is one such thing.
Ignoring the contentious aspect of this assertion, one can ask (with
Houlgate) whether children lack the capacity to make choices that do
not seriously endanger their lives. One must distinguish here between
any disinclination and any actual inability that children may have,
only the latter implies that children don't understand the risks and
hence cannot choose to avoid them, that is, only the latter involves
the claim that children lack the cognitive capacity to understand.
It also often includes the assertion that children lack the
information needed for rational choice and the view that children's
inability to defer gratification prevents rational choice. It has
been argued that there is "no evidence" to support any of these claims
except in the case of the very young. Houlgate reminds the reader
17. L. Houlgate, op.cit., p.67.
13. ibid., p.68.
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that work based on Piaget suggests that children reach the highest
(ig)
stage of human cognitive development around 12 years of age.
Since the information available to children is often a function of
the extent to which adults have decided to withhold it, this point
becomes circular. Finally even the very young can defer
gratification when playing games, for example. The final point is
undoubtedly Houlgate's weakest. Children may indeed be able to defer
gratification, but without any further psychological experiments this
must be qualified with the statement: 'if they see the point in doing
so*. The fact is they frequently do not see the point. Perhaps
more importantly, children have a different concept of time. To
suggest even to an 11 or 12 year old that one can afford a third rate X
(tennis racket, electronic game or whatever) now, or a first class model
in six months' time, is to present him with a far more serious dilemma
than an adult in similar circumstances. Six months seems an eternity
to a child. It is moreover decisions with long-term consequences that
are so often involved in areas where there is a reluctance to grant
children freedom of choice: the choice of school, of medical
practitioner, of home for example. A child may want to go to a given
school because his/her best friend is going there. S/he can only
anticipate the short-term misery of separation rather than any long-
term benefits perceived by parents. Perhaps s/he even understands
his/her parents' reason for refusal, e.g. the friend is going to a
private school and they believe in state education, but s/he gives
these reasons a different weight. It does not require much
L. Houlgate, op.cit.,
imagination to give rational arguments on both sides, but the issue
cannot be settled on objectively rational criteria divorced from an
evaluative framework, a conception of what is important in life, of
the kind of values the parents hope their children will adopt. It is
these things that a child even with the "capacity for rational choice"
so often lacks. Of course there may come a time when one has to
acknowledge sadly that one has failed to impart them and further
intervention is unjustifiable, but to deny the legitimacy of the
attempt is to misunderstand the nature of childhood.
The conclusions above are almost entirely negative. It will
perhaps be helpful here to indicate once more the direction in which a
more constructive approach to juvenile justice must move. It has been
suggested that the isolation of specific capacities as morally relevant
in denying certain rights to children, (and possibly ascribing other
rights to them) is unhelpful, except in the case of the very young.
Many children do indeed have the capacities of many adults. The key
difference would appear to lie not in any capacity, but rather in the
different perspectives of children and adults, perspectives of what is
important, of what is worthwhile, of time. There is no suggestion
here that the adults are always right, but they do have experience in
their favour. A theory of juvenile rights must ultimately accommodate
the concept of development and some kind of description of maturity as
that towards which development is directed. It is surely these
concepts which embrace the differences between adults and children that
constitute the grounds for ascribing varying rights to them. To
illustrate the practical implications of this kind of approach, the
concluding paragraphs of the discussion will examine an actual American
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case summarised in a recent book concerned with children's issues,
which will also serve as an introduction to an examination of some
aspects of the law.
*
In the matter of Seiferth (1955)
Martin Seiferth had a cleft palate and hare lip, his father
refused consent for surgery to rectify the condition because he
believed in "mental healing" by "letting the forces of the universe work
on the body". When the boy was 12 years old, the local Deputy
Commissioner of Health instituted proceedings to have Martin declared
a neglected child in order to transfer his custody to the County to
ensure that he would receive the necessary medical treatment. The
Children's Court Judge refused the request but the Appellate Division
granted the petition. The original decision was upheld in the state
Supreme Court by a margin of one.
Relevant facts
1. Surgical treatment for this condition is nearly always given
at a very early age (around 5 years) and the older the patient,
the less favourable the prognosis.
2. A surgeon testified to the effect that it was important to have
the operation young, but it could be done at any time. There
was no medical emergency. However, in twenty years of medical
practice he had never encountered a case which had been
neglected for so long.
20. Onora O'Neill and Wm. Ruddick (eds.) Having Children
(Oxford University Press, New York, 1979)» pp.138-1^.
Footnote: *The relevant citation is: In re Martin Seiferth jr.
309 N.Y.SO (1955)- However, due to difficulties in obtaining
complete copy of the original, references given here are all
Having Children cited above (reference 20).
3« In order for the surgery to be fully effective, patients
have to undergo extensive post-operative speech therapy.
Martin had been convinced by his father of the power of
"natural forces" and was totally opposed to surgery.
5. The father testified:
"If the child decides on an operation, I shall not
be opposed ... in a few years the child should
decide for himself ..." (20a)
The Children's Court Judge Wylegala concluded:
"After duly deliberating upon the psychological effect
of surgery upon this mature, intelligent boy,
schooled as he has been for all of his young years
in the existence of forces of nature and his fear of
surgery upon the human body, I have come to the
conclusion that no order should be made at this time
compelling the child to submit to surgery. His
condition is not emergent and there is no serious
threat to his health or life. He has time until he
becomes 21 years of age to apply for financial
assistance ... to have the corrections made. This
has also been explained to him after he made known
his decision to me". (20b)
The "decision" Martin made was taken after having had the medical
procedures explained to him at length, and having met other children
and medical staff involved in similar treatment. The majority
opinion of the Supreme Court ultimately upheld Wylegala's view,
stressing that without Martin's co-operation the treatment was
unlikely to be effective and such co-operation was thought to depend
on Martin's undergoing surgery voluntarily. The dissenting opinion
insisted that the case had to be viewed as one of neglect and that in
20a. Onora O'Neill and Wm. Ruddick, op.cit., p.lA-l.
20b. ibid., p.lA-2.
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the circumstances however desirable it might be to secure the child's
consent, it was in no way necessary:
"Neither by statute nor decision is the child's
consent necessary or material, and we should not
permit his refusal to agree, his failure to co¬
operate, to ruin his life and any chance for a
normal happy existence; normalcy and happiness,
difficult of attainment under the most propitious
conditions, will unquestionably be impossible if
the disfigurement is not corrected ... this is a
proceeding brought to determine whether the parents
are neglecting the child by refusing and failing to
provide him with necessary surgical, medical and
dental service. Whether the child condones the
neglect, whether he is willing to let his parents
do as they choose, surely cannot be operative on the
question as to whether or not they are guilty of
neglect ..." (20c)
This case raises most of the controversial areas of the preceding
discussion on children's rights. The child-libertarian and the
protectionist can both agree with the final ruling, but concurrence is
a far more complex matter for the protectionist. The child-
libertarian would oppose surgery solely because the child did not want
it. Had the child been in favour, this would have been sufficient
grounds for reversing the decision. A consistent child-libertarian
would adopt this procedure regardless of the child's age (although
presumably below a certain minimum a representative would have to be
appointed to present the child's probable views) and regardless of the
reasonableness of the child's views. Thus if a 12 year old boy whose
parents had consented to surgery, did not want it on grounds of beliefs
held independently of his parents, the child-libertarian would regard
carrying out an operation as a serious violation of the boy's rights.
20c. Onora O'Neill and Wm. Ruddick, op.cit., 1^3•
7^.
This view has the merit of consistency but it seems to run counter
to some very basic intuitions on appropriate behaviour towards
children.
The actual decision in the case of Seiferth was in fact taken
on protectionist grounds. Judge Wylegala certainly took Martin's
views into account, but his decision was based on the harm likely to
accrue where surgery was undertaken against his will, and on the fact
that the decision did not present an immediate threat and could be
reversed should Martin so wish. The Judge felt that the full benefit
of surgery could only be achieved with the boy's consent. It is
fairly clear that in the absence of a need for post-operative co¬
operation, Wylegala might well have reached the opposite conclusion.
The boy's views were thus only one problem among several, rather than
the overriding factor they constitute for the child-libertarian.
The dissenting opinion is also given in protectionist terms but
from a far more doctrinaire perspective. The underlying assumptions
here are: firstly that it is clear which action constitutes the
child's best interest, secondly that the child's opinion on the subject
is irrelevant, thirdly that the matter at hand is a clear case of
parental neglect and whatever rights parents may legitimately have
over their children they do not have the right to abuse them in this
way. Unfortunately none of these assertions is as uncontroversial as
it appears. It may well be clear that it is not in a child's interests
to have a cleft palate, but given that a particular child has developed
an overwhelming fear of surgery and adopted a belief system that
supports this fear, the issue becomes much cloudier. Similarly while
agreeing that the child's opinion may be irrelevant in some situations,
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for example where life is endangered, it is clear that this is not
such a case and that it is in fact his opinions which constitute the
major difficulty for successful intervention. Unless one is prepared
to take a strict deontological position advocating that treatment is
the right course of action irrespective of outcome, it is hard to see
how the child's view can be regarded as irrelevant. Finally although
one might wish to claim that parental views here are misguided, it
does not seem to be a clear case of parental neglect. The parents
hold strong principles and it is clear that they would wish to pass on
these principles to their children. Unless one wants to take the
extreme position that certain principles per se must disqualify
adherents from parenthood, one cannot regard teaching such principles
as constitutive of neglect. Perhaps this is the correct view, but
its consequences are far-reaching indeed, and would lead to an
intervention in adult life that many would find unacceptable. However
the dissenting opinion seems to capture one aspect that both the child-
libertarians and the majority view avoid, namely that some positions
are intrinsically more reasonable and more acceptable than others -
Fuld , J. who dissented, was prepared to articulate some conception
(however minimal) of what constitutes the good life.
"... normalcy and happiness, difficult of attainment
under the most propitious conditions, will
unquestionably be impossible if the disfigurement
is not corrected". (20d)
The view seems to be that with surgery the boy at least has a chance
of normalcy and happiness, without it, he has none. The view may be
20d. Onora O'Neill and Wm. Huddick, op.cit., p.1^3•
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controversial, but the issues are clear. A child cannot be allowed
to ruin his life chances. The child-libertarian position gives the
child the right to do just that. The protectionist, unlike the child-
libertarian cannot always come up with clear answers given ignorance
on how best to attain a full life, but where something is clearly not
constitutive of such a life - alcohol and drug abuse for example -
intervention is regarded as justifiable. In the Matter of Seiferth
can also be seen as just such a case. However the particular
difficulty of this case lies in the nature of the medical evidence.
If it is indeed true (and it would seem that at least one further
opinion should be sought on the matter) that the success of this
particular surgery depends on post-operative co-operation and that this
would almost certainly not be forthcoming, then compulsory surgery
would leave Martin physically no better off and psychologically worse
off. Consent in this case is peculiarly tied up with a successful
outcome. It seems to be a necessary constituent of effective
treatment - it is for this reason (and not because acting without the
boy's consent is a violation of his autonomy) that consent must be
sought. Having said this it should be stressed that in supporting
the ultimate decision, one should firstly admonish the parents,
secondly put the greatest possible pressure on the boy to change his
mind and finally inquire into why proceedings were not instituted much
earlier when the child's consent would not have been able to effect the
outcome in the same way. Perhaps the view presented here can be
clarified further by looking briefly at a hypothetical case.
In the Seiferth case, treatment of Martin's actual condition
required his co-operation. Presumably both his parents* and his own
views would have been identifical even where this was not the case.
However it will be argued that under such circumstances the dissenting
opinion most accurately reflects the truth of the matter. Consider
the situation if Martin had had two undescended testicles. * The
medical facts of this condition are that the operation is most likely
to be successful if performed under the age of about 6 years and that
if left until post-puberty the boy will certainly be sterile and
possibly impotent. The treatment involves minor surgery, 14 days in
bed and nothing further. Whilst reluctant (for reasons given above)
to call any refusal of surgery on the parents' part neglect, it would
indeed seem to be the case here that the child's consent or refusal is
immaterial and that the parents should be overruled, for it is clear
where his interest lies, whether or not he recognises it. Failure to
perform the operation constitutes a considerable diminution of life
chances. Even if as an adult such a boy were to choose not to have
children and/or to remain celibate, to narrow the range of his choices
and impose such a state at an early age seems indefensible - precisely
the kind of thing he cannot be allowed to do. It is for this reason
that his views sire in a sense 'immaterial'. But it is also because
the 'reasonable' view seems almost self-evident that if a child
demanded such an operation in opposition to his parents, he should be
given full support, not because he has demanded it, that is, not in
support of some liberty right, but because what he has demanded is
Footnote: * This is a condition that occurs not infrequently.
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clearly more constitutive of a full life than the alternative. *
The Legal Perspective
This section will be less comprehensive than the preceding one.
The aim is to examine the legal rights held by children in three
specific areas: compulsory education, the criminal law as it applies
to young offenders dealt with by the courts, and the issues of
custody and access in matrimonial disputes and to examine these areas
of the law in the light of the previous theoretical discussion. It
will be seen that the legal rights of children can sometimes be defended
from a protectionist and sometimes from a child-libertarian viewpoint,
but neither necessarily guarantees action in the child's best interest.
Once again the conclusions will be almost entirely negative, but it is
hoped that by revealing the sometimes conflicting attitudes of the
different areas of the law to children, a step can ultimately be made
towards indicating the direction in which future legislative measures
for children should move.
Footnote: * In a recent book on the problem of consent to medical
treatment for children (W. Gaylin and Buth Macklin (eds.)
Who Speaks for the Child? The Problems of Proxy Consent
(.Plenum Press, New York, 1982JJI, one of the contributors
suggests that the weight given to the views of both
parents and children should depend in part on an
assessment of the gains and risks involved. Thus where
the gains are high and the risks low as in the case of a
blood transfusion to save life perhaps, there can be no
right to refuse. Where both gains and risks are high,
as with a life-endangering operation to facilitate
walking for example, the state should not intervene on
behalf of the child and so on. The interesting point to
note is that once again, there is an implicit acceptance
of modified protectionism. Yet again the views of the
child are to be taken into account or rejected, not
because they are his/her views but because of their
reasonableness or otherwise according to accepted
standards.
Compulsory Education
"The child is entitled to receive education which
shall be free and compulsory, at least in the
elementary stages. He shall be given an
education which will promote his general culture and
enable him ... to develop his abilities ... and his
sense of moral and social responsibility".
(Principle 7 H.N. Declaration of the Rights of the Child)
The area of compulsory education seems a particularly appropriate
field to investigate in a discussion of children's rights. It applies
only to children and justification is therefore given in terms of
certain differences between children and adults. The principle cited
above has been given legal force in most countries. Recent
legislation for Scotland brings together all the relevant prior
enactments in the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 which will be referred
to throughout this discussion. The law regards the right to education
as a "performance right" (see above p.58 ). The statutes clearly
reflect the view that the right to education imposes (among others) an
obligation to ensure that it is in fact obtained, at least until the
age of 16 years. Inevitably such legislation has become a key target
of the child-libertarians. Farson echoes the earlier views of John
Holt in "Escape from Childhood" in asserting:
"The only people in our society who are incarcerated
against their will are criminals, the mentally ill
and children in school". (21)
"The real lesson in compulsory education is that one
cannot be trusted to govern oneself". (22)
21. R. Farson, op.cit., p.96.
22. ibid., p.98.
It was indicated in the first section that this view will be
rejected here in favour of a modified protectionism, but the child-
libertarian argument should certainly be taken into account in
assessing some aspects of current practice.
The 1980 Act clearly places the obligation for children's
education jointly on the education authorities and on parents.
Section 1 lays down the duty of the authority "to secure provision of
education" whilst Section 30 refers to "the duty of parents to provide
education". Section 28 states in addition that "pupils are to be
educated in accordance with the wishes of their parents". Section JL
establishes the age of compulsory education as between five years and
sixteen years and except in the exceptional cases where an exemption
has been granted (Section J>b), a child's failure to attend school
"without reasonable excuse" is an offence on the part of the parents
(Section 35). Any legal proceedings in such cases are taken against
the parents and penalties range from a maximum fine of £50 for a first
conviction to that of the same fine plus a month's imprisonment for the
third and further convictions (Section bj). Section bb makes provision
for any cases of proven truancy to be referred to the Reporter of the
children's panel, regardless of whether or not the parents have been
convicted. This Section is of particular interest here, for although
the Act clearly places responsibility for school attendance entirely
with parents, referral to the panel not only acknowledges that a
particular child may be "in need of compulsory measures of care" but is
also an implicit recognition (perhaps not intended by the legislation)
that failure to attend school may be a problem originating almost
entirely with the child and not with the parents.
Referrals to the hearing system for truancy range from cases of
young children with a parent who keeps them home for company, to
genuine school phobics, to children whose parents take them to the school
gates in desperation each morning only to find that they never reach the
classroom, to fifteen year olds who have decided (perhaps with good
reason) that school has nothing to offer them. The hearing system (in
contrast to the courts) has at least in theory, the flexibility to
differentiate between these types of cases and would almost certainly
recognise that at least in the last two instances, responsibility rests
very much with the pupils and not with the parents. Regardless of the
legal terminology, it does seem more realistic to say that here it is
the children who have not only the right but also the obligation to attend
school. This apparently paradoxical situation can be elucidated with
reference to the interest theory of rights advocated in Chapter 1 and to a
specific conception of "interests" which recognises the existence of
objective interests irrespective of subjective perceptions (the theme of
Chapter 3)» It has already been pointed out to those that view
compulsion as irreconcilable with the maintenance of legally recognised
rights, that there are other examples of right-holders simultaneously
incurring obligations, even where they have not chosen to do so (see p.^l).
It was asserted that it would be absurd to suggest that the element of
compulsion here makes it inappropriate to speak of "rights", to say for
example that where a right is felt or perceived to be burdensome by the
right-holder, it is no longer a right. Rather the rights and duties
involved in such circumstances have "different bases". Tom Campbell writes
as follows about the compulsion to work in some socialist states:
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"We can say that work is an obligation insofar as
it involves contributing to the satisfaction of
human need and a right insofar as it enables the
individual to develop himself, the latter having
more to do with the type of work done and the former
with 'what the work produces". (23)
As with compulsory work, so too with compulsory education neither
is intrinsically indicative of a violation of rights.
The observation in the preceding paragraph will later be shown
to be central to any analysis of the theoretical assumptions
underlying the Children's Hearing System in Scotland. Legalistic
criticisms of the system (by Morris and Mclsaac for example) focus on
the element of compulsion and the indeterminacy of disposals as
overwhelming evidence for the system's infringement of children's
rights. It is believed here that compulsion and indeterminacy are
not inherently antithetical to a due regard for the rights of those
involved. If there are grounds for accusing the Children's Hearing
System for denying rights to children, they do not lie here. In the
sphere of education, it is thus not compulsion which should give rise
to alarm, but,as will be explained below, there is cause for concern
elsewhere.
The Education (Scotland) Act explicitly views children as
entirely dependent and nowhere recognises that they may have their own
viewpoint. This is clearly not the case within all individual schools,
which may range from those with a compulsory curriculum to those with
individual time-tabling, but the focus of this discussion is the legal
status of children with regard to their education. This is nowhere
23. T. Campbell, The Left and Rights (MP, 1933), p.lSS.
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more clearly illustrated than in Sections 8 and 9 of the Act which
uphold the tradition of religious education in state schools:
"with liberty to parents ... to elect that their
children should not take part in such observance
or receive such instruction" (Section 8 (l)) (2*0
There is no provision at all for taking into account the views of
the children themselves. This applies not only to pupils who might
be tempted to exploit the "conscience clause" to gain a free lesson,
but also to any Muslim or Jew for example, who might genuinely wish
to participate in New Testament instruction, but whose parents are
opposed to it. Children have no legal rights at all in this area, nor
indeed in any other decision on the subjects they are to be taught or
on the institution which they are to attend. It is in these areas
that it might be salutary to give the child-libertarian view serious
consideration.
Predictably the legal position changes dramatically after the age of
16. Compulsory attendance can still be required for some young people
but the legal duty to attend now falls on the individual in question.
Section V? refers to compulsory attendance at junior colleges and states
clearly that:
"... it shall be the duty of every young person upon
whom such a notice is served to attend ..." (25)
The penalties for non-compliance (a maximum fine of £1 with a possible
month's imprisonment at the third conviction) are to be imposed on the
2*+. Education (Scotland) Act 1980
25. ibid.. Section *+5.
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truant and not on parents. The Act also gives over-sixteens the
right to education where the obligation to attend no longer exists.
Section ^9 is concerned with "... the provision to assist pupils to
take advantage of educational facilities". Such provision includes
the power to provide maintenance where necessary for those over school
leaving age. A decision in the Sheriff Court of Lanark in 1970
moreover, upheld a child's right to education after the age of 16 by
insisting that a father was obliged to continue support of his
daughter where he had the means to do so. In this case it was held:
"... that as the child was reasonably and appropriately
engaged in full-time education, the father was found
liable to pay therefor in so far as his personal
circumstances permitted". (26)
It would appear that the right to education is recognised in law even
where there is no longer a legal requirement to participate.
This brief account makes it clear that beyond the actual
provision of educational facilities, particularly for those between
5 and 16 years of age, the law has little to say on how the right of
education is to be interpreted. Litigation in the field is confined
almost entirely to attendance orders, either where a pupil is
truanting or where parents are disputing a school placement made for
their child and trying to secure a place elsewhere. Recent decisions
in the courts attest to the fact that the Education Act is open to a
wide range of interpretations with respect to parental choice. In a
26. Mizel v. Mizel, 1970 S.L.T. (Sheriff Court) 50.
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case in Lothian in August 1979» the court upheld a father's
decision not to comply with an order to send his child to a given
primary school in the following terms:
"... the said Act * placed the responsibility upon
the parent to provide efficient education, and
that in undertaking the responsibility the parent
had displayed a preference which was not fanciful
but had a basis of substance ..."
(* Education (Scotland) Act 1962) (27)
(28 )
However, in Sinclair v Lothian Regional Council, it was held that
the education authority is only bound to consider but not to follow
the wishes of parents and that since this had occurred, the local
authority's discretion should not be interfered with. It is clear
that for most people 'parental choice' has as limited a bearing on the
educational establishments their children in fact attend, as does the
choice of the children themselves. Within the public sector choice
is in practice very limited, but as stated above the limitations are
the outcome of policy decisions within a legislative framework and not
of the statutes themselves, which have little to say on many of the
substantive issues affecting children's rights in the field of
education. This observation extends to the use of corporal
punishment. It was recently pointed out:
"With the exception of the provisions relating to
approved schools, there is no statutory basis for
the proposition that a teacher is permitted to beat
his pupils". (29)
27. Brown v Lothian Regional Council, 1980 S.LoT. (Sheriff Court)!^.
28. Sinclair v Lothian Regional Council, 1981 S.L.T. (Sheriff
Court) 13.
29. Peter Wallington, 'Corporal Punishment in Schools'
Juridical Review 17 (1972) p.125.
The approved schools' "provisions" themselves seem to be limited to
the 1961 regulations which require all cases of corporal punishment
to be entered in the punishment book. Here too statutory provision
gives wide discretionary powers to those in authority. It is the
educational authorities that have effective control over the de facto
rights of children in school. As will be shown below, this is in
marked contrast to young offenders from a similar age group, who find
themselves facing action in the courts.
Children in Court
The Scottish system of juvenile justice was reorganised in 1971»
following the report of the Kilbrandon Committee in 196^ and the Social
Work (Scotland) Act 1968. As a result of the new legislation a large
majority of children in trouble and deemed to be "in need of compulsory
measures of care", were removed from the jurisdiction of the courts.
However a minority of young offenders over the age of criminal
responsibility (8 years) is still directed to the Sheriff Court and
dealt with under the terms of the Children and Young Persons Act
(Scotland) 1937 and the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975- The
Lord Advocate retains the power to prosecute all children above the age
of 8 years in the criminal courts. In practice only certain types of
cases involving children are automatically referred both to the
Procurator Fiscal and to the Reporter to the Children's Panel. Broadly
speaking the key considerations and categories of offence are:the
gravity of the offence (cases of murder, rape and armed robbery for
example have to go for trial under criminal procedure), some offences
under the Road Traffic Act by those over l*f years which on conviction
can lead to a disqualification from driving, offences which on
conviction permit forfeiture of an article (these are usually
firearms offences) and any offences committed by a child acting along
with an adult, as well as all offences by children over the age of 16,
who are not already on supervision under the terms of the Social. Work
(Scotland) Act. It is worth noting that the Sheriff is at liberty
to ask for advice from the Children's Panel regarding the disposal of
almost all such cases, but remains free to ignore any advice given.
The interesting point here is that children appearing before the court
have a distinct set of legal rights that are not granted to those
within the remit of the hearing system. They have the rights of adults
on trial including (except in rare cases of extreme violence) the right
to a determinate sentence on conviction. In addition there is separate
provision under Section 23 of the 1975 Act for the remand and committal
of those under 21. In brief this section of the legislation is
designed to keep young offenders apart from adult detainees, either in
separate institutions or in self-contained units of adult institutions.
With the exception of the provision of separate facilities and the
imposition of restrictions on reporting, the law here seems to be much
more in accord with child-libertarian principles. At least in this
area children and adults do appear to have the same legal rights. What
are the consequences for the child?
(30)A case study published in 1978 compared a number of boys
committed to such care by the courts and by the children's hearing system
and produced results that can only be regarded as deeply disturbing by
30. Monica Rushforth, Committal to Residential Care (Scottish Office
Central Research Unit, HMSO, 1978) especially pp.24, 26, 67-
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anyone who professes a concern for the rights of children. The study
centred on those sent to List D schools and found among other things
that for those included in the sample:
(i) there were no significant differences in the home
background or in the offence histories of the two
sets of boys;
(ii) a higher proportion of "court boys" was held in custody
both prior to the hearing and during the continuation
of their case and where no List D place was immediately
available after disposal, they waited longer than
"panel boys" for a vacancy and moreover had to remain
in custody more frequently while doing so;
(iii) "there was some indication that boys who have been
processed by the courts may stay rather longer in the
schools and may be somewhat more likely to be
transferred to a Borstal, or receive a subsequent
Borstal sentence";
(iv) "Though asserting that the two sets of boys were no
different, it was clear that half the staff interviewed
felt that some, at least, of the court boys were
subjected to subtle measures of control over and above
those imposed on panel boys".
The findings of the study raise many questions well beyond the scope
of this discussion. The most important point to notice here is that
granting legal rights in itself guarantees very little. The
overwhelming fact is that in the present system, the "court boys" from
the sample whose legal rights are more like those of adults and are thus
more clearly defined^suffered longer terms of confinement before and
after trial and more stigmatisation, than those who are referred to the
panel for similar offences. It could be argued that this is the
result of inherent inconsistencies in a system that allows control and
treatment principles to operate side by side. Irrespective of
whether this is indeed the case, the point remains that in the present
context, granting certain adult legal rights to certain children,
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seems to make them considerably worse off than similar children
denied such rights. The issues are far more complex than either
the child-libertarians or the protectionists are prepared to concede.
Perhaps this can be illustrated even more forcefully by a brief look
at one of the 'protectionist' provisions in the Criminal Law.
It was stated above that Section 23 of the 1975 Act demands
separate remand facilities for young offenders. In practice the
results of this requirement are also often very detrimental to the
individuals in question. In Edinburgh for example, the remand
facilities frequently used are a self-contained unit of Saughton
prison. As a result of the legislation, young offenders are debarred
from using nearly all the prison's very impressive recreational and
educational facilities, as well as the open workshops. Consequently
this category of detainees spends a far greater proportion of the day
locked up in cells than do all the other inmates. Once again the legal
rights divorced from an institutional context do little to guarantee
action in the child's best interest. One could argue that isolation
from adult prisoners is in the child's best interest regardless of any
consequences, but this is not only dubious, it has almost certainly
never been discussed. It would seem that in the field/, of law just as
in the realm of theory, there is an urgent need for articulating more
fully what is constitutive of "a child's best interests". The area of
the law which more than any other seems to take this standpoint, is
that relating to questions of parental custody and access in
matrimonial disputes.
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Custody and Access in Matrimonial Disputes
In cases of separation, nullity and divorce, decisions frequently
have to be made by the courts concerning the custody of any children
involved and access to them by the parent to whom custody has been
denied. David Walker writes:
'"Die paramount consideration is the welfare of the
child or children and the court will consider the child's
wishes, and a child in minority is entitled to be heard
on the matter".
In recent years questions of guilt and issues of custody have been
separated in matrimonial disputes. Bie 'welfare of the child' has
been redefined to allow considerable weight to be placed on the
child's own preferences, although these are not the only views taken
into account. A recent decision illustrates clearly that the "child'
best interest" can remain unknown and that in the absence of any other
relevant criterion for resolving the dispute, the child's view can
become the deciding factor. In Fowler v Fowler there was general
agreement that both parents were in a position to provide their 10
year old daughter a home, although in the past neither had put the
child's interests first. The mother's former cohabitee had been
found guilty of violence towards the girl and the father had
repeatedly given her into the care of others. Lord Stott stated:
31. David M. Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law,
Volume 1, (Clarendon, Oxford, 1982J p.282.
"I am fully conscious of the fact that while in
questions of custody the interest of the child is
of paramount consideration, it cannot by any means
be assumed that a child's interests necessarily
coincide with her wishes. All the witnesses
however agreed that Denise was a highly intelligent
girl with a mind of her own and that was fully
confirmed by my own impressions of her. I was
quite satisfied that she had not been pressurised or
brainwashed by either parent and since her views
were reasonable and there was no compelling reason to
disregard them I have I confess allowed Denise in
effect to decide the issue for herself". (32)
There are several points of interest here. Firstly the decision
focuses on all the theoretical arguments outlined in the first part
of this chapter. Secondly the case is very useful as a starting
point for a comparison between the different kinds of legal rights
accorded to children.
In the theoretical discussion it vra.s suggested that neither the
child-libertarians nor the protectionists could provide a
comprehensive theory of children's rights. It is worth noting that
the decision in Fowler v Fowler can be fully defended on both child-
libertarian and protectionist principles. It is also worth stressing
that the decision was made within the frame of reference indicated
above as the appropriate one in making decisions about the lives of
children, namely a prior statement of what constitutes the child's
interest and a prior notion of what might be considered "reasonable".
The child's right to be heard in such cases is clearly unconditional,
the right to determine the issue is more complex and in a very great
measure dependent on the actual views expressed, whether they do
32. Fowler v Fowler, 1981 S.L.T. (Notes) 9.
t
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indeed accord with or at least are not in direct conflict with what
is acknowledged as reasonable and in the child's best interest. In
all such cases there is general agreement that except in instances
of extreme abuse, it is better for children to spend time with both
parents. Requests to prevent access are viewed with caution. In
the case of Cosh v Cosh in June 1979» a mother attempted to deny access
to the natural father after her second marriage. She claimed that the
children no longer wished to see him. The children expressed no such
view in chambers and it became clear that the mother was putting them
under considerable pressure. The judge concluded:
"I do not consider that this is a case in which it
would be in the best interests of the children not
to have contact with their father and indeed I see
no good reason why this contact should be severed ...
the responsibility for making access arrangements now
rests to a substantial extent upon the pursuer (the
mother)..." (33)
Here it was clear that the views of the children (aged 12, 10 and
years) were confused and ambiguous and the prior notion of their
interest determined the case. Once again the principles underlying
the decision are taken within an evaluative framework. The legal
rights of the child in this area aire protectionist in that they rest
on a view of the child as a dependent, but they are also sufficiently
flexible to accommodate the concept of development. They do allow
the child to be self-determining within prescribed limits - the case
of Fowler v Fowler is clear testimony to this fact. How does this
compare with the legal rights discussed in the first two aireas?
33. Cosh v Cosh, 1979 S.L.T. (Notes) 73«
It was shown that in the sphere of education, the only legal
right of the child is to be given education - any other de facto
rights have a solely discretionary basis. It is not clear how any
changes in the law would materially affect children's education - any
choices have to be made on the basis of the available facilities and
these are often severely limited. Moreover choice of school, unlike
choice of parent can never be made on the basis of the child's
firsthand experience. Parents may have well-formed views based on
experience, on what is constitutive of the child's interests in this
area. Hie law at present can do little to accommodate even these.
In the area of education there is the additional problem of the
current professional orthodoxy which is often the main determinant of
how and what children are taught. Thus single sex schools are quite
out of fashion in Lothian Region at present, as are traditional
methods of teaching foreign languages. It is not clear that any
changes in the law could or even should affect this. However there
is certainly scope for minimal legal reform in the area of religious
education. If such education is to remain compulsory, then the
conscience clause should be extended to children at least to the
degree that it includes the right to be heard, which is so clearly
upheld in matrimonial disputes.
Compulsory education and custody and access are areas of the law
relating primarily to children. The legal rights of young offenders
are also partly based on a view of children as a special category but
in addition bear many similarities to the legal rights of adults. It
was shown above that those accorded such rights are often in a
considerably worse position than those to whom they are denied. TSiis
might be because the rhetoric of the two systems, the court and the
panel, has to some extent spread to the institutions in which the
offenders find themselves. The court in theory views those found
guilty, primarily as lawbreakers, the panel sees them in need of help.
The language of the one is punitive of the other supportive.
Ignoring for the present the degree to which rhetoric in fact matches
reality, it should now be apparent that any legal rights enshrined in
the two systems must be quite different. Where an offence is the sole
reason for intervening in a child's life, it is essential as in the
case of an adult, to establish that the offence was indeed committed
and notions of just punishment demand a determinate sentence that is
proportionate to the crime. However in a system that regards a need
for care as the criterion for intervention, these rights are as
irrelevant as they are to questions of compulsory education and custody
and access. The criteria for a just disposal in the first case are
well-defined and fairly uncontroversial, in the latter they remain
hazy at best. The concern of a court in criminal cases is the pursuit
of justice according to law, that is of Miller's "legal justice", in
cases where welfare is the issue as in matrimonial disputes, it is the
pursuit of some of the ideals of "social justice", of the best
possible outcome for a given individual in given circumstances within
the range of options permitted in law. There is no place for
"proportionality" and "determinacy" here any mope than in the present
hearing system. The objectives of such a system may indeed be
misguided particularly where extended to offenders, but it is absurd
to criticise it for denying children those rights which are alien to
its very existence. These issues will be explored further in Chapter 6
Criticism should be levelled at the hearing system for a different
but related reason, namely that in reality not only some of the
dispositions but some of the statutory grounds of referral to the
system have no place within a welfare ideology but belong rather to the
realm of law enforcement, that is to the very area in which
considerations of due process are of paramount concern. It will be
argued below (in Chapters 6 and 7) that in order to be immune from the
legalistic criticisms currently being levelled against it, the
children's panel must either openly accept a dual role that includes
both care and law enforcement and guarantees the rights of children
accordingly, or it must refer all cases requiring punitive measures
back to the courts and concern itself only with those children who are
genuinely "in need of compulsory measures of care". However, before
elaborating such proposals further, it would seem essential to attempt
an analysis of the concept at the heart of all considerations of care,
namely the concept of interest.
CHAPTER 3
Interests Within and Outwith the Law
When a children's hearing have considered the
grounds for the referral of a case accepted or
established ... the report obtained ...and such
other relevant information as may be available to
them, they shall proceed in accordance with the
subsequent provisions ... to consider on what course
they should decide IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD *
(Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, A-9, III ^3(l))
... that while in questions of custody the interest
of the child is of paramount consideration, it CANNOT
BY ANY MEANS BE ASSUMED THAT A CHILD'S INTERESTS
NECESSARILY COINCIDE WITH HER WISHES *
(Lord Stott in Fowler v Fowler, 1981 S.L.T. (Notes) 9)
... OUR KNOWLEDGE ABOUT HUMAN BEHAVIOUR PROVIDES NO
BASIS FOR THE PREDICTIONS CALLED FOR BY THE BEST
INTEREST STANDARD.* No consensus exists about a
theory of human behaviour, and no theory is widely
considered capable of generating reliable
predictions about the psychological and behavioural
consequences of alternative dispositions.
(R.H. Mnookin, 'Foster Care In Whose Best Interest?'
in Onora O'Neill and Wm. Ruddick, op.cit., p.189)
* My capitals
The quotations heading this chapter give some indication of the
centrality of the concept of interest in the area of juvenile
justice, while at the same time acknowledging that the nature of
children's interests often remains unknown. The "interest of the
child" has become such a well-worn formula in care proceedings, and
more recently within some jurisdictions, in juvenile criminal
proceedings, that the suggestion that it is of little worth as a
guideline for action without considerable elaboration and qualification,
will certainly be considered by many as outrageous. However, it will
be argued here that rigid adherence to this principle without
acknowledging its potential shortcomings as a guide to action, is
the most important single factor lending weight to the child-
libertarian argument. As in the discussion of children's rights,
there are both conceptual and empirical issues. There is a need for
an analysis of the concept of interest as well as detailed examples
of its application. The discussion of the empirical aspects of the
formula will show that even where agreement has been reached on a
formal principle, dilemmas on substantive questions reflected in the
third quotation above,are almost inevitable.
In attempting to elucidate the concept of interest, it is once
again possible to begin with a discussion of the conceptual issues or
to start from a descriptive account of some of the interests recognised
in law and then to proceed to clarify the principles and ultimately
perhaps to improve their application in practice. Soscoe Pound has
written extensively on interests relating to the law. His account is
primarily descriptive and his theoretical framework will be rejected
as offering only a partial account of interests (comparable to the
partial account of rights provided by the Choice Theory), however his
presentation is seen here as a useful starting point for a critical
inquiry into the nature of interests and their centrality in certain
areas of the law.
Pound's Account of Interests in the Law
Pound offers an extensive and detailed account of interests.
The main focus of the discussion concerns interests as they relate to
law, however Pound's initial definition of interests is of a far wider
scope:
"... an interest may be defined as a demand or
desire or expectation which human beings, either
individually or in groups or associations or
relations, seek to satisfy, of which, therefore,
the adjustment of human relations and ordering
of human behaviour through the force of a
politically organised society must take account". (l)
Pound goes on to assert that the law does not create these interests
but rather
"finds them pressing for recognition and
security". (2)
The starting point of the argument can thus be seen to be an
entirely factual definition of interests as the objects of individual
wants and desires. It has already been indicated that such an
account is entirely inadequate with respect to the very young and
only partially satisfactory with respect to other individuals
(see Footnote p.However, the immediate concern here will
be to examine Pound's account within his own theoretical framework.
After giving a brief summary of the main points in the doctrine and
putting the argument in context, the discussion below will concentrate
on those issues relating specifically to the area of children's
interests and more generally to that of parents and the family as a
whole.
Pound outlines three specific concerns of the legal system with
regard to interests. First it classifies and recognises a certain
1. Hoscoe Pound, Jurisprudence Vol.Ill (West, St Paul 1959) p.16.
2. ibid., p.21.
number of interests. Secondly the legal system fixes the limits
within which it attempts to secure interests. Thirdly the legal
system works out ways of securing interests. Pound acknowledges
that selecting interests to be recognised in law must involve
principles of valuation. It would appear that these principles
should involve utilitarian considerations of a maximisation of want-
satisfaction rather than any evaluation of the intrinsic worth of
the various interests themselves. In writing of individual interests
Pound asserts:
"All the demands that press upon the legal order
for recognition are to be recognized and secured
so far as possible with the least sacrifice of
the scheme of interests (i.e. claims, demands,
desires etc.) as a whole". (3)
But at this point the aim is to describe the different categories
of interests. The discussion will follow the order of Pound's own
presentation.
The three main categories of interest according to Pound are:
individual, public and social. It is crucial to an understanding
of the analysis to realise that these categories aire not mutually
exclusive and that some claims might fall under all three headings.
The different types are defined as follows:
3. S. Pound, op.cit., p.31
"Individual interests are claims or demands or
desires involved in and looked at from the
standpoint of the individual life immediately as
such - asserted in title of the individual life.
Public interests are the claims or demands or
desires asserted by individuals involved in or
looked at from the standpoint of political life ...
It is convenient to treat them as the claims of a
politically organized society thought of as a
legal entity. Social interests are claims or
demands or desires ... thought of in terms of
social life and generalised as claims of the
social group". (*t)
From this initial classification, Pound moves to a detailed
examination of the interests falling within each category, inquiring
into the extent of the interest, explaining the development of its
legal recognition and examining how far the interests in question are
in fact secured by law. For example, within the category of
"individual interests" are included firstly "interests of
personality", secondly "domestic interests" and thirdly what are
termed "interests of substance". Under each of these sub-headings
Pound gives a further detailed classification of interests falling
within the group. The second group (domestic interests) would seem
to be the most relevant for present purposes and will therefore be
presented in some detail, both to illustrate Pound's method and to
try and develop a satisfactory theory of children's interests as
they relate to the law.
In offering an account of interests in domestic relations, Pound
highlights several important distinctions too frequently ignored in
discussions of parental interests and the interests of the child.
h. R. Pound, op.cit., p.23.
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It is vital to distinguish individual interests in domestic relations
and the social interest in the family and in marriage as social
institutions. In addition it must not be forgotten that in this sphere,
V
there are individual interests vis-a-vis the rest of the world and
between members of a family. In the past, the law has been mainly
concerned with the former, but this pattern would seem to be changing.
It is also worth noting that:
"... the relations themselves are both personal and
economic". (5)
Within the area of domestic relations, there are four types of
individual interest which come within the realm of the law: the
interests of parents, those of children, the interests of husbands and
those of wives. Parents are seen to have certain interests against
the world at large. These include:
"... the custody and control of them (their children)
... and the authority to dictate their training,
prescribe their education and form their religious
opinions". (6)
It is clearly recognised that these interests are limited in law by
the competing interests of the child and by the social interests:
"... in the maintenance of the family as a social
institution and ... a social interest in the
protection of dependent persons, in securing to
all persons a moral and social life, and in the
rearing and training of sound and well bred
citizens &r the future ..." (7)




The interests of children against parents aire said to be those of
support during infancy, education and training within parental
means and (as with pairents against children) to maintenance under
certain circumstances. Pound asserts that:
"The first two ... are not secured directly by the
law, and derive their effective support almost
entirely from morals ..." (8)
The interests Pound ascribes to children would seem to be
unexceptionable. However, it is not at all clear how such interests
can be derived from either "the demands" or "desires" or "expectations"
of the group concerned. These interests aire precisely those claimed
on behalf of children by certain adults, either individually or in a
political or social group and, as will be shown below, such claims
rest on presuppositions concerning the rights of children and the
ideals of "a moral and social life" and "sound and well bred citizens".
The assertion that children's interests can be articulated in the
absence of such an evaluative framework, that is in the absence of
"ideal-regarding" * considerations, seems to have been put into
serious doubt implicitly by Pound himself, in his own so-called
"factual" account of these interests. Such a defect is regarded
here as the inevitable outcome of any attempt to present the interests
of children as pure facts. It is noteworthy that Pound evades the
problem of implicit value-judgements in determining the contents of
8. H. Pound, op.cit., pp.82-83.
Footnote: * This term is elucidated further below, p.108.
the list of social interests for he takes as his starting point the
interests actually recognised in law. The law is said to uphold
interests in six main areas:
1. the general security;
2. the security of social institutions;
3. the general morals;
*f. the conservation of social resources;
5» general progress;
6. the individual life.
"Interests in the security of domestic institutions" appears under
the second heading - "the security of social institutions". The law
seeks to uphold the family in many ways. A wife cannot, for example,
be an accessory for protecting a criminal husband and husbands and
wives are not required to give evidence against one another. Pound
suggests that the failure of the law to recognise the claims of
illegitimate children is a reflection of the fear of weakening the
(9)
institution of marriage. Pound asserts further that the movement
to give independence to married women is often regarded as damaging to
the interest in the security of social institutions. To sum up:
"... the social interest in the security of social
institutions (is) the claim or want or demand
involved in life in civilized societies that its
fundamental institutions be secure from those forms
of action and courses of conduct which threaten
their existence ..." (10)
There are two further interests in this area apart from that of the
interest in the security of domestic institutions, namely those in
9. R. Pound, op.cit., p.297
10. ibid., p.296.
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the security of religious institutions and those in the securing
of political and economic institutions. The question of whether or
not the particular institutions themselves are worth preserving is
of no relevance at all to Pound's analysis. Here the facts stand in
isolation. Ironically their relevance and weight in any actual
decision can only be determined on the basis of value. There are
some further references to the interests of the family in general and
of children in particular, but it is the sixth category of social
interests, "the social interest in the individual moral and social life
or in the individual human life" that will be of central concern here.
Pound views interests in this area as possibly the most important of
all social interests. He states that three forms of these interests
are recognised in law: first the interest in individual self-assertion,
second that in individual opportunity and third the interest in
individual conditions of life. This category of interests as a whole
is defined in the following way:
"... the claim or want or demand involved in social
life in civilized society that each individual be
able to live a human life therein according to the
standards of the society. It is the claim or want
or demand that if all individual v/ants may not be
satisfied, they be satisfied at least so far as is
reasonably possible and to the extent of a human
minimum". (11)
The law has recognised interests in all three groups under this
heading. The social interest in individual self-assertion is
recognised in laws forbidding the arbitrary subjection of an
11. R. Pound, op.cit., p.316
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individual to the will of others. The interests in opportunity are
recognised in different spheres: political, physical, cultural and so
on. An outstanding example is provided by the laws regarding the
compulsory education of children which can also be viewed as an
expression of the social interests in the conservation of social
resources and in the general progress. The interests in the
individual conditions of life are recognised in statutes regulating
conditions and hours of work as well as in minimum wage laws, housing
laws, child labour legislation and so on. Pound concludes his
classification of social interests with the following assertion:
"Looked at functionally, the law is an attempt to
satisfy, to reconcile, to harmonize, to adjust
these overlapping and often conflicting claims and
demands ..." (12)
The questions to which Pound now turns are those of evaluating and
'weighing' the various interests as well as securing them - that is
precisely those questions which are crucial, where decisions are to be
made according to the criterion of "the best interests". Perhaps the
most significant observation made by Pound in his discussion of the
valuation of interests is to stress the importance of comparing
interests "on the same plane" and of putting interests "in their most
generalised form" in order to compare them. If, for example, one
formulates one claim as an individual interest and a competing one as
a social interest, the issue may be decided in advance simply because
of the categories within which the problem has been posed:
12. R. Pound, op.cit., p.516.
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"Thus individual interests of personality may
be asserted in title of ... the social interest
in the general securing or under the social
interest in the individual life, or sometimes
from different standpoints or in different aspects,
under both of them." (13)
Pound1s arguments here are highly relevant in discussing the interests
of children. According to his vie\v, situations of conflict cannot be
fairly resolved until the relevant interests are considered under the
same heading, that is either as individual interests or as public
interests or as social interests. He also proposes that wherever
possible interests should be described under the title of "social
interests". It would seem then that questions of removing a young
offender from home for example, should be viewed as a possible conflict
between the social interest in the general security and the social
interest in the individual life, rather than a case of societal
interests versus those of the individual, where, as Pound correctly
points out, the scales have been tilted in advance. However, having
shown the starting point of any fair assessment of interests with great
clarity and depth of understanding, Pound now leaves matters hanging
uncomfortably in the air with a dogmatic statement that the quest for
assessing the intrinsic worth of interests is "futile".
"Probably the jurist can do no more than recognize
the problem and perceive that it is put to him as a
practical one of securing the whole scheme of social
interests as far as he may; of maintaining a balance
or a harmony or adjustment among them, compatible
with recognition of all of them". (l^f)
13. P. Pound, op.cit., p.329.
1'+. ibid., pp.330-1.
It should be clear that even from within the framework of Pound's account
of interests, a framework that will be rejected here as a means of
identifying the interests of children, this remains highly unsatisfactory.
It gives no indication at all of how to proceed in situations of a
conflict of interests, that is, in precisely those situations which might
be viewed as paradigmatic for legal intervention in the lives of children.
It may well be that such decisions are ultimately arbitrary and that even
Pound's policy of "interest-maximisation" is unrealisable, for such a
policy involves assigning relative values to the conflicting interests
once they have been identified. Not even here can decisions be made on
the basis of the facts, for such decisions involve an assessment of the
weight and relevance of the different facts, that is of their value.
Any adjudication on grounds of interests cannot proceed in a value-free
way. Whether or not such adjudication remains a desirable goal is a
separate question. However the preliminary steps to answering this
question and indeed to attempting to make decisions in the interests of
children, must surely be first a more satisfactory account of interests
and second an elucidation of the kind of activity necessarily involved
in such an enterprise. The former is the task undertaken in the second
part of this chapter.
The discussion will draw heavily on the arguments of Brian 3arry
and David Miller who are considered here as representing two opposing
points of view. Neither author has a great deal to say about children
and the relevant section of Miller's work concentrates on needs rather
than interests. However, in their discussions of interests and needs,
Barry may be said to put forward a subjectivist thesis comparable to
Pound's, while Miller adheres to an object!vist position. A satisfactory
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theory of interests is seen here as lying somewhere beti^een the two.
Barry's analysis in Political Argument will be taken as the starting
point. An attempt will be made to summarise and criticise his
arguments on interests with particular reference to children. This
will be followed by a comparison with Miller's discussion of needs in
Social Justice. It is thereby hoped to provide a framework for a
coherent normative theory of children's interests which will draw on
and develop different aspects of each account. The arguments of
Stanley Benn in particular seem to indicate the direction in which such
a theory should move.
Barry's Analysis of the Concept of Interest
The evaluation of the analysis of the concept of interest in
Barry's Political Argument requires a prior understanding of the
distinction between "want-regarding" and "ideal-regarding" principles.
Barry defines principles in such a way that these two categories are
"jointly exhaustive of the possibilities". Thus:
"Want-regarding principles ... take as given the
wants which people happen to have and concentrate
attention entirely on the extent to which a certain
policy will alter the overall amount of want
satisfaction or on the way in which the policy will
affect the distribution among people of
opportunities for satisfying '.■rants". (15)
"Ideal-regarding" principles are defined as "the contradictory of
(l^)the want-regarding theory". ^ It is on the basis of ideal-
15.
16.
Bo Barry, Political Argument (HKP, London, 1970) p.33.
ibid., p.39-
109.
regarding consideration that some wants are thought to be more
worthy of satisfaction than others, while some are discounted
altogether as legitimate goals. Hence, ideal-regarding principles
involve reference to some objective state of affairs irrespective of
individual preferences and may be seen as an attempt to articulate
what people ought to want. Mill's assertion: "... better to be
(l7)Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied" is a reflection of
a position that is at least partially ideal-regarding whilst Benthan's
(13)
dictum "pushpin is as good as poetry" reflects entirely want-
regarding assumptions concerning the nature of individual interests.
The key question for present purposes is whether interest as in the
phrase 'in her interest' is to be interpreted as a want-regarding or an
ideal-regarding concept. Barry clearly argues primarily in favour of
the former, but his conclusions remain highly controversial. In the
next paragraph Barry's arguments will be discussed in some detail.
Barry begins by giving a working definition of interest such
that
"an action or policy is in a man's interests if
it increases his opportunities to get what he
wants". (19)
He then proceeds to outline a number of significant differences
between: 'x is in A's interests' and 'A wants x'. Five differences
17. JoS. Mill, Utilitarianism, Everyman Edition (Dent, London, 1969)
p.9«
IS. J. Bentham, Works (Tait, Edinburgh, l3kj) Vol.2, pp.253-^.
19. 3. Barry, op.cit., p.176.
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are listed but sorr.e are much more important for present purposes than
others. The statement 'x is in A's interests' is considered to have
a more restricted application than 'A wants . Moreover, Barry
correctly points out that it is possible to be mistaken about one's
interests in a way in which it is not possible to be wrong about one's
wants. In addition there is clearly no logical equivalence between
the two statements in the sense that it can be established whether or
not something is in an individual's interest without the person's
approval and even without the individual's knowledge of its existence.
Furthermore there are times when an individual seeks to determine
whether something is in his/her interest in order to decide whether or
not to support it. Here 'x is in A's interests' is equivalent to
'A wants the results of x' where x is an action or policy. Barry sets
IxmiIs on what these results can be, but these appear to be at a
tangent to the main thrust of the argument until the following
assertion:
"To say ... that an action or policy is in
somebody's interest is not actually to say that it
satisfies his immediate wants at all; it is
rather to say that it puts him in a better position
to satisfy his wants ... it is clear that some want-
satisfaction does not consist of interest-
enhancement". (20)
Barry views 'interest as of more restricted application than wants
and regards:
"Evaluations in terms of 'interest' CasJ -ar niore
practicable than evaluations in terms of want-
1". (21)
20. 3. Barry, op.cit., p,153»
21. ibid., p.l8*f.
The argument seems quite acceptable until this point, but leaves
several questions unanswered. Barry acknowledges that an
individual nay be ignorant of his or her own interests and hat it
is not only possible for someone to seek clarification on whether or
not a course of action is in his/her interest but this can even be
established by others in total ignorance of the person concerned.
The crucial question is: What are the criteria for making such a
determination? Should the individual's wants be the only factor taken
into consideration or one among several, or are wants of no consequence
here? One can guess at Barry's answers, but these issues are not
explicitly discussed by him, almost certainly because they are
peripheral to the main theme of the book. Before exploring these
points further, it will be helpful to examine the concluding paragraphs
in Barry's analysis of interest. It is recognised that there are
situations where the limitation of opportunities for satisfying wants
can be in an individual's interest - withholding some asset from an
addictive gambler provides a clear example. Barry claims that such
cases can be redescribed as limiting current want-satisfaction for the
sake of future want-satisfaction, that is ,as frustrating short-term
desires to fulfil long-term desires. In support of this position
Barry cites arguments representing the opposite viewpoint and claims
to demolish them. It will be held here that he fails to answer his
opponents and that the arguments of Stanley Benn in particular are
far more forceful than Barry allows. Benn states that there are
occasions when one can judge what is in someone's interest without any
reference to wants at all, and that children provide the clearest
example of such a situation:
'"'/hen we act in the interests of a child, we may
not be much concerned with what he wants but
rather with educating him to be a person of a
certain sort ... It might be in the child's
interests to deny him satisfaction of some of his
desires to save him from becoming the sort of
person who habitually desires the wrong sort of
thing". (22)
Barry insists that such accounts are mistaken and widen the concept of
interest to an unacceptable degree. He asserts:
"Parents ... do not in general 'act in their
children's interests'; they 'bring them up'
or 'raise them'. (23)
Barry continues by saying that a legitimate use of the "interest of
the child" arises where local authorities check on foster parents to
ensure that the child is not being exploited. This he views as
determining:
"... the degree to which the child is left free
time to do what he wants, rather than acting as
an unpaid servant". (2*0
Hence no ideal-regarding considerations about "moulding the child's
character" are involved. The entire argument here appears very
superficial and highly unsatisfactory. It seems appropriate to
dispose of the minor issue first. The examples provided in no way
illustrate Barry's point. Where the authorities supervise foster
placements, they are at least in theory concerned not only with
'whether or not a child is being exploited, but with whether or not
22. S.I. Benn, 'Interests in Polities', Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society LX (i960) p.131.
23. B. Barry, op.cit., p.133.
2*f. ibid., p.l86.
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it is adequately cared for; treated kindly, fed, clothed, sent to
school and so on - these are the factors that constitute the child's
interests in such cases and they are in great measure ideal-regarding.
Moreover, Barry's criterion of non-exploitation as being "left free
time to do what he wants" is extremely weak and seems to have been
provided purely to suit his argument. However, the use of an
inadequate account as a way of avoiding substantive issues i£ far more
pronounced in the criticisms levelled against Benn. To dispose of the
question of what constitutes action in a child's interest by asserting
that parents usually "bring up" or "raise children" rather than "act in
their children's interests" appears to be an implicit recognition that
Benn's example highlights a fundamental weakness in Barry's position and
that he is not prepared to meet the challenge. It seems undeniable
that at least in the case of children, evaluative elements must enter
into a full definition of interests. Benn refers to children who have
desires 'which might be considered destructive of their interests. But
what of children whose patterns of wants may be subject to frequent
change or even quite unestablished; are such children to be said to
have no interests at all? Before enlarging on this theme and on Benn's
points, it might be helpful to approach the whole subject from another
direction, by -.extending Miller's analysis of the concept of need to that
of the concept of interest.
Needs, Interests and Harm
It will be considered rather a strange move to criticise an analysis
of interests by comparing it with an account of needs. As a preliminary
defence, it seems adequate to point out that the two are closely related
II-'!-.
and that at least one current elucidation of interest such that
"harm (in the relevant legal sense) is the
invasion of interest" (25)
almost exactly parallels Miller's definition of need in the
statement:
"A needs x = A will suffer harm if he lacks x." (26)
These points are discussed further below.
Miller asserts that "wanting" is a psychological state ascribed
on the basis of an individual's avowals and behaviour. "Needing"
on the other hand is said to be an "objectively" ascribed condition.
Miller distinguishes "instrumental", "functional" and "intrinsic" needs,
denying Barry's view that all need statements are of the form 'A needs
(27)
x xn order to do Y*.
The examples given of the different categories of need are very
clear. "Instrumental needs" are expressed in statements such as:
"He needs a key" or "She needs a driving lesson". Here it makes sense
to ask: "What for?" "Functional needs" are reflected in statements
such as: "Surgeons need manual dexterity" or "University lecturers
need books". To ask "Why?" here is not to ask what ends are served
by possession of these things, but rather to ask for an explanation of
what being a surgeon or a university lecturer involves. The need is
25. J. Feinberg, 'The Interest in Liberty on the Scales' in
J. Feinberg (ed.) Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty,
Princeton, New Jersey, I960) p.31-
26. D. Miller, Social Justice (Clarendon, Oxford, 1976), p.130.
27. ibid., p.12.
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for something whose possession is essential to and in some cases
almost constitutive of the occupation. Intrinsic needs can be
understood in the following examples: "People need food" or "She
needs someone to understand her". Here the need is not constitutive
simply of an occupation but of what it means to be a person or at
least a particular person. In Miller's words,
"What appears as a 'means' is really part of the
'end'". (22)
The first and third categories of need might be as usefully applied
to interests. It is of no importance here to determine 'whether or not
the second could be similarly extended. The question is undoubtedly
more problematic than in the other two cases particularly with
reference to children. Instrumental interests would be those
explicitly connected with a particular goal. Thus a child who wants
to become a professional swimmer has an interest in receiving coaching,
hence providing some form of appropriate tuition would be in this child's
interests. A person's "intrinsic interests" would ba in the
possession of those things which are a precondition of having any other
(OQ)
interests at all. Feinberg uses the expression "welfare interests" x
to refer to those interests necessary as a means to any goals. In
view of the argument put forward later in the chapter it might be more
helpful to term them "basic interests". There are considerable
difficulties in drawing up a list of basic interests beyond the bare
2 9
29
D. Miller, op.cit., p.128.
J. Feinberg, op.cit., p.32.
necessities of physical existence. Feinberg, for example, includes
"emotional stability" in his list of "welfare interests". Whilst
this may indeed be a necessary condition of having any kind of
worthwhile existence, its inclusion in a list of basic interests
presents practical problems of a quite different kind to 'goods',
such as health and physical integrity. Moreover it is precisely the
kind of interest that may come into conflict with other interests,
particularly with regard to children. A child (or indeed any human
being) has an uncontested basic interest in his/her health and physical
integrity, hence where a child is being physically abused through
malnutrition or physical violence, it is clearly in his/her interest
to have the situation altered either by close supervision or by removal
to a different environment. But even here there are borderline cases
involving a balancing of interests. Consider the following example
from a children's hearing - the account is of an actual case - where
a decision had to be taken "in the interests of the child".
Bill was 13 years old. He had no father, his
mother went out in the morning before he did,
without leaving any food. In addition she went
to bed in the evening ignorant of his whereabouts.
The school Billy attended was very alarmed at his
undernourished, ill-clad state. There was a
place for him in a children's home but he begged not
to be "put away", stating "I haven't done anything,
I want to stay with my Mum".
In this situation, what course of action is in the interest of the
child? The only clear answer is a change in the mother's attitude
which would lead her to care more adequately for her son. However
although this is something which a social worker might aim to achieve,
it is not a disposal available to a children's hearing. A clear
outcome might also have been indicated had Billy himself wanted
to go to a Home. Again this is something that might happen in the
future, in which case one would have little hesitation in asserting
that such a decision was 'in his interest'. However, just as the
child's own perception and wants were intimately bound up with the
ultimate decision in the Seiferth case (see p. 71 above) so too Billy's
picture of his situation made it difficult to determine where his best
interests lay. Had there been evidence of physical cruelty as well
as neglect, he would certainly have been removed from home. After a
lengthy discussion Billy was in fact put on supervision, but it was
made clear to his mother that social work intervention was aimed at
providing more effective care and that she would be required to play
her part rather than opt out even further. The example should serve
to show that even decisions governed by basic interests are not entirely
uncontroversial, however they are clearly less context-bound and
individualistic than those based on instrumental interests. To return
to Barry's categorisation: basic interests would seem to be ideal-
regarding rather than want-regarding but wants cannot be entirely
eliminated from the picture. Even basic interests are partially want-
regarding but clearly to a far lesser degree than instrumental interests.
However, this is by no means self-evident, for a close examination of
instrumental interests will reveal that ideal-regarding considerations
cannot be left out of the picture. This will now be explained further.
It was explained above (pJ-l^O that Miller attempts to define
need with reference to the concept of harm. He suggests that:
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"A needs x = A will suffer harm if he lacks x." (30)
Feinberg on the other hand has offered an elucidation of harm and
interests in terms of one another, such that:
"Harm ... is the invasion of an interest". (31)
It does not seem necessary to enter into a debate on the difference
between needs and interests here except to point out that an account
of interests in terms of needs is viewed here as a partial account.*
'The overriding factor for present purposes would appear to be that
when one talks of the needs and interests of an adult or of a child,
there is indeed an implicit reference to the harm that would result
by failing to act on them. If this is the case, the current argument
can proceed with an elucidation of harm rather than further debate on
the concepts of interest and need. Miller believes that with certain
reservations:
"... to determine what counts as harm for any given
person, it is necessary first to identify the.-aims
and activities which are central to that person's
way of life". (32)
30. D. Miller, op.cit., p.130.
31. J. Feinberg, op.cit., p.31.
32. ibid., p.133.
Footnote: * The relationship between needs and interests has been
analysed in some detail in a book by Wm. 3. Connolly,
The Terms of Political Discourse (Heath and Co., Boston,
197^) Chapter A-. It is suggested that assessments of
needs and interests are usually made within a system of
accepted standards and conditions but once these are
questioned, one can legitimately ask whether certain
policies, pursuits and preferences are in the "real
interests" of any given individual. Thus workers qua
workers have certain needs, but it remains a separate
question whether being a worker is in a person's interest.
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These "aims and activities" sire collectively termed "plans of
life". They may be chosen by the individual or laid down in advance
for him/her and refer to such things as social roles and ideals,
specific goals and tasks, occupations, ambitions and so on. A person
may or may not be able to articulate his/her "plan of life", but in any
case there will be activities that are "essential" and those which are
"non-essential" to it. Harm can now be defined as:
"... whatever interferes directly or indirectly
with the activities essential to (a) plan of
life ..." (33)
Until this point the account is entirely empirical, but Miller proceeds
by recognising that a "plan of life" must be acceptable or
"intelligible" if it is to be regarded as a starting point for
recognising the individual's needs and interests.
"Thus if confronted with a pyromaniac we are
likely to say not that he needs a plentiful supply
of matches, access to barns etc. but that he needs
psychiatric help". (3*0
In other words the life plan of the pyromaniac is unacceptable and
there seems to be an acknowledgement here that such a person's needs
and interests are unidentifiable apart from and prior to a change in
such a plan. It should now be obvious why it was postulated at the
beginning of this paragraph that ideal-regarding considerations cannot
be eliminated from the picture even with regard to so-called
33- David Miller, op.cit., p.l3*+.
3*+. ibid., p.135-
"instrumental interests", for until the goals, with reference to
which such interests have been identified, have been evaluated, it
is not clear that the interests themselves exist. The example of the
pyromaniac provides a clear illustration of the point. A further
example from a children's hearing will furnish a second illustration and
direct the discussion back towards the issue of children:
Charles was 15 years old and had been charged with
several thefts. He had escaped from the locked
wing of a List D school and admitted to a string of
offences including seducing homosexuals and then
blackmailing them. It was clear that he was set
for a life of crime.
The relevance of this example here (it will reappear later in the thesis)
is to show that in the absence of an acceptable "plan of life", it does
indeed seem difficult to identify an individual's needs and interests
beyond the basic requirement of survival. Charles might well have
thought it in his interest to secure an apprenticeship with the Mafia.
The hearing members, clearly not of this opinion, were at a total loss
as to how to proceed. The directive to "act in the child's best
interests" seemed inapplicable here. There are further problems in
identifying the interests (and needs) of certain other groups, which
Miller fails even to mention. Charles was almost an adult, and it makes
some sense to talk of his having a "plan of life", but there are many
individuals of whom it makes absolutely no sense to say that 'they have
a plan of life' even where their lives exhibit a plan. Children must
surely form the largest single such group and the next paragraph will
attempt to extend the analysis of harm and hence of interests and needs,
presented above to their case. In doing so the discussion will return t
Benn's views (outlined above) on the nature of children's interests.
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The Interests of Children
It will be remembered that Miller has defined harm and need in
the following terms:
"Harm, for any given individual, is whatever
interferes directly or indirectly 'with the
activities essential to his plan of life; and
correspondingly his needs must be understood to
comprise 'whatever is necessary to allow these
activities to be carried out". (35)
Hence, for Miller, the recognition of a person's needs involves a
prior identification of his life plan. It seems that this analysis
can be extended to children by stipulating that their interests (like
those of adults) consist of those things necessary to having a life plan,
that is, basic interests or "welfare interests" which are little more
than the prerequisites of any kind of decent life and in addition those
goods necessary for forming a plan of life. These interests are quite
different from those identified with a particular life plan and are
thus quite different from adult interests. These interests are in fact
intrinsic to being a child. Benn acknowledges the distinctive nature
of at least some children's interests in the statement:
"... that anything which is a condition necessary
to the development of an individual into a person
capable of making responsible decision in his own
interest, is both in his and in the public
interest ..." (36)
It should now become apparent why the attempt to identify certain
interests in the case of children is a gamble in a way in which
35- David Miller, op.cit., p.13^.
36. S.I. Benn, op.cit., p.139-
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assessing an adult's interests is not. Parents may, for example,
proT/ide for a child on the assumption that he/she will ultimately go
to University. If at the age of 17 the child decides to become a
professional footballer, decisions taken by the parents may well turn
out to have been antithetical to his/her interests. The source of
the conflict in such cases is that the parents have attempted to choose
a "plan of life" for the child rather than simply enabling the child to
come to a decision on his/her own behalf. They have in fact
identified the child's interests as those of a particular kind of life,
rather than recognising them as lying in keeping open as many options
as possible within a range of acceptable alternatives. ('Acceptable'
is used here only to exclude cases such as the pyromaniac, the sadist,
the professional criminal and so on. In an ideal world, children would
never choose such forms of life and where they do in reality, their
interests are only rarely identified with such pursuits by the adults
around them.) Once again Benn seems to have highlighted the main
issue:
"When we act in the interests of a child, we may not
be so much concerned with what he wants but rather
with educating him to be a person of a certain sort.
This is to set up a norm. Falling short of it
would be a 'stunting' or a 'frustrating' of the
personality. The conditions necessary for
attaining the norm are 'needs' rather than 'wants'
and it is in the child's interests that these needs
should be satisfied". (37)
Feinberg takes strong issue 'with this ideal-regarding theory of interest.
He claims that unless children can be educated to have wants of a certain
37- J- Feinberg, op.cit., p.^9»
kind, it is mistaken to talk of their having certain types of
interests. With reference to "moral education" Feinberg writes:
"... far from showing that a good character is in
a person's interest even if it does net promote
want-satisfaction, Benn's example shows instead
that a good character can be something that is
directly in a person's interest only when the
person has a want-based interest in it". (>°;)
There seems to be a fundamental confusion here. While it is
indeed true that it is impossible to get a child or indeed any human
being to act in his/her interest if he/she is determined not to do so,
the lack of desire is in no way to be taken as evidence for the
absence of a corresponding interest. Identification of an individual's
interest is a quite distinct process from getting someone to act on
these interests. Feinberg is prepared to recognise the distinction
in the area of health and other "welfare interests":
"... we have some welfare interests in conditions
that are good for us even if we should not want
them (for example, health), whereas in respect
to our more ultimate goals, we have a stake in
them because we desire their achievement, not
the other way round. In these instances, if our
•wants were to change, our interests would too". (39)
The implication here is that welfare interests apart, interests can
only be identified with reference to specific goals or ends and the
term is wrongly applied in such expressions as: 'children have an
interest in learning a foreign language' or less tortuously: 'it is
33. J. Feinberg, op.cit., p.^9»
39. ibid., p.^0.
in a child's interest to learn a foreign language'. The wider
implication would seem to be that apart from basic or welfare
interests, those without ends or goals have no further interestsat all.
This position is quite unacceptable and seems to be precisely the view
that 3enn is trying to counter. In particular it makes complete
nonsense of any attempt to "act in a child's best interests". If
children have no interests beyond the preconditions of having any
interests at all, that is, survival and perhaps a reasonable standard
of health, then the aim of acting in their interest is quite misguided.
Such a view of interests parallels the choice theory of rights (see
pp.38-^2 above) which denies that children have rights on the grounds
that they are unable to choose whether or not to exercise them. In
both cases it seems that the conclusions furnish immediate evidence
regarding the inadequacies of the premisses on which they are based.
It may be contingently true that no particular formula can guarantee
that a child will mature in such a way that he/she is able to formulate
ends or form 'life plans', but it seems clear that certain types of
behaviour such as withholding a child from any form of education will
make it quite impossible for such a child to take responsible decisions
concerning the future. Such actions can be said to be contrary to a
child's interests and interests here has a far wider meaning than that
reserved for 'welfare or basic interests. It again seems reasonable to
postulate a third category of interest, termed "intrinsic". Inasmuch
as 3enn acknowledges that children have interests quite apart from
basic interests and unrelated to their wants and aims, he seems to
provide a much more compelling account of the nature of children's
interests than either Barry or Miller.
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Some preliminary answers can now be given to the theoretical
questions posed earlier. It would seem that there are certain basic
interests which have also been termed welfare interests'. Feinberg
sees these interests reflected in the assertion:
"... one cannot live on bread alone, but without
bread one cannot live at all". (^0)
Leaving aside Marie Antoinette's likely response to this statement,
it serves as a reminder that there are certain conditions necessary
to the achievement of any human goal. Feinberg produces a fairly
lengthy list:
"In this category are the interests in one's own
physical health and vigor, the integrity of
normal functioning of one's body, the absence of
distracting pain and suffering or grotesque
disfigurement, minimal intellectual acuity,
emotional stability, the absence of groundless
anxieties and resentments, the capacity to engage
normally in social intercourse, at least minimal
wealth, income and financial security, a tolerable
social and physical environment and a certain
amount of freedom from interference and coercion". (M.)
These interests are objective in the sense that they do not seem to
relate to any personal ideals but are rather a precondition to the
achievement of any ideals. What is regarded as "normal", "minimal"
and "tolerable" vd.ll clearly vary from one society to another. A
diet that appears indicative of neglect in Scotland, for example, may
well seem highly desirable in the more destitute areas of the world.
However the fact remains and has been sufficiently laboured that there
'fO. J. Feinberg, op.cit., p.35•
exists a set of commonly recognised interests which applies equally
to all human beings. In addition there appear to be further interests
that are related to particular ends of "plans of life". These
interests would seem to be quite different for those who can actually
be said to have a plan of life and those who are as yet unable to
formulate aims constitutive of such a plan. In the case of the former
(most adults) want-regarding considerations clearly come into any choice
of aims but it would seem that once a choice has been made, what is in
the individual's interest is often no longer a matter of subjective
preferences. If a woman wishes to become a doctor, it is clearly in
her interest not to neglect her studies. If a single man wishes to have
a family, it is not in his interest to seek membership of social clubs
open only to men and so on. However the interests of those who do not
have aspirations are not as easily identified. Although it seems clear
that they have interests, these are not constitutive of any life plan,
but rather, in the case of children, of acquiring the capacity to
formulate such a plan. These interests, unlike basic interests are
specific to children alone. As with the case of basic interests, there
will be some variation between societies. Within the context of the
Western world, it certainly seems uncontroversial to say that a child
would be substantially harmed by being denied a minimum level of
literacy and in almost any society today it could be argued that it is
very much in a child's interests to learn to read, for even where there
is a low level of literacy, the ability to read and write opens up a
range of possibilities denied to the illiterate. It therefore seems to
follow that a child can be said to have an intrinsic interest in learning
to read. Other items to be included in such a list must remain
controversial. Possible candidates include interests in: limited
liberty, privacy, education, going to school, choosing friends and so
on. To digress briefly, it seems worth remarking that the lav/ sometimes
appears to place a greater emphasis on the interest in education than on
that in going to school, since certain parents are still permitted to
teach their children at home. It could be forcibly argued that the
interest in going to school is far greater than that in receiving a
formal education. The example provides a clear indication of the
controversial nature of such a list and disputes of this kind cannot be
settled by appealing to empirical data. If a child emerges at twelve
years of age with distinction in three Advanced Level subjects and no
social skills, both sides can claim their case to be proven! Enough has
been said to indicate that the intrinsic interests of children are more
complex and open to debate than those termed "basic'interests". Even
where there is agreement on the list of intrinsic interests, such
interests may be given different weights by different people. Parents
who recognise a child's interest in choosing friends, for example, may
on occasion be forced into a position of saying 'but not friends like
that!. 'Basic interests' seem quite different in this respect, since
although it is (regrettably) sometimes necessary to choose between them,
such a conflict is unimaginable in an ideal world, whereas conflicts
between and disagreements about intrinsic interests are unlikely ever to
be completely eradicated. It should now be fairly apparent why the
instruction to "act in the child's best interests" offers no determinate
guidelines to those making decisions about children's lives. This part
of the discussion will conclude by indicating briefly the complexities
involved in taking such decisions.
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It was suggested earlier, (p.113 above) that Barry's view
that parents "bring up" or "raise" children rather than "act in their
interests" was a very inadequate response to any proposed theory of
children's interests. However this view does seem to capture a point
worth making, namely that just as children's rights are only invoked
when things have somehow gone wrong for a child, so too parents do not
regulate their day-to-day behaviour towards their children by appealing
to what is in their interests. Talk of interests arises on being
faced with some kind of conflict. Perhaps things are going badly or
maybe a change is being contemplated of school, or home, for example.
This is even more apparent where children's interests fall within the
remit of the law. A little reflection will show that where official
or legal decisions are to be made "in the best interests of the child"
a conflict situation has already arisen. The appearance of children
in a juvenile court, or at a children's hearing, or before a judge in a
custody case, is in itself evidence that their interests have been
inadequately safeguarded or at the very least may be at risk. The
decision which has to be made could far more accurately be described as
determining the second-best interests of the child, or less paradoxically
r/ip)
choosing "the least detrimental alternative". Such a
reformulation could lead to a completely different attitude both on the
part of those taking the decisions and of their critics. The reality
of the decisions made 011 behalf of children both in courts and at
children's hearings nearly always involves a clash of interests which
would and should never be in conflict in an ideal world. It may mean
choosing between basic interests or between basic interests and
intrinsic interests (the 'happy truant' provides a clear example of the
J. Goldstein, A. Freud, A.J. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of
the Child (Macmillan, New York, 1973) Chapter k. ~ ~~
second kind of choice) and in no such case is there an objective
method for arriving at the right answer. Indeed it might be forcefully
argued that there is no right answer, for as the foregoing argument has
attempted to show, an assessment of both interests and needs involves
criteria of value, yet where the law intervenes in the lives of children,
such values can be said to 'masquerade as facts' and hence serve to
conceal the irreducibly subjective element necessarily involved in any
eventual outcome. It will be argued below (Chapter 6) that neither the
introduction of such a subjective element, nor the 'individualised'
disposals which are inevitable whenever decisions are made on the criterion
of interests, are inconsistent with principles of justice. As a first
step towards defending these claims, the next chapter will look in detail
at the reasoning that takes place within one specific context where
decisions are taken "in the interests of the child", namely the Scottish
Children's Hearing System. - The argument will then proceed (in Chapter y)
by referring briefly to other areas of the law in which such reasoning
takes place, but which nevertheless seem to have escaped the type of
criticism levelled against the juvenile justice system ana will attempt
to analyse how such reasoning proceeds to a conclusion.
CHAPTER k
Seasons and Reasoning in the Children's Hearing System
The remit of the Scottish Children's Hearing System is to make
decisions in the interest of the child. Such decisions are necessarily
made within a setting which imposes both legal and extra-legal
constraints on the decision-makers. Hence what can be deemed to be in
a child's interests, is severely limited in advance prior to any
investigations or rulings the panel members may make. A hearing cannot,
for example, move a child from one educational establishment to another,
nor does it play any part in choosing foster parents and so on.
Similar constraints operate in courts acting in the interests of the
child. Thus in custody cases, the judge has to decide in favour of one
of two parents. The possibility that a child's interest might lie in
residing outwith the family is only raised in the most extreme
circumstances of cruelty and neglect.
These observations should in no way be taken as criticisms. It
would be absurd to assume that such decisions could be taken in a vacuum,
divorced from numerous other considerations, not least the rights of
parents and the available alternatives. However, theoretical discussions
of children's interests often seem oblivious to the complexities involved
in making actual decisions on interests. Whether in a hearing or in a
court, reasoning on interests is necessarily limited by the context in
which it occurs. The precise nature of the limitations may vary from
one setting to another, but it will be assumed here that a detailed
examination of one such setting will serve as a paradigm for all of them.
The Formal Structure of the System
A hearing usually involves at the very least three panel members
(at least one man and one woman), the Reporter to the children's panel,
a social vrorker, the child and at least one parent. Depending on the
nature of the case, various other people may be present too: teachers,
•Children's H.ome staff, members of intermediate treatment groups and so on.
Occasionally a hearing may proceed in the absence of a child. This
usually happens v/hen the children are very young or in particularly
distressing neglect and abuse cases. Hearings also sometimes proceed
without any parent present, for although parents are required to attend
there are no prohibitions against making decisions in their absence.
In practice this does happen where a parent refuses to attend, but there
is a general reluctance to proceed in such cases and the parents may be
charged. A hearing cannot proceed without three panel members, a
Reporter and a social worker. The whole procedure is conducted in front
of all the participants and the decision is reached in public. Hearing
members only ever retire to another room in very exceptional circumstances.
In six years as a panel member, I have only once had a discussion in
private during a hearing, in a situation where a highly experienced panel
member chairing the hearing felt that the risk of sending the children
home was so great that she could not consent to such a decision. The
mother was crying hysterically and it was therefore decided to withdraw
briefly. Such occasions are very rare indeed. In normal circumstances
the proceedings are entirely open. Once the grounds of referral have
been established, the hearings proceed in a relatively informal manner in
which it is to be hoped that all those present are involved. It should
be noted that it is required that:
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"The chairman shall inform the child and his
parent of the substance of any reports,
documents and information ... if it appears
to him that this is material to the manner in which
the case of the child should be disposed of and
that its disclosure would not be detrimental to the
interests of the child". (l)
At the end of a hearing, except in cases of adjournment, the
member in the chair is required to inform the child and parents of
the decision taken, of the reasons for the decision and of the rights
of the family to request the stated reasons in writing and to appeal
against the decision to the Sheriff within twenty one days. Once
these formalities are over and usually after the family has left, the
person chairing proceeds, either alone or together with the other two
members, to write down the reasons for the decision. The reasons are
meant to be an accurate account of the grounds for the decision and
hence a reflection of the reasoning underlying the decision. The
written reasons are kept on file irrespective of whether or not the
family requests a copy of them and regardless of whether or not an
appeal is lodged. The following discussion will rely in part on such
written documentation.
Perhaps the most instructive way to proceed is to consider first
a few examples of what are deemed 'good reasons'. It is important to
note that such reasons may often be considered no reasons at all by
critics of the system, but the present chapter aims to look at the
hearing system from the 'internal point of view'. There is no doubt
that for those within the system, 'good reasons' are clearly
1. Children's Hearings (Scotland) Hules [statutory Instruments,
1971, No.492 (S.SO)J 17,3-
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distinguishable from bad ones. Indeed whole training sessions are
devoted to instructing those about to chair for the first time, on the
giving of reasons. Briefly, 'good reasons' are those which accurately
reflect the grounds of the decision, indicating, wherever possible, why
it is thought to be in the child's interest and which 'will stand up
in court'. The latter is often stated as a separate requirement in
recognition of the vie\tf stated in an early appeal:
"... a Sheriff should not interfere with the
determination simply because he felt another
form of treatment would be preferable ... I
consider the Sheriff should not allow an appeal
unless there was some flaw in the procedure
adopted by the hearing or he is satisfied that the
hearing had not given proper consideration to some
factor in the case". (2)
It must be remembered that there are limited disposals available
to a hearing and that there may be situations in which none of the
available options seems to offer the key to a solution. The possible
alternatives include: first, discharging the case; second, placement
on supervision to a social worker whilst remaining at home; and third,
a residential supervision order removing the child from home and
either placing him/her \vith a family or in a children's home or in a
List D school. All supervision orders may be reviewed at any time,
subject to certain rules and regulations, and must be reviewed within
a year or they automatically lapse. A hearing may also adjourn to
obtain further information or to see whether a child can 'get back to
school' or 'stay out of trouble' pending an actual decision. The
2. D. v Sinclair, 1973 S.L. T. (Sheriff Court) ^7/3.
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remit of the panel is to act "in the best interests of the child".
The underlying philosophy of the system can perhaps be most accurately
portrayed by the dictum:
'Help for tomorrow not punishment for yesterday'.
This is the rhetoric of the system and it seems self-evident that in
the light of this rhetoric, the decisions taken will be justifiable
(if at all) primarily on forward-looking grounds. This stands in
marked contrast to legal intervention in the lives of adults, where
consequentialist considerations at most form only one element in the
reasoning resulting in a decision. According to the rhetoric of the
Scottish system of juvenile justice, the anticipated consequences of
the different available disposals are the overriding criterion in all
decisions made on behalf of children. The reality is very different,
for very often the actual decision is the only one available in the
circumstances, or it may (despite the contrasting rhetoric) be taken
on grounds involving societal needs or legal requirements. These
observations will be substantiated by presenting the examples below in
separate groups which are intended to reflect the reality of the kinds
of decision taken. The cases have been selected accordingly and in
addition they are all considered to exemplify 'good reasons' and thus
to be illustrative of the reasoning that takes place in children's
hearings. They will thereby also serve as an indication of the
limitations of the instruction to act "in the best interests of the
child". The discussion will concentrate on reasons and reasoning',
but the view of interests presented in the preceding chapter should be
kept in mind throughout. The examples will be presented on three groups.
The first group contains decisions and reasons of the kind that best
conform to the rhetoric and ideology of the hearing system, that is
where an attempt has been made to identify the interests of the child
concerned and to go some way towards furthering those interests. The
second group includes cases where the hearing makes a genuine choice
between alternative options but where it is quite clear that the
decision is at most only partially governed by the criterion of best
interests. Only two cases are cited here, one where the decision was
made in the light of legal requirements, the second where societal
needs were paramount. All cases in this category fall under one of the
two types documented, hence there is no need for further examples. The
third group represents those cases where the so-called 'decision' is
merely a rubber stamp, for there are no choices to be made. Here only
one example is provided as representative of this type of case. It will
be argued below that principled criticisms can be made of any system of
juvenile justice based on the criterion of interests, with regard to the
kinds of decisions falling within the second and third categories, but
that the first group remains immune from such criticisms, particularly
those concerning the supposed violation of the rights of children. It
is because any system of juvenile justice is inevitably confronted with
all three types of decision that conflicts must arise between the
rhetoric and reality of a system founded on one single independent
criterion of justice. It should be noted that there are identifiable,
and to some degree overlapping, types of reasoning associated with the
decisions in each category. As stated above, in any cases coming before
a hearing where an actual decision is taken, that decision is either to
discharge the referral or to issue a supervision order either at home or
at a specified residence. The patterns of reasoning underlying
such decisions can be broadly categorised as follows:
A. Discharge
(i) There doesn't seem to be a real problem, for example,
the offence was an isolated incident.
(ii) There is a problem but it can be dealt with without
formal supervision because:
(a) the family can manage
(b) there is already a social worker involved with
the family
(c) voluntary help is available and being used,
for example, a youth club etc.
(iii) There seems to be a real problem but formal
supervision is seen as irrelevant, for example, the
family refuse to co-operate with any kind of
intervention, fail to keep appointments with
psychologists etc. but removing the child from home
is inappropriate.
B. Supervision
Whether at home or involving a residential placement there
seem to be at least three patterns of reasoning underlying such
orders. Only the first and second conform in any way to the
declared aims and objectives of the hearing system.
(i) There are some clearly identified problems associated
with the child or the child and the family; course
of action X might be helpful in working towards a
solution, hence the hearing decides in favour of X.
(ii) There are clearly identifiable problems which will
not necessarily be resolved by supervision, but
which make supervision inevitable. The most
extreme examples are provided by children whose
parents refuse to give them a home. In at least
some of these cases, the problem lies entirely with
the parents.
(iii) The child's behaviour (most often repeated offending)
is quite unacceptable, there must be something wrong
although there is little indication what it is and
the hearing cannot 'do nothing', hence 'the need' for
a supervision order.
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It is worth noting that it is precisely in such
cases that a 'tariff system' creeps into operation.
Supervision at home is tried for the first two or
three appearances, possibly followed by residential
assessment and then a residential placement.
It is held here that any theory of juvenile justice must
accommodate all such patterns of decision-making and that reasoning
exemplified under B(i) and B(ii) above only rarely occurs with
reference to adults. It is also believed that there are relevant
differences between children and adults that make reasons of this kind
justifiable in the case of the former and not in the case of the latter.
However there are serious complications with regard to 3(iii) and it is
in this area that the arguments of advocates of the "justice model", the
main critics of welfare systems, would seem to have some validity.
Examples of actual decisions and the reasons given for them are set out
below for illustrative purposes and reference will be made to them
throughout the remainder of the discussion. The examples 'will be
presented under three headings:
I ■ Decisions on the Basis of Perceived Needs & Interests
II Decisions on the Basis of Other Criteria
III Rubber Stamps.
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Some Decisions and Seasons from Children's Hearings
I Decisions on the Basis of Perceived Needs 8c Interests
A
Subject: Boy, years old
Grounds of referral: Review
Initial grounds: Theft and truancy
Decision: Supervision (varied) to allow residence at
hone and attendance at List D school as a
day pupil
Reasons: That Arthur is doing extremely well at the
school and both he and his parents would like
him to remain there until he finishes his
schooling and that the school would be very
pleased to have him as a day boy
Comment: The decision here was taken entirely in light
of the perceived beneficial effects of








Failure to attend school
Discharge
Reasons: That Bill's school attendance has improved
considerably over the last four weeks and
that, since his older brother is on
supervision, the Reporter would be informed
immediately should the situation deteriorate
again
Comment: The problem appeared to have resolved itself
and there were built-in safeguards. The
decision was in the boy's interest and the
reasoning behind it is clear.
l4o.
c
Subject: Girl, lk years old
Grounds of referral: Failure to attend school
Decision: Home supervision
Seasons: Carol is very unhappy and seems quite unable
to get back to school. On the other hand, a
psychiatric report advises strongly against
residential schooling. It is hoped that a
social worker might help her to resolve her
problems and might look for a short-term
placement in a children's home to enable
Carol to try to attend school from there
Comment: Needs here are quite unknown but it is obvious
that some form of help is necessary. The
decision was thought to be in the girl's
interest and was the result of reasoning about
those interests. The hearing discussed the
possibility of residential schooling and
rejected this option because of the
psychiatrist's view that it would add to Carol's
anxiety rather than have beneficial
consequences. It was generally agreed that
her increasing isolation from her peers was
very damaging and that it was important for
her to be with her own age group. The idea
of a short spell in a children's home was
mentioned since a girl in a similar situation
to Carol had managed to get back to school
after a brief stay away from home. The
family all thought this might be a good idea,
particularly if the placement was in visiting






Boy, 13 years old
Lack of parental care
Home supervision
Seasons: That David has not been in any kind of
trouble and desperately wants to stay at home.
It was thought that a social worker could
ensure that the situation does not deteriorate
further and might offer support to David's
mother in caring for him
Comment: The problem here lay with the parent and not
with the child - supervision is merely a way
of 'keeping an eye' on him. The decision
was undeniably taken 'in the interest of the







Boy, 12 years old
Review
Multiple thefts
Decision: Continuation of supervision
Reasons: That Eric has managed to stay out of trouble
and his school attendance is quite
satisfactory but the situation at home remains
unstable and his mother welcomes the support
of a social worker. It was also felt that
Eric would benefit from further social work
support
Comment: The reasoning is clear ('instability at home'
is a veiled reference to the mother's drink
problem and the father's violence) and the
decision was taken in the boy's interest.
The boy and the father were opposed to the
continuation. The disposal is quite
unrelated to the original offences and hence
might be viewed as unjust.
1^3.





Boy, 15 years old
Review
Truancy
Decision: Continuation of residential supervision
Reasons: That Frank has to attend school for a further
six months, that he has been excluded from his
local school which is not prepared to take
him back and that other day schools are
unlikely to accept him at this stage in his
education
Comment: Both Frank and his parents wanted him to return
to day school. Regardless of the hearing's
perceptions of the situation, this option was
unavailable. The 'decision* was wholly
predetermined by the facts of the case, not
least the law regarding school attendance.
This type of reasoning occurs again and again,
almost always in cases involving school
attendance. It can indeed be forcefully
argued that it is in a child's interest to
attend school, but there may be a small minority
for whom school is inappropriate or at least less
important than other considerations. However,
hearings never question whether or not a
particular child is benefitting from school.
The only questions addressed in truancy and
exclusion cases are: 'How can we get the child
back to school?' 'What school is prepared to
accept the child?' and, sometimes perhaps,
'What school would be appropriate?' The crunch
in such hearings is always 'The lav/ requires you
to attend school', it is the legal requirement






Boy, 15 years old
Multiple thefts
Decision: Continuation of supervision in secure unit
Reasons: That Gregory has repeatedly absconded from a
number of residential placements and that he
persists in committing serious offences and
therefore needs to be contained in a locked
unit
Comment: The decision was based entirely on societal
needs, that is the need to be protected from










Soy? 13 years old
Review and theft
Theft
Continuation of supervision at a List D school
That although Harry is doing well at day school
and seems ready to return home, his father
refuses to take him back and his mother's
whereabouts are unknown
Comment: The decision had nothing to do v/ith the boy's
interests or needs, indeed it was unanimously
held by the hearing members that he should
return home. There simply was no alternative.
As in the example under Category II, this case
is typical of its kind. Parents quite often
reject children once they are in care and
refuse to allow them home again. The 'decision'
is no more than a 'rubber stamp' on the existing
arrangement.
1^6.
It should be clear that in Categories I and II it makes sense to
talk of the hearing reaching a decision, whilst for Category III the
decision is almost irrelevant. It would be a mistake to conclude that
such hearings serve no purpose at all. They not only fulfil a formal
requirement (supervision orders lapse where not reviewed within a year)
but often provide some comfort and a measure of reassurance to the child?
as well as serving to explore whether there really are no other options.
However, although such goals may be of considerable value, they are
peripheral to the process of decision-making which is the focus of the
present discussion. As stated above, decisions, in the sense of a
choice between alternative options, are only taken at hearings in the
first two categories. The discussion will concentrate on the decisions
in the first category in this and the following chapter and turn to issues
relating to the second category in Chapter 6.
The first category includes all decisions conforming to the rhetoric
of the system. Here it makes sense to say that the decisions are taken
according to the criterion of "interests". However this immediately
raises questions of the identification of such interests, together with a
realisation that in all but a small minority of cases there is an alarming
scope for error. For some children, legal intervention may provide "a
new beginning", for others it may be "the beginning of the end". It
seems quite unacceptable to suggest that where the former is true the
intervention is to be deemed 'just' whilst in latter cases it is to be
considered 'unjust'. In the present context, it might prove helpful to
reflect further on the identification of interests within the setting of
a children's hearing.
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In a recent study of the Scottish system ^ the authors provide
a detailed account of the observations of 3d hearings, which include
among other things, an analysis of the dialogue of those hearings.
It is noted that the topics discussed can be broadly classified into
ten categories, with an eleventh for residual items, and that on
average five of these themes were discussed at any one hearing. The
topics include the actual grounds of referral, behaviour and progress at
school, leisure activities, behaviour at home, previous offences, family
stress and so on. Each category is discussed and illustrated in some
detail. The dialogue is seen as having both formal and informal
concerns. The latter include factors like the expression of moral
disapproval, influencing parental attitudes and so on and lie outside
the scope of this discussion. The formal goals are "objectives with a
clear statutory basis" of which the identification of interests is the
most important. The conclusions reached by Martin, Fox and Murray
(unquestionably in accord with my personal experience) provide little
comfort to the sceptics:
"A good deal of the dialogue did not appear to reflect
any systematic searching for the specific etiology of
the child's behaviour nor did it reasonably indicate
any consideration of the implications of various
possible dispositions. Panel members ... did not
appear to make use of a coherent framework of ideas
concerning the causes of delinquency ...
To attain the formal objectives implies a model
derived from an ideal of professional practice in
the child care field - one in which assessment of the
child's interests and choice of the most appropriate
course of action are based on a framework of knowledge
about the developmental process ...
3. F.M. Martin., S.J.Fox and Kathleen Murray, Children Out of Court,
(Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 19ol).
The imperviousness of panel members to social
work or any other professional language and
ideology is manifest in our study of the dialogue
of hearings. The richness of the discussion lies
in the variety and intensity with which the common
man responds to the lifestyles of others and tries,
where possible, to locate points at which some
pressure for change can be applied". (A-)
Apart from the fact that it seems highly debatable whether the
"formal objectives" imply any "model" at all, these conclusions do not
seem detrimental in any way to the whole endeavour, but simply
illustrative of the complexities involved. If an analysis of the
dialogue of hearings were to show that decisions are in fact quite
arbitrary, this would indeed be an indictment of the system, but Martin,
Fox and Murray make no such claims and are indeed concerned elsewhere
\tfith the possibility of predicting the outcomes of hearings from a
number of different variables (Chapter 11). In addition, it should be
noted that even given initial disagreement most hearings end in a
unanimous decision (91% of hearings observed in Children Out of Court
ended in such a decision), a very improbable occurrence, were the
members' conclusions random or arbitrary. Is it possible to offer
anything more than a banal explanation (the limited number of possible
outcomes for example) by analysing the decision-making process in
greater detail? It would seem helpful to approach this question from
two different directions. First by looking in considerable depth at
some cases presented to the children's panel and second by discussing
and comparing this type of reasoning with that concerned with some
other legally binding decisions, such as criteria of "reasonableness"
F.M. Martin, S.J. Fox and Kathleen Murray, op.cit., pp.138-9•
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in courts of law. It is hoped thereby to widen the scope of the
argument to include other areas of the law that seem to be faced with
some problems of a markedly similar nature to those where interests are
said to be the paramount concern, namely the ascription of weights to
reasons and factors in a seemingly objective manner, where such reasons
and factors do not have any objective weights.
The first approach (via actual cases) will be made by giving some
full accounts of children's 'careers' through the system, from the first
referral to the Reporter's office, to the point of the last hearing,
which is often (but not necessarily) at school leaving age. Since all
records are destroyed once a child reaches the age of sixteen and is no
longer on supervision, it was decided initially to request access to
all the papers after the next few such termination hearings in which I
participated, before they were finally consigned to the incinerator.
3y chance, all the termination hearings for 16 year olds during the
relevant time period were for children who had initially come into the
system on offence grounds. Since it seemed important to include at
least one neglect and abuse case in the accounts and the only
termination hearing of such a case which I attended at the time, involved
a ten year old, his 'career' is also included. In order to avoid any
breach of confidentiality, the names of all the individuals and of the
schools and children's homes involved have either been changed or
omitted altogether, otherwise the details have been reported exactly as
they appeared in the records.
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Three 'Careers' Through the Hearing System
PAUL CAMERON is the fifth of five children and was first referred
to the Reporter in 1976 at the age of nine years. He was required to
attend eleven hearings between that date and May 1932, when the case
was closed and all records destroyed. The account will be given
hearing by hearing, including the reasons for each decision and any
critical comments.
First hearing: May 1976.
Grounds of referral: Theft.
Decision: Discharge.
The social work report was no longer available,
but the stated reasons give a clear indication
of the basis of the decision.
Reasons: "Paul has now settled down at school and there
has been no further incidence of theft. He
was made aware of what the consequences would
be if his anti-social behaviour continues.
The parents seem capable of exerting their
parental authority and it was felt that for








The social work report was pessimistic,
describing Paul's father as "very protective"
and "authoritarian" towards the family, but
quite ineffective and the mother as
"understanding" but often frustrated. He
felt Paul was modelling himself on a much
older delinquent brother and "heading for big
trouble", in conclusion:
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"The Camerons seen to think of themselves as a
stable, united and well-integrated family,
but clearly this is not an accurate picture.
The Camerons resent any interference from
outside authorities and in the past have not
shown any real motivation to accept help from
this department ... Because of the family's
unco-operativeness, I ean only repeat ... that
in this case, Paul would not be a suitable
candidate for a supervision order."
Despite this recommendation, the hearing
decided to place Paxil on supervision.
Reasons: "The decision was made in view of Paul's needs,
rather than the offence itself. He has been
involved in minor offences and kipping school
following his older brother".
(B)
(N.B. These 'reasons' provide a class ic example of "bad reasons"
according to the system's own criteria. They merely echo the
rhetoric of the children's panel: "needs not deeds" with no
assessment at all of what those needs might be.)
Third hearing: June 1977.
Grounds of referral: Review.
Decision: Adjournment for assessment.
The hearing was called because Paul's behaviour
had deteriorated to such a degree that he was
about to be excluded from school. He was
truanting, forging excuse notes (again),
disrupting classes and bullying other pupils,
as well as stealing. He had also run away
from home and stayed out overnight. Paul's
mother was said to be co-operating, albeit
reluctantly, with the supervision. Mr Cameron
refused to have anything to do with it. Two
possible courses of action were proposed for
consideration by the hearing: a full
psychological and educational assessment or
three months' 'grace' to give Paul a chance to
'pull his socks up'. The decision was in
favour of an adjournment for assessment.
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Reasons; "From reports available and following discussions
with Paul, his headmaster, social worker and
mother, the hearing felt that Paul's involvement
in further incidents of theft and housebreaking,
his non-attendance at school and his failure to
keep appointments at the social worker's request,
were giving cause for concern. The members felt
that further advice was needed before a
decision could be reached and requested an
Assessment Team Report. The hearing felt that
Paul's behaviour was being unduly influenced by
older boys and his parents' instructions
regarding this were being persistently ignored.
Despite his being only ten years old, it was
therefore decided that he should reside in the
centre for the assessment".
(C)
(N.3. 'Reasons* are only given for an adjournment if the child is
detained on a warrant, i.e. an explanation is required for
removal from home.)
Fourth hearing: July 1977.
Grounds of referral; Continuation.
Decision: Supervision at home.
The educational assessment showed Paul to be
well below average in intellectual ability and
lacking in concentration. The psychologist
concluded that the child was a very anxious boy,
and saw this high level of anxiety as the root
of both his truanting and his delinquent
activity. She felt the cause of the anxiety
was a constant awareness of both his parents'
chronic ill health. She also described Paul's
mother as "extremely co-operative". She felt
he had no psychiatric illness but rather "a
mixed behaviour'disorder". The team's overall
recommendation was that Paul be:
"... returned home under supervision ... that the
family (might) accept Dr X's offer of therapjr
for Paul to reduce the level of his anxiety.
However ... it must be made clear to Paul that
if he continues to truant, or to indulge in
delinquent activities, then that will leave no
alternative to committal to a List D school in
the future. "
The recommendation was accepted.
153.
Reasons: "After a period in the Assessment Centre, it
was apparent that Paul had various anxieties
which he was acting out. He agreed, together
with his family, to seek help from the Royal
Hospital for Sick Children. The hearing
therefore decided to continue supervision with
a warning that the next step would be List D
school".
(C)
Fifth hearing: June 1978.
Grounds of referral: Annual review.
Decision: Termination of supervision.
The social work report at this hearing stood in
marked contrast to earlier reports. Both
parents were unemployed because of ill health
and the father was said to be drinking heavily.
The family had failed to take up the offer of
psychiatric help, but
"... Paul seemed to be improving very well and to
have settled down considerably ... Paul's school
attendance is very good, as has been his
behaviour both in and out of school. His
mother ... reckons he received such a fright at
the Assessment Centre that he will not put
himself in a position where he might have to go
back there ... his spell there was the best
thing that could have happened to him ...
He has always been very co-operative when I
have seen him ...
Paul is due to start at (secondary) next term and
I would suggest to the panel that he does so with
a 'clean slate and his supervision order be
terminated'."
The recommendation was accepted by the hearing.
15^.
Seasons: "Paul's progress over the past year has been
very good. School and Social Background reports
both indicate how well he is doing. The hearing
therefore decided to terminate the supervision
requirement".
(G)
Sixth hearing: October 1979•
Grounds of referral: Theft by housebreaking.
Decision: Adjournment for assessment.
In September 1979* Special Educational Services
informed the Heporter that Paul was about to be
excluded from school and that both he and his
mother had failed to keep appointments to
discuss the situation. It was felt by the
Department that Paul would eventually have to be
sent to a List D school. A further letter in
October indicated that Paul was involved in
gambling and glue -sniffing. The hearing was
actually called on grounds of theft. A new
social worker became involved who reported that
he had managed to talk to Paul's father, who
seemed "reasonable", that the mother had not
received any letters of appointment and that the
glue sniffing was an isolated incident. However,
prospects of Paul keeping his secondary school
place seemed bleak. There was a recommendation
of supervision and a home assessment to explore
"the possibility of alternative educational
provision". The hearing decided to adjourn for
such an assessment to enable members to make a
more informed decision.
Peasons: Not required for an adjournment.
* The decision in the Fifth Hearing is an open acknowledgement of the
stigma attached to being on supervision. The recommendation was that
Paul should start with a 'clean slate' at secondary school. It should
be noted that a strong case could have been made for continuing
supervision at this point to facilitate a smooth transition to secondary
school. In such cases, a great deal depends on the perceptions of the
family and the child. Had they asked for supervision to continue for a
further period, the decision would almost certainly have complied with
their wish.
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Seventh hearing: December 1979 •
Grounds of referraL; Continuation.
Decision: Supervision at hone with a condition of
attendance at the YFU.
The D.S.E.S. remained adamant in its
recommendation of a List D placement. The
psychiatrist at ... on the other hand felt that
the family should be offered an opportunity to
channel its obvious strengths towards keeping
Paul at home. The hearing decided on a home
supervision order with attendance at a Young
Person's Unit as a formal requirement.
Seasons: "A full discussion took place and it became clear
that one positive offer (?) was a Supervision
Requirement with a condition of attendance at the
... by Paul, together with other members of the
family. The school felt that this additional
help would be of assistance ... in dealing with
Paul ... it was clearly understood that a review
would be called if required, when a residential
placement would be the only other solution.
Mrs Cameron assured the hearing of her and the
family's co-operation in the decision".
Eighth hearing: December 1980.
Grounds of referral: Annual review, theft and assault.
Decision: Supervision at home.
In May 1930, Paul was referred to the Reporter
on grounds of theft and assault. The social
worker submitted a full report, indicating that
up until that time, there had been a marked
improvement in Paul's behaviour and suggested
that it might be appropriate to take no further
action unless Paul was involved in any additional
offences. This recommendation was accepted.
Paul's next hearing was therefore the annual
review. To the annoyance of the social worker
and the surprise of the hearing members, the
additional grounds were put to Paul, but were
soon dismissed as having been already covered.
It was clear that Paul had benefitted from his
sessions at the YPU but the situation at school
remained unstable and his classroom behaviour,
erratic. The school report suggested cause
for "muted optimism". Supervision was
continued without formal involvement by the YPU.
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Seasons: "A full discussion took place and we had the
help of Mr V. from the school. Paul had taken
steps to occupy his leisure time and he had made
some small gains at school due in some measure to
the support of the staff. Attendance had
improved, though time-keeping was not satisfactory.
Because Paul needed further support and
encouragement, it was agreed to renew the
supervision requirement though this time with no
condition."
(D)
Ninth hearing: March 1981.
Grounds of referral
Decision:
Review, theft, assault and trespass.
Supervision at List D.
At the end of February, the Reporter was informed
that Paul had been excluded from school. This
exclusion was the culmination of a gradual
deterioration in his behaviour. Things were
going badly at home too, with FSaul staying away
for days on end. A place was available at a
suitable List D school. The social worker wrote:
"... it is with some regret that I make this
suggestion. I feel that, had adequate
alternative provision been available, it might
have been possible to avoid Paul's removal from
home ... in the circumstances, I can really see
no alternative ..."
Paul was admitted to a List D school.
Reasons: "The decision was made in view of the facts of
Paul's lifestyle, i.e. staying out at night
without parental consent or knowledge,
involvement in minor trouble with the police,
rows at school with the staff and a seeming lack







Decision: Continued residential supervision.
There were two referrals to the Reporter during
the year, concerning minor incidents, which
were dealt with internally by the school through
a temporary loss of privileges for Paul,
otherwise the reports were very favourable and
optimistic, showing an all-round improvement in
Paul's behaviour and attitude. It was decided
that Paul should complete his schooling at
List D.
Reasons: "... that Paul has made very good progress at
(List D) and is enjoying and benefitting from
current work experience and that it is clearly
in his interests as seen by his mother, himself,
the social worker and the school to continue at
(List D) until he is due to leave this summer".
(E)
Eleventh hearing: May 1982.
Grounds of referral: Review.
Decision: Termination of supervision.
Reasons: "... that although Paul has failed to find
employment, he is determined to do so and
intends to maintain contact with both the school
and the social worker. He has clearly made
good use of his time at (List D) and has taken
full advantage of what the school has to offer.
KEVIN MACDONALD is the second of two children and was first
referred to the Reporter in 1978 at the age of twelve years. He was
required to attend ten hearings betv/een then and June 1932.
First hearing: March 1978.
Grounds of referral: Theft (2).
Decision: Supervision at home.
Kevin had already received a police 'warning
about stealing and had taken money from home.
He had a serious problem of encopresis.
He was described 'as "a young Woody Allan".
Both parents were in employment but the mother
was not well. "Both parents are concerned and
very caring people 'who are at a loss to
understand Kevin's behaviour". It was
reported that the father's long hours and shift
work meant that he spent little time with Kevin
and most of their time together involved
disciplining him. The soiling and stealing were
seen to be possibly "indicative of deeper
problems".
Both Mr and Mrs Macdonald and Kevin feel that
intervention at this stage would be helpful.
The family are receptive to social work
involvement and the potential for constructive
use of supervision is very much in evidence.
The recommendation was accepted by the hearing.
Reasons: "The hearing members were concerned at Kevin's
continual stealing from home and also his
shoplifting activities. His parents were at a
loss what to do and welcomed Kevin being put on
supervision.
(A)
Second hearing: February 1979•
Grounds of referral: Annual review.
Decision: Termination of supervision.
The social work report was very positive. Kevin
had moved to secondary school without any real
difficulty, was involved in extra-curricular
activities and was making good progress.
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"Both Mr and Mrs Macdonald have shown that they
are very interested and concerned about Kevin's
progress. Mrs Macdonald changed her job in
order that she could be in for the children in
the mornings and when they came home from school. "
The recommendation was for the termination of
supervision. Help was also offered on an
informal basis should it be required. The
recommendation was accepted.
It should be noted that the school report
referred to Kevin as "a nuisance", "attention-
seeking" and "disruptive" in class. He was
said "to act the clown".
Reasons: "Kevin has not been involved in further offences
and has responded well to his period on
supervision. He has moved to secondary school ...
and although the school report indicated that he
was a bit of a nuisance in class, Kevin was aware
of his faults and said he would try to improve
his behaviour there. It xvas considered that he
could seek help from the social worker on a
voluntary basis".
(B)
Third hearing: 'August 1980.
Grounds of referral: Theft by housebreaking.
Decision: None - the grounds were denied and hence referred
to the Sheriff.
The social work report reiterated the parents'
genuine concern for Kevin but felt that they had
unrealistic expectations and placed too much
stress on his achievement rather than on his
happiness. Kevin was still very young for his
years. He was in the remedial department at
school, and at the receiving end of a lot of
bullying. The school report referred to his
inability to apply himself and his attention-
seeking behaviour. Kevin denied taking part in
the theft but admitted to receiving stolen money.
There was a recommendation of supervision.
160.
Fourth hearing: September 1980.
Grounds of referral: Remittance for disposal.
Decision: Adjournment for assessment.
A letter had been received from the school since
the previous hearing, explaining that Kevin had









Following a six week assessment, several detailed
reports were submitted to the hearing. A
psychiatric report referred to theft inside and
outside the home, to truanting from school and to
Kevin's staying out all night. Mr Macdonald was
seen as very punitive and his relationship with
Kevin quite unsatisfactory. He refused to meet
the psychiatrist. She saw Kevin as "physically
and intellectually retarded" but felt that the
co-operation necessary for therapeutic work with
the whole family would not be forthcoming. The
educational psychologist reported that Kevin was
"underachieving" to some extent and that he
should be able to manage the secondary course.
The overall assessment was confused and
suggested an eight week stay in a reception home
from which Kevin could continue attending school
and be observed further. The recommendation was
accepted.
"Kevin has bad a domicilliary assessment but
unfortunately the full extent of his problem is
not yet apparent. It was therefore decided
that we should also have information about the
way Kevin operates away from home and so
arrangements have been made for a short stay
(3 weeks) at ... We are very concerned that his
bad behaviour at school and his staying out all








After observing Kevin for several weeks in
the reception home, the assessment team
concluded that his problems arose partly from
his general appearance - he is very small, with
poor eyesight - which did not contribute to his
self esteem and partly from the dynamics of the
family, which were felt "unlikely to be open to
modification". There was a recommendation of
supervision at home and attendance at an
intermediate treatment group. However it was
stressed that should Kevin persist in truanting
and in delinquent activities, he would have to
be placed in a senior List D school. The
recommendation was accepted.
Reasons: "The decision was made in view of the need for
Kevin to face the situation as it exists.
Mother and father want Kevin at home. Kevin
to some extent does not trust them to meet him.
(Children's Home) considers that the next step
must be tried before the situation passes a
point of no return and the parents lose interest
The problem of school must be settled. "
(D)
(N.B. These reasons are very poorly formulated and almost
incomprehensible without access to the background reports.)
Seventh hearing: August 1981.
Grounds of referral:
Decision: Place of safety order.
Kevin turned up at his IT group bruised and cut,
allegedly by his father. After a lengthy
discussion and interviews with the parents, it
became clear that Kevin had behaved badly and hi
father had over-reacted, hitting him with
scissors. It was also clear from Mr Macdonald*
mood that the same thing might happen again.
Moreover, Kevin adamantly refused to go home.
Considerable confusion followed because his
social worker had left and Kevin's claims that
his mother drank seemed quite unsubstantiated.
The order was granted.
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Reasons: "She situation at Kevin's home was breaking down
with Mrs Macdonald saying Kevin was staying out
without her consent. (IT group) had also
noticed bruises on Kevin's arias caused by his
father hitting him. The panel decided to
continue the Place of Safety order ... until the
next hearing."
(E)
Eighth hearing: September 1931.
Grounds of referral: Continuation.
Decision: Residential supervision.
Kevin stated consistently that he wished to
remain in care and Mr Macdonald refused to have
him home. Members of the IT group felt that
supervision had broken down and the social worker
did indeed appear to be out of touch with recent
events. There was a favourable report on
Kevin's attendance and behaviour at the group
tv/ice weekly and at two residential camps.
Kevin still maintained that his mother drank,
his father said that he (Kevin) drove her to it
and Kevin was then punished. The old social
worker felt these accounts were exaggerated, the
new one could not gain any co-operation at all
from Mr Macdonald who was very angry at the
implementation of the Place of -Safety order.
Kevin is keen to stay on at school. It was
decided that Kevin should remain in the children's
home and attend school from there.
Reasons: "As Kevin did not want to return home and was
"
doing well at school since his admission to
(children's home), his father did not attend the
hearing and also said through Mrs Macdonald that
he did not want Kevin home. Mrs Macdonald
although wanting Kevin home, felt that perhaps a




Ninth, hearing: December 1931.
Grounds of referral: Review.
Decision: Residential supervision (continued).
Reasons:
Kevin had reached 16 and could not stay in the
children's home in the long run. It was a
reception unit which rigidly enforced a maximum
stay of six months. Kevin's state had
deteriorated badly. His mood had changed from
initial "euphoria" at being in care, to "general
apathy". He no longer wanted to go to school
and had no wish to return home. The social
worker felt there was no alternative to
returning to his family but the hearing viewed
this as unrealistic in the existing conditions.
It was generally agreed that Kevin could not yet
manage on his own. The decision was for Kevin
to continue in care prior to an eventual return
home.
"Kevin should remain at (children's home) for the
next two months. During this time a phased
return home will be tried by all parties
concerned. The panel members felt that Kevin
could not return home immediately."
(C)
(N.B. This is a reformulation of the decision and not of the reasons for it.)
Tenth hearing: June 1982.
Grounds of referral: Review.
Decision: Termination of supervision.
Kevin had been home for a trial period some time
after the last hearing, but things broke down
after a few weeks. He returned to the reception
unit and from there went on a number of weekend
visits to a home for older boys, which had a
vacancy. He then went there on "a holiday basis".
He also got a placement on a TOP scheme. The
social worker reported that Mr Macdonald had not
changed his attitude to Kevin at all, while
Mrs Macdonald maintained contact but seemed
relieved that he v/as out of the house. The nexv
home was prepared to admit Kevin on a permanent
basis until he became more independent. The IT
group continued to offer support. In the
circumstances there no longer seemed to be a role
for formal supervision.
16k,
"... that Kevin has settled down in (the home)
and is currently working well on a YOP scheme,
that he has regular contact with his mother and
the offer of continued support from (IT group).
In the circumstances there seemed no further
need for formal social work involvement."
(P)
TOM SINCLAIR is an only child whose mother died in 197^1 he was
first referred to the Reporter in 1973 at the age of six years. He
was referred to ten hearings between then and March 1932. 'This case
stands in marked contrast to the other two in that Tom was never required
to attend a hearing because of his own behaviour, but rather because he
was badly neglected.^ In addition, although all formal supervision is
terminated, he is only ten years old, so that the records are still on
file.
First hearing: January 1973.
Grounds of referral: Lack of parental care.
Decision: Issue of a warrant and application to Sheriff.
The RSPCC, Tom's GP and the social worker
submitted detailed reports sill indicating severe
neglect. Tom's father had left him to be cared
for by his mother (Tom's grandmother) and moved
to England, returning six months later to fetch
Tom. They lived together with a Mrs X for
fourteen months and the three came back to
Edinburgh fourteen months later when Tom was
voluntarily placed in the children's Shelter,
and shortly afterwards returned to his grandmother
until his father could find accommodation. In
the meantime his father was drinking heavily.
The grandmother was admitted to a psychiatric
unit three weeks after Tom's arrival from the
Shelter and Tom was sent to stay with an uncle
and aunt. At the hearing the grounds of
referral were denied but a warrant was issued
to prevent Tom's father from moving him yet
again prior to further enquiry.
Reasons: "In view of Mr Sinclair's threat to remove Tom
from where he is staying at the moment with an
uncle and aunt and taking into consideration the
serious nature of the grounds of referral, it
was thought to be in the boy's interest to take
out a Place of Safety order to ensure that he
remains with his uncle and aunt until the ...
court proceedings have taken place."
(A)






This hearing 'was held on a technicality, since
Place of Safety orders lapse after 21 days and
the court proceedings had not taken place.
"Until such times as the grounds of referral
v;ere established and a full hearing could take
place, the hearing felt that it was in Tom's








Supervision with condition of residence.
Tom had settled fairly well with his relations.
His father had not visited him since the last
hearing. Tom's grandmother had been released
from hospital but it seemed unrealistic to
think that she would be able to care for Tom
again. There was a recommendation that Tom
should continue to reside in his present home
and attend school from there.
"Mr Sinclair agreed that he could not provide a
home for Tom at the moment. Over the past few
years Mr Sinclair has moved from place to place
frequently. He has yet to show that he can
settle down and provide a stable environment for
his son. Tom is presently happily settled with
an aunt, and attending school regularly. The
hearing felt this arrangement should continue
while Mr Sinclair took the opportunity to set
up a home.
(C)
?ourth hearing: June 1973
Grounds of referral: Review.
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Decision: Continuation of supervision.
Tom's father was in full-time work but still
moving around with, no permanent address and
drinking heavily. He had been talcing Tom out
on Saturday afternoons but appeared to have been
leaving Tom and going off on his own or with his
co-habitee. Tom was doing well at home and at
school. In particular he was becoming less
isolated. He showed some ambivalence about the
time he spent with his father. The social
worker felt that overnight visits (requested by
Mr Sinclair) were not a good idea. "The
coincidental remarks of a six year old child are
not the basis for legal restrictions on parental
access, but they do suggest a need for caution
in arranging and monitoring that access". Tom's
stories had indicated that his father was drinking
heavily on their outings and had on at least one
occasion visited what sounded like a brothel.
The view of the social worker was fully endorsed.
Seasons: "Owing to the fact that Mr Sinclair has not got
a house and his co-habitee has two children in
care, the hearing felt that having Tom for
weekends was not a suitable plan at present.
Mr Sinclair was not at all happy -with this
decision".
(D)
Fifth hearing: December 1978.
Grounds of referral: Heview.
Decision: Supervision with a new residence.
Tom's uncle and aunt felt that they could not
continue looking after him as well as their own
children, particularly as Mr Sinclair created
enormous tension by his sporadic visits and
inconsistent behaviour. He had not seen his son
for eight weeks. It seemed quite inappropriate
for Tom to reside with him, particularly as he
still had no fixed address and Tom's feelings
towards him had become increasingly negative.
Hew foster parents had been found and Tom had been
for an evening and a weekend. It was agreed that
this new placement seemed to be the best
alternative.
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Seasons: "The hearing members were guided entirely by
the recommendation of the social work
department who stated that the fostering at the
(uncle and aunt) had broken down and that a
place had been found with the ... family."
(S)






The review hearing was not attended by Tom's
father. The social work report indicated
that steps were being taken to assume parental
rights on Tom's behalf so that he could be
adopted. Tom had adjusted well to the new
foster placement but -was still "shy and
withdrawn". Tom's father was taking legal
advice but his whereabouts were unknown. It
was decided that Tom should continue to stay in
the oresent foster placement.
Reasons: "Mr Sinclair has made no effort to visit Tom
during the past six months. No information is
available about his present circumstances as no
contact has been made with the social work
department. Taking the boy's history into
account, the hearing had no alternative but to
ensure that Tom i-emained in foster care."
(E)
Seventh hearing: May 1980.
Grounds of referral: Review.
Decision: Supervision in children's Home.
Mr Sinclair had visited Tom and created serious
problems by keeping him away overnight - the
police had been called in. The agreement with
the foster parents had been for one year and this
had now elapsed. They did not wish to continue
fostering Tom, mainly because of the tension
created by Mr Sinclair. He had appealed against
the assumption of parental rights and the appeal
was to be heard in three weeks' time. In the
circumstances a placement in a children's home
was seen as the only available alternative.
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Seasons: "The hearing members were concerned that the
foster placement for Tom had broken down which
had necessitated an immediate move to ...
children's home pending the outcome of the appeal
against the assumption of parental rights by
Tom's father. It was regretted that the father
could not be cited so that the recent developments
could be discussed with him, but it was the view
of the hearing that it would be in Tom's best
interests to remain for some time in the stable
environment of (children's home) with continuity










The Sheriff upheld Mr Sinclair's appeal against
the assumption of parental rights by the region.
In the circumstances long-term planning for Tom
had undergone a complete reversal and all
energies were being directed towards securing his
eventual return to his father. Tom had made
good progress in the children's home. A senior
social worker was making regular visits to
Mr Sinclair and his co-habitee and Mr Sinclair
was visiting Tom every Saturday. The school
report was optimistic. Mr Sinclair still had
no permanent home, so it was inevitable that Tom
should remain in the children's home.
"Tom has settled very well at (the children's
home) and is doing well at school. His father
is more optimistic about being allocated a house
and the plan at present is that the social worker
will give him support and continue the process of
more frequent visits by Tom to his father's
present accommodation so that they get to know
each other better and the co-habitee. The
hearing members were satisfied to continue the









Supervision residing with his father.
Mr Sinclair and his co-habitee had been given
a house (outside Edinburgh) with the help of
the social work department. Tom had been to
stay overnight several times. The children's
home was supporting the parents and offering
help. Tom displayed anxiety about leaving the
children's home but wanted to go and live with
his father. It was decided that the time had
come to attempt a return to the family home.
"It was considered that since Mr Sinclair now
had a house and a job and preparations had been
made by the social work department with him and
his co-habitee to receive Tom into the household,
Tom should return home but should remain on
supervision so that a social worker could help









The reports documented Tom's year at home in
great detail. After an initial "honeymoon
period" Tom went through two very bad patches
including severe temper tantrums and very
clinging behaviour for weeks on end. Mr Sinclaii
immediately asked for advice both from the social
worker and the children's home staff who all
provided help. The co-habitee had become very
fond of Tom and no problems arose when her two
sons moved in temporarily after an eviction.
The household also weathered a severe crisis when
Mr Sinclair became ill and was forced to give up
work. Tom was clearly well settled and formal
supervision was no longer necessary.
"It was decided to end the supervision
requirement because it seemed that Mr Sinclair
and Mrs X had successfully established a home of
which Tom was a part and that there was no need




It is worth noting that when foster placements break down (twice
in this case) remedial action usually has to take place before a hearing
can be arranged, so that in such cases the 'decision' is often little
more than an endorsement of action taken by the social work department.
In this case the hearing could have decided to return Tom to the care of
his father at any time, but it hardly seemed a real option. It should
also be stressed that the eventual outcome in no way negates the attempt
to assume parental.rights. This rather drastic action may well have
been the factor that finally brought Mr Sinclair to his senses - he began
visiting his son regularly and reliably only after being informed of the
plan to have Tom adopted in the future.
Discussion
Six features emerge from these cases with varying degrees of
clarity. First, the tentative nature of all of the decisions is
indicative of the lack of certainty as to the best course of action.
Second, in offence and truancy cases, there is a constant balancing of the
non-punitive and the punitive. Help is offered, advice given, but 'the
consequences' of non-co-operation are constantly emphasised - the List D
stick. Third, there is a persistent underlying assumption that removal
from home should be a measure of the last resort. The view that taldng
a child away from parents can only rarely (if ever) be in the interests
of the child, is rooted in empirical observations and independent
principles. The latter can be seen in the belief that parents have a
right to raise their own children, except where this is forfeited by
cruelty, negligence or disability. This is clearly reflected in the
fourth, common element, namely the strong emphasis on parental competence
in arriving at any decision. Where parents are deemed to be
"responsible", "concerned", "in control" and so on, the outcome of hearing
is quite different from situations v/here parents are seen as "inadequate"
or "in need of support". Fifth, and rather less interestingly, although
equally important, one is struck by the limited disposals available to the
panel. Even when Paul was finally sent to a List D school, the social
worker regarded this as indicative of "the lack of alternative provision"
rather than an ideal placement. Sixth, and closely related to the fifth
factor, is the obvious autonomy of the education department. Where a
child is excluded from school for example, the panel has no powers to
reinstate the child or to implement an alternative placement, except at a
List D school, which is outwith the jurisdiction of the education
department. The fifth and sixth points do not require further
elaboration here, the first four features will be discussed and developed
further.
The first point observed in the careers was the tentative nature of
the decision. This is not only the outcome of the present state of
knowledge, but more importantly seems inevitable in any form of
consequentialist argument. However much understanding of the
developmental process from childhood to adulthood increases, there can
never be a control against which to test the success or failure of any
given decision - that a specific child grows into a law-abiding,
contented adult, does not indicate the wisdom of any compulsory measures
of care, any more than a child growing into a hardened criminal is proof
that the wrong decisions were taken. The most that can be said in the
former case, is that no harm was done and in the latter that it does not
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appear to have helped. 3ut even here, it might make a difference to a
child to know that there were people genuinely concerned for his/her
welfare. These observations are very similar to those made on assessing
child-rearing techniques in an earlier chapter (p.61 ). However, there
is an additional factor here. 'The impossibility of ever proving
conclusively that a certain course of action was "in the best interests
of the child", lies not only in the lack of any independent control, but
also in the fact that an appearance at a hearing or in a juvenile court
is just one small event among a very wide range of occurrences and
situations affecting a child. It is not at all unusual for fairly
persistent boy offenders to reform in a very short space of time after
making a new friend (usually a girl) who strongly disapproves of his
behaviour. Similarly, a teacher may take a particular interest in a
child, with far-reaching consequences. Family events too have an
overwhelming effect - births, deaths, marriages, divorces, are at least
as likely to make a lasting impact as any compulsory measures of care.
One of the strengths of the system is that at its best, it has the
flexibility to take these other changing factors into account and vary
decisions accordingly. The key problem in the present context is seen
to lie in the inevitable difficulties of relying very heavily on
consequential!st reasoning. If the future is unknown and largely
unknowable, how can a system of justice be based so heavily on reasoning
about possible future outcomes? The argument will return to this
question later. The second point, concerning the mixture of non-
punitive and punitive reasoning exemplified by hearings is yet another
way of vie\tfing the conflict between the rhetoric and the reality of the
system. Critics argue that treatment is simply another form of control
and that in the eyes of children the distinction between compulsory
measures of care and punishment is of no significance at all. The type
of reasoning shown above is produced as overwhelming evidence for their
case. This seems an oversimplification of a very complex process,
familiar to anyone who has day-to-day dealings with children. The
'carrot and stick' approach is so all-pervading, it seems almost
absurd to question its legitimacy, what is new is its incorporation into
a formal system of justice. Children at home and in school are daily
offered 'carrots' in the form of praise and encouragement, as well as
material rewards, and 'sticks' in the form of displeasure, threats and
actual punishments. Moreover, there are criteria of justice governing
the informal system too. Thus it has always seemed a flagrant injustice
to me, when children are offered huge gifts in the event of a good exam
result - do badly in the exam and you suffer a second misery, the
withholding of the present. Similarly within the context of a children's
hearing there are criteria (usually unarticulated) governing the just
application of non-punitive and punitive forms of reasoning. Consider
the case of a fourteen year old girl who found herself in the assessment
centre after getting drunk when both her parents had run av/ay with their
respective lovers, being told 'You asked for it ...'. Within the
evaluative framework of the system itself, the punitive approach could
only be regarded as intrinsically unjust if all talk of punishment is
seen as antithetical to the interests of the child. No such suggestion
has ever been made. It is the rhetoric that is at fault here, not the
system as it actually operates. However the critics have a point 'which
must ultimately be answered, in that in reality punitive disposals are
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sometimes used as a way of furthering the interests of the child and at
other times as an end in themselves (see example G in Category II).
The second have no place at all within a welfare system and the former
need to be governed by formal criteria of justice as much as the latter.
"Interests" should never be regarded as a carte-blanche to act without
restraint, nor indeed are they so in practice. Some of the constraints
on any hearing are illustrated in the third and fourth points above.
But before moving on to these, it might be helpful to summarise the
argument so far.
Seasoning about interests in children's hearing (as in courts of
law) involves consequentialist considerations of a special kind and in
addition a balancing of non-punitive and punitive arguments to a degree
that seems quite alien to other kinds of legal reasoning. The detailed
examples illustrate clearly that this reasoning does not occur in a
vacuum but rather with reference to specific aims apart from the
generalised aims of the system. In Paul Cameron's third hearing, for
example, the aims were clearly to get him to change his behaviour both in
and out of school, "interests" were thus identified with whatever course
of action was most likely to get him to stop stealing and bullying. In
the circumstances three months' 'grace' seemed unlikely to result in
improved behaviour and the psychiatric assessment certainly revealed a new
dimension of which all those concerned had been quite unaware. Similarly
at Kevin's first hearing the aim was to put a stop to his persistent
thieving - "interests" were seen to lie in whatever might achieve this aim.
With Ton too, interests were identified by reasoning with reference to a
well-defined aim, namely finding a stable home for him. The first two
elements viewed as characteristic of the reasoning in hearings can thus be
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validated or rejected by examining the aims of the system and of the
individual hearing. V/here these are seen as just, this type of
reasoning cannot be entirely inconsistent with the relevant criteria
of justice. If the aims are unjust, so too are the means of achieving
them. However, the end does not justify any means. The narrow range
of available disposals makes it clear that the aims have to be achieved
(if they are to be achieved at all) by using a very small number of
options. These options are not only limited by statute but by the kinds
of considerations mentioned under the third and fourth points above.
It is clear that in reasoning about the interests of the child, the hearing
members attach considerable weight to factors other than immediate aims
and formally acceptable means of achieving them. The scope of the
argument can be widened here, for what is viewed as "acceptable" by a
hearing in identifying interests and what is regarded as "reasonable" by a
court of law where "reasonableness" is the focus of a decision, both
appear to rest on objective assessments, but further analysis reveals the
importance of the context in which these judgements are made and of
underlying shared values which often remain unarticulated. It is hoped
that a discussion of these and similar types of judgement will prove
instructive. The next chapter will thus extend the focus of the
argument in the hope of shedding light on a kind of reasoning which occurs




Evaluative Seasoning and the Weighing of Interests
The process of reaching a conclusion as to the interests of a
child in a children's hearing involves a constant balancing and assessment
of all the available information in an attempt to arrive at the best
possible disposal. It was suggested in the previous chapter that certain
aspects of this process seem very similar to whole areas of law unrelated
to juvenile justice. The decisions as to whether or not 'reasonable care'
was taken, as to what constitutes a 'fair rent', as to whether or not am
individual exhibited 'unreasonable behaviour' all seem to necessitate an
answer to the question posed by J. Wisdom:
"When all the facts are known how can there still be
a question of fact?" (l)
One may have access to all the available facts concerning a child
like Tom Sinclair and yet still not be able to determine what should be
done in his interests. One may appear to know all the events leading up
to an accident and remain undecided as to whether it was a case of
culpable negligence. A judge may be privy to all the details of certain
marital disagreements and still uncertain as to whether or not one party
behaved unreasonably. In all the above situations the final judgement
involves weighing the factors, but in order to weigh one must first have
weights and what makes this type of reasoning perplexing is that the
1. J. Wisdom, 'Gods' (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society XLV
19V*-5) p.193.
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weights have not been assigned in advance, but are rather arrived at
in the course of the argument and hence seem to have an irreducibly
subjective element. And yet both in courts and in children's hearings
there is a strong degree of consensus. Wisdom writes of this form of
reasoning:
"It has its own sort of logic and its own sort of
end - the solution of the question at issue is a
decision, a ruling ... But it is not an arbitrary
decision, though the rational connexions aire neither
quite like those in vertical deductions nor like
those in inductions ..." (2)
The question to be examined is thus given that:
"... we ascribe greater or lesser weight to some
reasons or factors than others ... how can we do so in
any kind of objectively reasonable way?" (3)
Chaim Perelman has posed the problem in the following terms:
"The reasons on which our decisions are based consist
more often than not of opinions which we consider
the most probable, probability in this case being in
any case rairely susceptible of quantitative
determination. These opinions are worked out by
means of reasonings which depend neither on self-
evidence, nor on an analytic logic, but on
presumptions whose investigation depends on a theory
of argumentation. Not all opinions and all
argumentations merit equal consideration. This
does not prevent the existence of a rational
argumentation, an argumentation which, like Kant's
categorical imperative claims to be valid for the
community of reasonable minds". (k)
2. J. Wisdom, op.cit., pp.19^5*
3. D.N. MacCormick, forthcoming article, 'On Reasonableness' in
Ch. Perelman CedJ Les Notions a Contenu Variable en Droit
(Brussells) Section III. ~
k. Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem cf Argument
(koutledge, New York, 1963J p.97.
How does such "rational argumentation" proceed and how does
it move to an acceptable conclusion?
It will be argued here that decisions of the kind under
discussion can only be taken within a system of values and a
commonly accepted body of knowledge, and that even inside such a
system decisions are and cam only be reached within a fairly narrow
sphere, which is partly determined by the context in which they are
made. The discussion will first turn to the need for a system of
recognized values.
Becognized values
The term "recognized values" is used advisedly. It will be
argued that for the kind of reasoning under discussion to reach an
acceptable conclusion, there is a need for agreement on which values are
to count, that is for a system of "recognized values", rather than for
a system of shared values. This qualification is essential, since it
explains how, for example, a practising Catholic can preside over a
Scottish divorce court. Such a judge's personal values would rule out
all divorce, but a court (like a children's hearing) does not operate
within the framework of individual values, but rather those of the society
and the system over which it has jurisdiction. If the judge felt
sufficiently strongly, it presumably might be permissible to opt out of
divorce cases, but it would not be in order to deny a divorce to all
couples appearing in the court on the grounds that divorce is wrong.
"Becognized values" are thus those values which are or should be
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operational in the decision-making process at hand. *
It is important to realise immediately that to argue for a set
of common recognized values as a necessary condition of reaching
agreement on the significance and implications of a number of
acknowledged facts, is quite independent of the much wider question of
whether or not there exist criteria for choosing between different value
systems. The Catholic may be right. The present discussion should in
no way be taken to imply that any set of values is as good as any other.
The point which is being made and has already been made in the preceding
chapter, can perhaps be illustrated rather forcefully by imagining the
reaction to a woman's complaint that her husband only stayed one night
a week with her and spent the other six with other women, in a monogamous
and in a polygamous society. In the former such behaviour would not
only be deemed 'unreasonable* but would constitute overwhelming grounds
for divorce. In the latter, the woman might well be told to count herself
* Familiarity with Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard,
Cambridge 1978) might give rise to speculation as to whether or not
"recognized values" are simply another name for what Dworkin terms
"principles". There is clearly a marked similarity between the two
concepts but they are nevertheless distinct. Principles are viewed
by Dworkin as particular kinds of reasons for making certain
decisions. They do not apply in an "all or nothing way" but are
brought to bear in "hard cases". Moreover they (like recognized
values) have weight and their weights are assigned during the
reasoning process which culminates in a decision. Principles like
recognized values are to be found in an institutional context.
However principles are an integral part of Dworkin's rights' thesis
and they come into play primarily in determining where the rights of
individuals lie in "hard cases". Recognized values are rather a
feature of evaluative reasoning in a specific context. In
particular, with respect to this thesis, they serve to identify
interests in a system of juvenile justice. These interests may or
may not enjoy the status of rights within the system. At the most
general level, recognized values can be said to have wider
application than Dworkin's principles but there is clearly a considerable
area of overlap between them.
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lucky! The 'unreasonableness' of the man's behaviour in the former
society is as self-evident as its 'reasonableness' in the latter.
Where social institutions are commonly accepted, conformity to them is
not seen as a matter of personal choice, subject to individual
preference, but rather as an objective fact about the world. In such
a situation certain kinds of behaviour will automatically be regarded
as 'objectively reasonable*. Where the institutions rest on rockier
foundations the criteria of 'reasonableness' are no longer 'self evident*.
One hundred years ago women demanding the same kind of education as men
were considered 'unreasonable'. Today it is those trying to deny women
equal education who are deemed 'unreasonable'. 'Reasonable' is thus
itself a relative term or perhaps more accurately what has been described
as:
"a value-function which covers a range of variable
factors and values at different levels varying according
to the particular topic or focus of concern in different
types of case and fields of law". (5)
Similar observations can be made on the assessment of the interests of
children.
It was stated above "an assessment of both interests and needs
involves criteria of value" (p. 129). The current orthodoxy on one
aspect of children's interests was recently voiced by a speaker at a
meeting of the Scottish Child Law Group:
"I believe it is an unchallengeable fact that man
has found no better way of rearing children than
in families - however one defines 'better' or
whatever the objectives of child rearing". (6)
5. D.N. MacCormick, op.cit., Section IV.
6. L.J. McEwan, 'A Social Work Perspective' in Scottish Child Law
Group, Parents' Rights, Children's Welfare and State
Intervention (.January 1980J p.3« ""~™~""""" "" "
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This is the often unarticulated assumption underlying the
identification of interests in children's hearings. The implication
is that if for some reason a child can no longer stay with its natural
parents, a substitute family must be found. The important point here
is to realise that this assumption has at best a very partial basis in
any scientifically established fact. The scores of broken marriages
and unhappy children appearing at the panel and elsewhere are hardly
strong testimony to the strengths of the nuclear family, yet the belief
persists and interests are identified accordingly. This is dearly
reflected in the third and fourth points above (pp.171-172). A less
extreme example can be seen in attitudes to education. In attempting
to identify the interests of a twelve year old truant, the question asked
is usually "How can we get her back to school?" There is only very
rarely a suggestion that it might be appropriate for a given child not to
attend school and this particular belief is enshrined in the law. It is
a belief that is being challenged in sane quarters. Michael Duane writes
that in:
"The school of the future ... the children will be
free to choose whether or not to come to school and
what they shall do while they are there". (7)
It is clear that were these views to become generally accepted
or recognised, interests would no longer almost automatically be
identified with school attendance. One final example to stress the
point. In the current climate of high unemployment and almost no job
7. Michael Duane 'Freedom and the State System of Education' in
a collection Children's Rights (Elek, London, 1971) p.2*f0.
prospects for non-certificate school leavers, it would not seem
entirely inappropriate to advise some young offenders to perfect
their thieving techniques. The advice is never given because it
contravenes all kinds of assumptions about what constitutes a decent
way of life and interests sire quite properly identified in the light
of these assumptions. Becognized values can thus be seen to be a key
factor in the reasoning described at the beginning of the chapter. Is
it possible to give a more systematic account of the way in which they
operate?
The actual operation of recognized values will vary from one
context to another. But it is clear that in any context there sure many
vsilues relevant to the various decisions taken and in most cases there
is a hierarchy of values which is rarely made explicit. To explore this
further the discussion will concentrate once more on the sirea of juvenile
justice. The argument will focus for a time on examples of theft by a
child and it will become apparent that recognized values lie at the very
heart of the dialogue which occurs at children's hearings and indeed of
the sentencing process in juvenile courts too.
The first premiss underlying all such referrals or charges is
that: stealing is wrong. It is highly unlikely that anyone within the
hearing or court system or even among readers of this text, would question
this assertion (hence it might be termed a "provisional fixed point" as
explained on p.17 above) but it in fact depends for its validity on the
assumption of the legitimacy of private property and it must be
acknowledged that such legitimacy is itself not beyond dispute, but
involves a particular view of human beings and the ways in which they do
and ought to live together. Where such views are rejected, the contention
that stealing is wrong may not only become a matter for debate but
almost meaningless. Agreement on the wrongful nature of stealing is
however, no more than a starting point when faced with actual cases.
Consider the following examples:
(1) Stealing an apple off a tree hanging on to the street.
(2) Stealing sweets from a shop.
(3) Stealing a suitcase full of clothes from a department store.
(k) Stealing a radio from someone's home by breaking in.
(5) Stealing a car and driving it away.
Suppose these thefts were all committed on various occasions by a
twelve year old boy who was neither starving nor homeless, that is (in
the terminology of Chapter 3) whose basic interests were being met and who
moreover was quite aware of what he was doing. What attitudes would be
taken towards these offences? In the absence of any further information,
such as whether or not an adult was involved, and holding all factors
constant for the five cases, it can be predicted with some certainty that
panel members, juvenile judges and once again the reader of this account,
would regard these events as increasingly serious with (4) and (5) as the
most disturbing. The basis for this prediction is the existence of well-
established values which would almost certainly be brought to bear on
such cases. The first and second would be regarded as pranks or giving
way to temptation and although not actually condoned would be dismissed
as trivial either with or without a homily on the evils of taking what is
not one's own. The third would cause greater concern for two reasons.
First and probably less importantly, because of the much greater value of
the stolen property and secondly and fair more seriously because of the
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premeditated nature of the action. Even if the sweet stealing were
premeditated in the sense that the boy entered the shop in order to
take the sweets, to go into a large store with an empty suitcase aiming
to fill it, does suggest a far greater degree of deliberate intent to
do wrong and hence a step further on the road to criminality, than the
second example. Breaking into a private home (always postulating the
absence of further information) certainly appears to involve not only
deliberate intent, but a lack of concern for the feelings of others
which is not manifest in the same way by stealing from a public place.
The people living in the house will at very least suffer a shock quite
apart from the loss of any property. The invasion of privacy is
regarded by most as a wrong quite irrespective of whether or not anything
is stolen. This latter element is absent in the last example but there
is a new factor here which will make it highly probable that, at least
in the case of a twelve year old offender, this would be regarded as the
most serious. A twelve year old at the wheel is a serious threat to
life and limb. In addition, given the absence of insurance in nearly
all such cases, there is often no possibility of any kind of compensation
for the potential victims. Summarising from the examples, they can be
said to incorporate the following beliefs and assumptions:
(a) the legitimacy of private ownership which leads to:
(b) the claim that stealing is wrong;
(c) the belief that premeditation is more serious in cases of
theft (elsewhere too?) than giving way to temptation on the spot;
(d) the belief that the invasion of privacy is an independent wrong; *
(e) the belief that endangering life is far more serious than either -
stealing or invading privacy.
The concept of privacy like that of private ownership rests on a
certain view of people and society.
It should be evident that the above beliefs are not arbitrary
but can all be argued for and that at some point a lack of agreement
would have to be regarded as a lack of common perspective and hence an
inability to reach any kind of consensus. Consider the claim that
theft (of any kind) is far more serious than endangering life, that is
that the sanctity of private property always outweighs the sanctity of
life. Regardless of the status of such a belief, that is irrespective
of whether or not it could be said to be mistaken, it is quite clear
that it could not be accommodated in a communal decision-making process
that involves, at least partially, an assessment of the gravity of
certain types of behaviour. This is not a denial of the possibility that
recognized values might be such that the sanctity of property always
outweighed the sanctity of life. The dialogue and reasoning can only
begin on the basis of recognized values,and in their absence necessarily
breaks down.
The examples all focussed deliberately on one aspect of theft
referrals or charges, namely the offence itself, postulating that other
factors should be held constant and ignored. In any actual case of this
kind involving children, the offence is only one element. A hierarchy
of recognized values will come into play with almost every element taken
into consideration. Other factors to be considered (already mentioned
above) will include at the very least, the offender's home circumstances
and his performance and behaviour at school. The most basic and rarely
challenged assumptions concerning home life are that parents have a right
to raise their children unless they have somehow forfeited it through
neglect and abuse and that except in such cases children should live
with their families. The Sheriff's ruling (quoted on p. 193 below) in
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'Bom Sinclair's 'career' outline is overwhelming testimony to these
views. Prevailing attitudes towards schooling have already been
described (p. 182). The underlying assumptions are that children
need education and that except in unusual circumstances, this is best
achieved in a school setting. Despite repeated offending, Paul Cameron
was not sent to a List D school until he was excluded from day school.
Once again, however well-established, every assumption is no more than
a "provisional fixed point" and is therefore open to challenge and can
be questioned and disputed and some positions will always appear
(8)
inherently more reasonable than others. A recent article has
suggested that parents might be licensed before being allowed to raise
children. Michael Duane's views cited above (p. 182 ) are a total
rejection of the beliefs currently underpinning attitudes to children
who fail to attend school. Should either of these proposals assume the
role of prevailing orthodoxy and become enshrined in the law, the
decisions regarding children in both hearings and courts would be quite
different. In the event of even a minority of panel members bringing
such opinions to bear on the issues coming before them, agreement would
become almost impossible. It is only in rare instances that such a
clash of principle occurs during hearings and presumably in juvenile
courts too; were it to become a common occurrence, the reasoning that is
taken to be characteristic of such settings simply could not take place.
In practice the basic assumptions are so rarely questioned, that they
assume the status of objective facts rather than recognized values.
Before looking at what occurs when all the aspects of the case are viewed
8. Hugh Lafollette 'Licensing Parents', Philosophy and Public
Affairs 9, 2 (1980) pp.l82-197.
as a whole and finally weighed, it might be advisable to give some
thought to the other two elements claimed to be central to the
reasoning process under analysis: first, a commonly accepted body of
knowledge and, second, the narrow sphere within which decisions are
made.
The role of facts
There would seem to be a body of uncontested facts which is
essentially different from any values, even the least disputed, although
it has been apparent throughout this discussion that the distinction
between fact and value is often very hazy. The statement regarding the
role of the family cited on p. l8l seems to me to be a statement of value
and yet was presented as "an unchallengeable fact". Similarly, the
discovery of 'facts' in many research projects is a direct consequence of
the evaluative framework of the research, of the questions asked, and
often Of the impossibility of any independent control. However even with
these strong qualifications, there does seem to be a body of undisputed
facts which is relevant in the balancing process being analysed here.
Examples of the kind of facts referred to are the effects of non¬
compliance with public health regulations in restaurants, the likely
results of smoking in the presence of flammable products, medical
knowledge on the symptoms and effects of diverse diseases, a child's
basic nutritional needs and so on. Thus where food is served from a
filthy kitchen, those responsible can be said to have been negligent, as
can the factory owner who permits smoking on the production-line for
flammable goods. Similarly a diagnosed kleptomaniac may be given special
consideration, and children deprived of a basic diet can be said to have
at least some of their interests ignored. Of course here too there are
often borderline cases. However it is clear that these facts have a
bearing on certain cases that is quite different from that of the values
described above. The case of Martin Seiferth (pp.71-78)
provides an outstanding example of how available knowledge can affect the
outcome of a case. Where such cases are to be decided on protectionist
criteria, what is for the good of the child can only be determined (if at
all) by referring to what is known about the condition to be rectified.
•Hie hypothetical case of undescended testicles (p. 77 above) provided
another clear example. The damage caused by postponing surgery until
puberty, has only been discovered fairly recently. Before this fact came
to light, there would have been no grounds at all for proposing compulsory
treatment. These examples highlight a further complication, namely that
not only values but inevitably knowledge too is subject to change and
increased knowledge may well result in new criteria of reasonableness, of
negligence and of what is to count as an interest. Thus until it became
known that dirt breeds infection, it was not unreasonable or negligent
for a surgeon to proceed to the operating table without first washing
hands. Becent legislation on the compulsory wearing of seat belts is
also the direct outcome of studying the consequences of failing to take
such precautions. Presumably failure to comply with the new
regulations will in future count as negligence. The role that an
"accepted body of knowledge" necessarily plays in the reasoning process
appears to be less problematic than that of recognized values, but the
relationship between such values and the kind of facts just described, is
very complex.
In areas of controversy, the two sides may hold opposing views on
grounds of principle or on factual criteria or some fusion of the two.
Corporal punishment provides a good example. It is possible to put the
case for and against the practice in terms of certain values and on the
basis of empirical observation. One can argue for physical punishment
on retributive principles - violence should be met with violence - and in
terms of its supposed beneficial effects. Similarly, the case against,
rests on arguments concerning the dignity of the individual and respect
for persons, which are said to be violated by any form of beating, as well
as on the supposed ill effects of the practice - it breeds violence, fails
to act as a deterrent and so on. In each case principles and values can
be seen to play a prior role which exactly parallels the role they play in
the reasoning and balancing process under discussion. A convinced
retributivist will not be swayed by the evidence any more than the person
who regards corporal punishment as a violation of individual rights.
Each might summon arguments in support of their cause, for example,
"corporal punishment is barbaric and has been shown to cause lasting
damage", but in neither case does any evidence constitute the grounds for
the belief, rather the belief (where it exists) determines what is made
of the facts. The arguments for and against the reintroduction of
capital punishment exhibit similar characteristics. It is argued here
that this is the very same process which occurs in the so-called
"weighting" of factors that takes place in courts and in children's
hearings and indeed in extra-legal contexts too. In the long-run a
marshalling of evidence may lead to a modification of principle, but this
is a slow process, discussion of which is beyond the scope of the present
study. The point being stressed is that in the day-to-day decisions
being analysed here, "recognized values" play a central role that is often
not made explicit in the legal process, and is hidden by the rhetoric
of the system. They structure the reasoning that takes place in a
particular way, often determining what is 'made* of particular facts
and facts, in the sense of a body of knowledge, often determine what is to
be deemed 'reasonable' and what is to count as an interest. What of the
third element mentioned above?
The limited sphere of actual decisions
The third factor - undoubtedly the least interesting - claimed to be
characteristic of the reasoning being analysed here, is the narrow sphere
within which decisions are taken. This may perhaps seem too obvious to
mention but the account would be incomplete without drawing attention to
this point. It can be dealt with fairly briefly. In cases of purported
negligence, judges are asked to make a ruling on specific actions and the
degree of care taken in performing those actions, not for example on
whether a particular agent is a negligent person. Children's hearings too
have a very confined remit. They can order supervision to a social
worker but never choose the actual worker to whom the child is to be
entrusted, nor dictate the precise content of supervision. They may
decide on a placement at a List D school, but only rarely have more than
a marginal say as to which List D school, particularly as such schools are
under no obligation to take in pupils they do not wish to accept. If sill
such issues were left open to judges or hearing members to decide, there
would be a far wider measure of disagreement between panel members and in
some instances, arbitrary outcomes, or perhaps no decisions at all.
Decisions in such instances would depend to a very high degree on
individual decision-makers and would probably be predictable (if at all)
192
on the basis of knowledge of individual values and characteristics.
Here decisions would become individualised to a degree that would seem
to be unacceptable in a system of justice. The next chapter will return
to this theme. Enough has been said here to take a closer look at how
all three elements come together in the reasoning process.
The three elements in concert
It would seem helpful to take one of the 'careers* of the previous
chapter to show how all the various elements affect outcomes. Tom
Sinclair's case seems to be illustrative of much that is being elucidated
here. It is hardly a matter of controversy that abandoning a six year
old child first to a sick and unstable grandparent, subsequently to a new
cohabitee and then to a children's shelter whilst constantly under the
influence of drink, is constitutive of neglect. Whatever the lack of
conclusive evidence on child-rearing techniques, current knowledge is more
than adequate to attest to the damaging effects of such behaviour. By
the time of the third hearing Tom appeared to be happy and settled at
school, but it is important to note the last sentence of the reasons:
"The hearing felt this arrangement should continue
while Mr Sinclair took the opportunity to set up a
home".
Here is the first appearance of the implicit assumption or, in the
terminology of this thesis, "recognized values", governing the whole of this
case, namely that except in exceptional circumstances children should
reside with their parents. By the time of the fourth hearing, the father
had given ample cause to doubt his adequacy as a parent even further and
in addition Tom was not enthusiastic about seeing him, nevertheless
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although overnight visits were not permitted, there was no suggestion
at all that visits should cease altogether. It was apparent in the
fifth hearing that Tom's uncle and aunt's failure to offer him a home
any longer was due entirely to the father's unreasonable behaviour. By
the sixth hearing the father had failed to contact his son for six
months and the boy was not at all happy. The social work department
clearly felt that the parent had now forfeited all parental rights and
were talking steps that would ultimately lead to Tom's adoption by
alternative parents. Once again Mr Sinclair's subsequent behaviour
resulted in a breakdown of the foster placement and Tom was placed in a
Children's Home pending the father's appeal to the court. Because of the
court decision, all efforts were now channelled towards reuniting father
and son. Die Sheriff's reasoning is most instructive:
"It is provided by Parliament that, when a resolution
is passed by a Local Authority, assuming parental
rights, but the parent dissents, the resolution shall
lapse unless the Local Authority satisfies the Court
not only that it is in the interests of the child that
the resolution should not lapse, but that there were
specific grounds justifying the resolution and also
that the grounds continue up to the time of the hearing". (9)
It should perhaps be pointed out before discussing this issue further,
that the panel's decision-making role in this 'career' was fairly
minimal. Until the ninth hearing (when Tom finally went to live with
his father) the hearing only served to confirm an arrangement that had
been arrived at quite independently by the social workers involved.
Once again no attempt is being made here to offer criticism. The
9. Unreported case Sheriff Court, Haddington 1981.
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course of events may or may not have been the best in the circumstances
and the outcome certainly seems a happy one. The only aim at this
stage is to look at the reasoning and how the three elements described
above all helped to determine the results. Perhaps most illuminating of
all is the way in which certain recognized values, in this case the
concept of parental rights, act in the manner of what Joseph Raz has
termed "exclusionary reasons".
In Practical Reason and Worms, Raz points out that a logical theory
of practical conflicts demands a recognition of different forms of
argument. He goes on to state:
"... that we should distinguish between first order and
second order reasons for action and that conflicts
between first order reasons are resolved by the relative
strength of the conflicting reasons, but that this is
not true of conflicts between first order and second
order reasons". (10)
"Second order reasons" are defined rather tortuously as:
"any reason to act for a reason or to refrain from
acting for a reason. An exclusionary reason is a
second order reason to refrain from acting for some
reason". (11)
In the context of Raz's argument, a promise provides a good
example of a factor that can act as an "exclusionary reason".
Except in special circumstances, the fact that a promise was made to
perform a certain act, rules out the possibility of balancing the
other (first order) reasons for and against the very same act. It is
10. J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Hutchinson, London 1975)» P-36.
11. ibid., p.39.
195.
suggested that in the type of reasoning being examined here, certain
principles and values sometimes act as "exclusionary reasons" in
exactly the same manner. Parental rights provide an outstanding
example.
It was stated above that a commitment to the ideal of the nuclear
family played a crucial role in identifying children's interests. It
will be argued that in addition an implicit view of parental rights often
acts as a guillotine in any exploration of a given child's interests.
In other words it is not open to a court or to a children's hearing to
place a child with a substitute family for example, or less drastically
in a different school, on the grounds that the child will almost certainly
be happier there. Parents have a recognised right to make all, kinds of
decisions concerning the lives of their children, unless they have
forfeited this right in some specified way, and in many cases this right
acts as an "exclusionary reason" in the course of deciding how to further
a child*s interests. It has already been pointed out that in the
absence of any abuse or neglect, the judge determining custody after legal
separation or divorce, tries to ascertain which parent would best provide
a suitable home for the children involved not whether they might not be
happier living with quite different parents. The reasoning involved is
clearly illustrated by Sheriff X (cited above) in refusing to uphold the
assumption of parental rights in the case of Tom Sinclair. He makes it
clear that regardless of where a child's interests may be seen to lie,
parental rights can only be withheld if there sire other reasons apart from
perceived interests for doing so. In such cases parental rights "trump"
interests in the ssune way as Eaz's "exclusionary reasons" trump first order
reasons. They sire not just another factor to be put on the scales but
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rather determine what it is that can go on the scales in the first
place. They limit alternatives to a very considerable degree and in
a way that is hidden by the rhetoric of the system, that is, that the
interests of the child are the paramount concern. The three 'careers*
presented in the last chapter show this very clearly, Tom Sinclair's
most clearly of all. However what counts as an exclusionary reason is
once again dependent on the institutional framework within which such
reasons operate and on the principles which they reflect. Parental
rights would not count as an exclusionary reason or possibly any reason
at all in a society where children are reared communally. Similarly
under certain circumstances it is impossible to give consent to the
performance of some actions, for example, assault. Hence such prior
consent could never become a reason for doing or abstaining from doing
amything. Thus once again there are underlying criteria of value
which should be made explicit in order to reach a full understanding of
how actual decisions sire made.
The analysis so far has relied on fairly simple causes in order to
illustrate the complex relationship between recognized values, an
existing body of knowledge and the relatively narrow scope of the
decisions taken. The most complex cases are those in which, in addition
to these three elements, there is a conflict of recognized values. It
is in these cases that decisions become overtly controversial and are
sometimes on the basis of the majority opinion rather than unanimous
agreement. The case of Carol (p. lA-O) provides a useful example.
Here, a fourteen year old girl had not attended school for a year, was
clearly unhappy but very anxious to remain with her parents who apparently
provided a good home for her. The psychiatric report was of the firm
opinion that residential schooling would only heighten her anxiety.
The competing sets of values are thus those concerning home and
schooling. There were not the slightest indications of abuse or
neglect, nor had Carol ever been involved in any offences, hence (according
to the underlying recognized values) she ought to reside with her parents.
On the other hand, according to recognized values, fourteen year olds
need to go to school and are indeed required to do so by law. In such a
case, removal from home would appear to be the only certain way of
achieving this end. There seem to be three possible approaches to this
dilemma. One might wish to argue that there is no dilemma and that the
decision should be governed by one set of recognized values. It could be
said that failure to ensure that a child receives schooling, even if it
means accompanying her to school and possibly staying around during school
hours or undergoing psychiatric treatment, is in itself constitutive of
neglect, hence, whilst every precaution should be taken not to increase
the girl's anxiety, steps must be taken which will ensure that she will
receive some kind of education immediately. Alternatively those
opposed to compulsory education could presumably argue that the law in this
area is totally misconceived and the decision should be taken in the light
of the values attaching to residing with one's family.* Either way, the
dilemma disappears and reasoning can proceed on the basis of one set of
recognized values. In practice some hearing members, undaunted by the
psychiatric assessment, would adopt the first attitude. The second is not
open to hearing members.
A hearing member qua hearing member could not argue in the second
way since it is in direct contravention of the law, it also conflicts
with current recognized values, but followers of Michael Duane (p. 182)
would clearly approach the dilemma in this manner and it is presented
here for purposes of completeness.
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A second approach when faced with a conflict of values which needs
to be overcome or resolved before a decision can be taken, is to stipulate
that whenever such a conflict occurs, one set of values should always take
priority. Thus in the case of Carol, it could be argued that there is
indeed a conflict of values but homelife is far more important and
although every effort should be made to get her back to school, such
efforts must take place from and in co-operation with her home.
Alternatively one might argue that however valuable family life might be,
schooling is of even greater importance, so that she should immediately be
sent to school and every attempt should be made to pick up the pieces of
her home life afterwards. In practice and almost certainly without
realising it, panel members do indeed come to hearings with precisely such
priorities and decisions are taken accordingly. Once again discussion of
whether or not this is desirable, will be postponed.
The third approach, like the second, openly acknowledges the
existence of the conflict, but unlike the second, regards the two sets of
values as irreconcilable, within the particular context (they clearly are
not irreconcilable for the majority of children) and opts for seme kind
of compromise. This is clearly what occurred in Carol's case. She was
neither forcibly removed from home nor was she allowed to forget about
school. Cynics will probably respond by commenting that the decision
was tantamount to allowing the situation to continue, that is to taking
no action at all. But it might just be that the only fair and realistic
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decision was the one in fact taken. *
The issues raised here can be explained more schematically as
follows: the recognized values providing the framework within which
decisions are made in the hearing system, encompass both the basic
interests and the intrinsic interests outlined in Chapter 3. In
addition and cutting across these two types of interests, the law itself
sometimes actually defines what is to be regarded as an interest. This
can be seen most clearly in the area of school attendance: regardless
of any views on the irrelevance of the curriculum and the desirability
of some sort of work experience from a very early age for example, the
law declares that, very exceptional circumstances apart, a child ought
to attend school and interests are to be defined accordingly. Legal
values similarly play an additional, though not independent role, in
offence referrals: thieving is not in a child's interest, at least
partly, because it is against the law. The law here provides
exclusionary reasons for the system. It can now be seen that recognized
* There is a useful analogy to be made here with indifference curve
analysis as expounded by economists in the areas of demand theory
and welfare economics. Suppose am individual is equally fond of
apples and oranges for example,then s/he will be equally satisfied
with or indifferent with respect to having five of one and three of
the other or four of each and so on, but would obviously be better
off, that is where the two are plotted against one another, on a
higher curve, with twelve of one or six of each. In other words
overall welfare or satisfaction is the same anywhere along a given
curve and decreases or increases on lower or higher curves. In
exactly the same way it might well be that any action taken with
respect to children like Carol may well be no more than a move along
a given curve, giving her a little more schooling perhaps at the cost
of greater anxiety and less domestic security. In other words such
decisions might in no way change her overall welfare, but only its
constituent parts, hence giving rise to the delusion that something
has been done. The third approach implicitly encompasses the belief
that action should only be taken if there is some prospect of
improving the overall situation, that is, of moving onto a higher
curve.
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values operate at the level of basic interests and intrinsic interests
and can either accord or conflict with legally defined interests.
Basic interests can be broadly defined in terms of a child's need for
love, for shelter and for food and clothing. Intrinsic interests are
inherently more controversial but include at the very least recognition
of the need for some kind of education, for play, for friendship and for
privacy. It should be noted that all these interests are non-
substituable to a significant degree and are likewise no incomparable - a
child cannot survive undamaged where one, two or even three of these
needs sure met to the exclusion of all others. Consider the absurdity
of the assertion that a child doesn't need food because s/he is loved
(or vice versa), or similarly that s/he doesn't need friends because
s/he is achieving well in all school subjects (or vice versa). Can
these interests be ranked in any way and if so, should they be? It can
be asserted that at the simplest level, basic interests do (and should)
take priority. Few hearings would (or should) concern themselves in the
first instance with the educational requirements of a child abandoned on
the steps of the social work department. Can the basic interests
themselves be ordered? Once again, at the simplest level, they can be
and indeed are prima facie. Love clearly takes precedence, not because
it is necessarily viewed as the most important dimension of a child's
development but because it is clearly the only basic need whose
fulfilment cannot be guaranteed in any way at all. Foster parents and
Children's Homes can all provide more than adequate food and shelter as
well as a high degree of concern, but whether or not those caring for a
child will come to love it, is not merely unpredictable but would not
even seem to be a matter for speculation. It is for this reason that
where a child is clearly in a loving environment - and there sire of
course borderline cases here too - all efforts will be and should be
channelled towards meeting other needs within the context of the
present home surroundings. Some hard cases are precisely those where
it is felt that the circumstsmces are such that no amount of effort can.
adequately secure the other interests, hence even in undisputed cases
of love for a child, it may be necessary to decide on a removal from home.
The crucial factors in such a decision will be the extent to which other
interests, basic as well as intrinsic, are being neglected and in
addition the age of the child in question. Examples will make the
process clearer. Where parents have a severe drink problem such that
they are unable to give consistent care (regardless of their feelings
for their child) then the younger the child, the more likely its removal
from homo. A thirteen year old might well survive regular parental
weekend drinking bouts quite successfully, a six month old baby would
almost certainly be severely damaged. However, in the case of the
thirteen year old, the recognized values inherent in intrinsic interests
and the degree to which they were neglected might give rise to a decision
to remove the child from home. If, for example, s/he was quite unable to
attend school, or regularly went on shoplifting expeditions (or both)
whenever the parents were drunk, s/he would undoubtedly receive
sympathetic understanding from the hearing but would at the very least be
placed on supervision and in the event of continued truancy and theft,
would almost certainly be removed from home. These are precisely the
sorts of considerations that lie behind decisions such as that concerning
David (Category I, D, p. I'+l ). He was obviously neglected, but
nevertheless attending school and staying out of trouble. Moreover, he
wanted to stay at home. The child's wants provide the last piece
in the jigsaw showing the reasoning of hearings actually at work.
Where two courses of action both seem reasonable options, the child's
wants may determine the outcome in exactly the same way as in the
custody case cited in Chapter 2 (p.9l). Thus had David wished to
leave home, an order would almost certainly have been made accordingly,
not because of his wishes alone, but because in the circumstances they
would have seemed entirely reasonable. Had he been previously excluded
from school and/or involved in repeated offending, his wishes would not
have determined the outcome of the proceedings. The elements present
in the reasoning process are thus: a body of knowledge and a hierarchy
of recognized values which all have a bearing on the recognition and
weighting of basic, intrinsic and legally recognized interests.
Priority is given in the first place to basic interests but damage to
such interests may sometimes not provide a conclusive argument for
drastic remedied, action where such action itself might harm other
interests, whether basic or intrinsic or legal, that appear to be
undamaged and where the child in question articulates a strong preference
for one of a number of reasonable options. The decision-making process
can now be seen to be very complex and the key to its complexity lies in
understanding that although this process is rational and operates
according to an implicit ranking of priorities, none of these priorities
is indefeasible. It should be clear from the preceding discussion that
there are various reasons for this. At the simplest level, a preliminary
judgement may be rejected on receiving additional information. Secondly
the application of accepted general principles to individual cases
sometimes reveals that the principles are too crude and cannot be applied
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in the decision-making process without further refinement. Hence
interests often remain a matter of dispute even in settings where there
is total agreement as to whose and even which interests should be the
paramount concern. In the terminology of the beginning of this chapter,
the "ascription of weights" is often highly problematic and in need of
revision. In rather less abstract terms, some children, for example,
manage to survive quite cheerfully in circumstances in which others fail
to function at all and their respective interests must be identified
accordingly. Finally the case of an individual child may sometimes
reveal that the principles of the system sure themselves in need of
modification. In other words, a considered judgement about a given
child may simply not •square• with the established principles, priorities
and values of the system. In such a situation there is a need to
return to the balancing process involved in reaching a reflective
equilibrium, as described in the Introduction (pp. 16-17)
for such a case reveals sua unacceptable inconsistency of theory and
practice and a need for some kind of modification to achieve a new
equilibrium. The decisions of children's hearings should thus be
viewed as tentative conclusions rather than final resolutions. The
grounds given for identifying the interests of a child as lying in one
course of action rather than another and indeed those given for
decisions on the reasonableness or otherwise of certain behaviour,are
all "cumulatively persuasive rather than logically conclusive". It
would be a grave error to conclude from this that one decision is as
good as another. There are criteria for distinguishing good decisions
concerning reasonableness, from bad ones, for distinguishing just
disposals at a children's hearing from unjust ones. The next chapter




Conceptions of justice within decision-making systems are
inextricably bound with types of justification, that is with the general
and specific reasons supporting individual judgements or decisions in
actual eases. What counts as a good reason is determined to a very
great extent by the principles underlying the system and by its declared
aims. The general, nature of the rival principles in the area of juvenile
justice was outlined in the introduction with reference to Miller's
distinction between "legal justice" and "social justice". In any
hypothetical system purporting to focus purely on deeds, different
outcomes with respect to the same offences would involve an injustice,
whereas in an equally hypothetical system concerned exclusively with
needs, different decisions following identical offence referrals would
in no way be indicative of injustice, but rather precisely what the system
was aiming to achieve. Accusations of injustice therefore fall into two
broad categories: first, those which view the whole system as unjust
because they reject its underlying principles and declared aims and
second, those which point to injustices within the system, that is to
practices and disposals which appear to violate the principles and aims
according to which the system operates. Criticisms of the first kind
can be either on grounds of principle, for example, viewing all forms of
compulsion as a violation of individual rights, as do Farson and Holt
cited in Chapter 2; or on more pragmatic grounds, perhaps stating that
however laudable the ideals, they cannot be incorporated into a formal
system of justice.
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The second type of objection (sometimes in conjunction with the
first), is raised by Morris and Mclsaac and by their colleagues in the
Justice for Children organisation. It should be clear from the
discussion in the previous chapters, that views of the first type, in
particular child-libertarianism, are rejected here in favour of a
modified protectionism. But such a protectionist perspective may not
be immune from what have been termed "pragmatic" objections. These will
now be discussed more fully, since they have a direct bearing on the
question of what is to count as an unjust decision within the framework
of any welfare system and of the hearing system in particular. At
their most general, such objections are all levelled against the theory
of justice for children which has been implicitly adopted throughout this
thesis. It might therefore be helpful to begin by summarising this view
and then trying to meet each objection in turn.
Modified Protectionism in Outline
Liberal theories of the state such as those of Bawls, Dworkin and
Nozick, support competing theories of justice and the just society but
they all share the view that one can arrive at a theory of justice
without a prior commitment to what may constitute a good life. It has
been argued repeatedly in the previous chapters that regardless of the
validity of this claim with respect to adults, it is false insofar as it
relates to children. Children's rights, children's interests and needs and
hence what constitutes just behaviour towards children, can only be
elucidated, if they can be elucidated at all, by reference to
"perfectionist" considerations, to notions of what it is good for a child
to have, to be and to become. Apart from an account of the most minimal
basic interests in the securing of love, food and shelter, these
standards are all contestable and contested. As stated in a recent
book on juvenile justice:
"... except for the basic physical requirements for
healthy development, children's needs are socially
defined, socially sustained and socially adjusted
to conform with prevailing values and expectations ..."
It is therefore quite impossible to draw up am uncontroversial list
of goods required by any ideal of justice towards children. It
nevertheless seems a wrong move to argue from here to the invalidity
and hence the injustice of the whole enterprise, that is to conclude
from the observed impossibility of drawing up a complete, universally
recognised list of goods that one should draw up no list at all.
Morris and Mclsaac claim:
"Where there is an absence of objective criteria
by which the nature and extent of a * problem*
can be determined, decision makers can do little
more than refer to their own values ..."
Decision-makers can and do refer to far more than their own values,
but the values to which they refer are open to debate. This in
itself is no reason to reject than but seems rather to call for a
maximum degree of openness, sensitivity, awareness and flexibility in
arriving at decisions by appealing to such values. In the
1. Michael King, 'Welfare and Justice' in M. King (ed.) Childhood,
Welfare and Justice (Batsford, London, 1981) p.110.
2. Allison Morris and Mary Mclsaac, Juvenile Justice? (Heinemann,
London, 1978), p.52.
terminology of the previous chapter, justice would seem to demand an
explicit acknowledgement of the recognized values operational for the
system at any given time, rather than a rejection of the system itself.
However this will only go a small way towards meeting the critics of
the "welfare model" whose cries of injustice are aimed at two further levels
of the system. Even if agreement can be reached on what interests and
needs ought to be secured, the questions of whether and how they can be
secured and what the interests of any particular child may be, remain
quite distinct. One can argue in the manner of some authors * that many
(if not all) current forms of intervention seem to exacerbate rather than
alleviate problems, without denying the possibility of identifying
individual interests and meeting needs in the future. Similarly one can
point out the inadequacy of some current modes of assessment of interests
and needs, without thereby criticising the other institutional arrangements
in existence for children. In practice, the two types of criticism often
go hand in hand and although this may be no more than a contingent fact,
the two will remain closely linked. If, in the present state of
knowledge, it turned out that little or nothing can be done to secure the
interests of children, then there may indeed be little point in channelling
a great deal of effort towards identifying individual interests. If on
the other hand, it were to be the case that despite recognition of general
overall interests, individual interests cannot be identified with any
degree of certainty, then it is absurd to set up institutions which aim to
do more than secure interests at the most general level. The truth of the
matter (as so often!) would seem to lie somewhere between these extremes.
* See for example: L. Taylor, R. Lacey and B. Bracken, In Whose Best
Interests? (Cobden Trust, MIND, 1979).
The following paragraphs will look at accusations of injustice both at
the level of meeting interests and needs and then, yet again, at the
level of identifying individual interests.
The Supposed Injustice in Meeting Needs
There would seem to be overwhelming evidence that many of the
institutions currently supposed to be catering for the welfare of
children are serving to create far more problems than they solve. The
research of many writers * indicates that much of the residential
provision for children serves as a breeding ground'for violence and crime
despite the good intentions and genuine concern of many of those staffing
them. This is not the place to examine such findings further, but
rather to remark that it seems extraordinary to argue from here to a
rejection of welfarism and a plea for legalism in the maimer of Morris and
Giller, and Taylor, Lacey and Bracken. If the effects of residential
placements whether in open facilities or secure units are indeed as
damaging as is suggested, placing children there under determinate,
proportional sentences, seems to have very little to commend it except in
a context relying on the twin concepts of retribution and deterrence, that
is in a setting in which welfare criteria are inapplicable and regard is
given to quite different principles of justice resting on notions of
desert of some kind. If children who might otherwise have led honest
lives, are indeed set on the road to criminality by being sent away from
home, then a substantive injustice is being perpetrated at the very least
to the children concerned and such action can never be taken in the
* See for example the works of Norman Tutt, Spencer Millham and
David Thorpe cited in the bibliography.
interests of the individual child; whether or not it might be in the
interests of society remains highly questionable. But it is absurd
to argue from here, in the manner of Morris and Giller, to the view that
it is therefore unjust to take any action (apart from voluntary measures)
in the interests of the child and that all forms of compulsory
intervention on the criteria of needs and interests are inherently unjust.
The most that can be said is that some forms of intervention are clearly
antithetical to children's interests and should therefore either be
rejected outright or imposed only on quite different grounds. How best
to meet acknowledged needs and interests and which needs and interests
can be secured through institutional arrangements can only be touched on
briefly here. However, there is a considerable literature on the subject
and some references are included in the bibliography. For the moment, it
need only be pointed out that to recognise on the one hand the injustice
done to some children through intervention aimed at promoting their
interests, and on the other hand the impossibility of securing some
interests through legislative provision ,does not invalidate the whole
attempt to make such provision for some forms of action in the interests
of children. This would only be the case in the unlikely eventuality of
every form of compulsory intervention being shown to have damaging
consequences: social work supervision, intermediate treatment, placements
in youth groups, specialist educational provision and so on. The
likelihood of finding such evidence seems, to say the least,remote. And
only if such evidence could be found, would the sweeping indictment of
Morris and McIsaac be well founded;
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"There is no place for concepts such as 'fairness'
and 'justice' in a system based on welfare
ideology". (3)
In the meantime this kind of polemic is vague and unsubstantiated and
does little to further an understanding of the issues involved. What
of injustices with respect to identifying individual needs?
The Potential Injustice in Identifying Interests
The previous chapter focused in some depth on the reasoning
process which culminates in disposals based on the identification of
individual interests. It has been suggested that if it transpired that
such identification was, in practice, nearly always mistaken, compulsory
intervention on the basis of such findings would be unjust. This type
of criticism gains strength from two quite different sources: first
from the failure to see the crucial role the child must play in the
identification process and second from attempts to deny that the scope
for error is very large indeed. These will be examined in turn.
Children are not passive containers into which one can pour
acknowledged objective goods, but, as argued in Chapter 2, are from a
very early age, individual beings with their own feelings, preferences,
opinions, aims and desires. However unreasonable these may appear to be,
they cannot be ignored without fair-reaching and often harmful consequences.
The Seiferth case presented in Chapter 2 provides a forceful illustration
of how individual circumstamces may contribute towards making a presumably
almost universally acknowledged desirable end (removal of a cleft palate), an
3. A. Morris and M. Mclsaac, op.cit., p.lS^.
inappropriate outcome. Given Martin's own strongly held views, there
can be little doubt that enforced treatment would have been only
partially successful and at the price of considerable psychological
harm. Many less dramatic examples can be found in the context of
school problems. On investigating school attendance figures, it is not
at all unusual to find that non-attendance coincides with the days on
which a certain subject is taught. Some lessons, for whatever reason,
create such a high level of anxiety in some children that it seems quite
reasonable to argue that although a wide-ranging compulsory curriculum
(as opposed to free choice) is a desirable policy for most children,
there may be circumstances in which such a policy is antithetical to a
child's interests and should not be pursued. A particular case will
serve to illustrate the point: a large, very unhappy teenage girl who
was referred to a hearing for failure to attend school. Despite
encouragement from panel members and a social worker, she simply refused
to go on the days on which she had physical, education. She was finally
sent to a residential school where physical education was voluntary and
returned to a hearing a year later much happier and much more confident.
Insofar as anyone could tell, her aversion for school really was linkdd
only to her dislike of P.E. In extreme circumstances such as this, it
seems absurd to say that the child's perceptions, preferences and fears
are irrelevant and that her interests are to be assessed quite
independently of such subjective factors. The degree to which
institutional arrangements can and should be sufficiently flexible to
accommodate such individual idiosyncracies, is beyond the scope of this
discussion. The example is used only to underline the point, that even
from a protectionist perspective, ignoring the child's own viewpoint may
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be a serious obstacle to securing an outcome "in the best interests of
the child". It is for this reason that a juvenile justice system built
around the concepts of interests and needs and hence around perfectionist
criteria, cannot deny the child's right to be heard without contravening
the very principles on which it is founded. Any assessment of interests
and needs, with the possible exception of those too young to have any
views at all, is thus necessarily individualistic. Disposals based on
such assessments must likewise be individualistic. What of the scope
for error?
The Scope for Error
The aim of acting in the interests of the child has been clearly
endorsed in the preceding chapters despite certain qualifications and
reservations regarding the identification of interests and appropriate
methods of securing them. Once such forward-looking considerations have
been accepted as the paramount issue in a given setting in determining
outcomes, the scope for error is enormous, whilst the scope for injustice
is more limited. To return to the various examples in Chapter 4, all
the decisions in Category I are just in the sense that they conform with
the declared aims and principles of the system and with its procedural
requirements. The same can be said of the case histories. But
whether or not the decisions taken were the right decisions in the sense
of actually securing rather than being thought to secure the interest of
the child, remains an open question. The impossibility of making any
conclusive assessments on the Tightness or wrongness of a chosen course
of action is an inherent part of a system based on forward-looking
considerations. A medical analogy may clarify the nature of the problems
involved. A woman suffering from severe depression might be told
by a psychiatrist that there sire four possible courses of action:
short-term relief of some of the symptoms perhaps through sleeping
pills or relaxation techniques; long-term more extensive drug treatment,
psychotherapy or just to 'grin and bear it*. If after discussing the
advantages and disadvantages of each, examining the woman's medical
history and taking into account her own views on the matter, the
psychiatrist opts for drug therapy and the patient turns out to have a
severe allergic reaction to the medication, the decision taken will
almost certainly have been the wrong one, although even here there is
room for doubt. However it is very clear that there has been no
professional negligence and no breach of medical ethics. The decision
involved a leap into the unknown and therefore inevitably, an element
of risk. In exactly the same way, decisions taken about children's
interests involve a balancing of at least partially unknown risks and
can, with benefit of hindsight, prove mistaken. The Maria Colwells of
this world provide a stark testimony to the alarming scope for error.
Even those cases with a happy outcome do not necessarily indicate that
the right decisions have been taken. Tom Sinclair has been happily
reunited with his father but at the moment of writing he is only 10 or
11 years old and things could go badly wrong again. Moreover, he
thrived with his foster family until his father arrived on the scene and
disrupted the home. If the Sheriff had upheld the request to assume
parental rights, Tom would almost certainly have remained where he was
without further disruption. Paul Cameron's story had a relatively
happy ending but he should clearly have been sent to a residential school
at a much younger age. The combination of the hearing's reluctance to
remove children from home and the social worker's view that such
measures were inappropriate in his case, militated against this.
However at his last hearing Paul stated (and the school confirmed) how
much he had enjoyed the experience and requested a continuation of the
placement until he was due to leave school. He had made academic
progress for the first time in years and was clearly very happy. Can
any conclusions be drawn from these observations? This question takes
the discussion right back to the issues of whether or not and in what
circumstances, it is in fact possible to identify and meet the needs of
children falling within the remit of the system.
It seems impossible to do any more here than indicate guidelines
for assessing the effectiveness of any form of compulsory intervention
in the lives of children and to note that this seemingly empirical
problem, raises central non-empirical questions concerning the nature of
the relevant criteria of assessment; the child's happiness, ability to
make friends or to communicate, progress at school, the parents'
perceptions, an end to offending, or a combination of any and all of
these and more factors? Which are to count and how can they be
measured? Comments can only be made here at a most superficial level,
pointing out that in cases such as that of Tom Sinclair, it can be
asserted with some certainty that a lack of intervention at the initial
stages would have had serious consequences. In other cases, like that
of Paul Cameron, intervention has beneficial consequences but comes much
too late. In situations like that of Kevin Macdonald, it seems to
serve a minimal 'watch dog' role and in yet others it may simply have no
effect or substitute one set of problems for another or, worst of all,
compound existing problems leaving a child considerably worse off than
before. It has already been asserted that if all cases were to be
of the last type, that is, intervention only served to exacerbate
problems, then a concern for the interests of children would indeed
demand a policy of radical non-intervention or intervention only on
the basis of quite different criteria such as the protection and
appeasement of the public, for in such an eventuality, positive action
in the interests of the child would necessarily involve an injustice.
Even the most extreme critics of the Scottish system have refrained
from proceeding this far in their attack. There are of course no
controls possible in examples of 'happy' outcomes to establish what
would have happened without intervention. However, on the basis of
personal experience it does not seem an exaggerated claim to say that
some children are indeed helped by the system while others are no worse
off on leaving than they were on entering it. What proportions sure
regarded as appropriate in the two categories to justify the whole
system, is a matter for extensive discussion of which factors should be
considered as relevant, that is what should be put into the scales, and
of how weights are to be assigned to these different factors, followed
by empirical investigation and an analysis of the results. Sadly it is
impossible to do any more here than point to the urgent need for answers
to these questions.
The preceding paragraphs attempted to provide a qualified defence
of welfarism with respect to children coming into direct contact with
the law, that is of a system of juvenile justice having regard to
interests and needs, rather than offences and deeds, viewing these as the
most relevant criteria in making decisions about children within a legal
framework. It seems clear that the case for welfarism could be
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strengthened further by showing that its chief rival, the so-called
"justice model", rests on shaky foundations. The quotation marks are
used advisedly for, as already indicated, the two models rest on
competing theories of justice, rather than, as is suggested by the
terminology, representing justice versus some alternative to justice.
Since these two theories are considered to be jointly exhaustive of
the possibilities, indicating the weaknesses of the one may serve to
strengthen the case for the other. It must be remembered throughout
that the models are ideal-types and that in reality neither exist in a
pure form, rather as Norman Tutt recently stated:
"... inevitably the operational system emerges as a
compromise which attempts to be fair and differentiate
for individual circumstances. Therefore even the
most ardent proponents of a justice model (Morris and
Giller) allow for pleas of mitigation to explain
individual circumstances, likewise the leading welfare
systems (Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968) allow for
pleas of not guilty to be determined in a court of
law. However, in order that the debate continue in
an attempt to refine the juvenile justice system, it is
important to examine the criticisms that exist for both
models and to evaluate these criticisms". (*+)
This whole thesis is an attempt at such refinement and it therefore
seems important to look further at objections to the "justice model"
before proceeding to a discussion of possible injustices within the
welfare framework which is broadly adopted here.
The "Justice Model" Reconsidered
The recommendations of the Justice for Children organisation have
been summed up in the following terms:
*f. Norman Tutt, 'Justice or Welfare?' Social Work Today l*f, 7 (1982)
p.7.
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"... intervention on the proof of commission of
the offence and proportionality of sanction to
offence". (5)
The account proceeds to recommend further principles, in particular,
that sentences be determinate and the least restrictive of any
available alternatives. Moreover children should be given a waivable
right to counsel and there should be minimal intervention prior to any
legal proceedings. Finally decision-making should be visible and
accountable. It should be noted that at least three of these
principles are entirely compatible with the welfare model and indeed with
the recommendations to be made in the concluding chapter of this thesis,
while the remaining principles rest on theories of responsibility and
autonomy that are here considered at least partially inappropriate with
respect to children, quite regardless of any applicability they may have
with respect to adults. These points will be examined in turn.
Pleas for the least restrictive disposal, for the right to
representation and for visible and accountable decision-making can all
be made from within a welfare ideology. Given the serious doubts raised
about residential placements, for example, it is entirely consistent with
welfarism to urge that removal from home should be a measure of the last
resort. Similarly given the complexities involved in identifying
interests and the difficulties a child may have in putting forward its
own views in the face of perhaps half a dozen well-meaning adults, it
might be considered very much in a child's interests to be represented
at any hearing in which decisions are being made affecting his/her life.
5. A. Morris, H. Giller, E. Szwed and H. Leach, Justice for Children
(Macmillan, London, 1980), p.67.
Once again several supporters of welfarism have put forward the case
for independent child representatives. Finally the principles of
visibility and accountability have certainly been recognised in the
Scottish system in the Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules, where it is
laid down that:
"The chairman shall inform the child and his parent
of the substance of any reports, documents and
information mentioned in paragraph (2) (a) if it
appears to him that this is material to the manner
in which the case of the child should be disposed
of and that its disclosure would not be detrimental
to the interests of the child". (6)
There is also a right of appeal following any decision. The
interpretations put on these various provisions are by no meams immune
from criticism but they are included here only to show that they can be
incorporated within the "welfare model" as consistently as within the
"justice model". What of the remaining principles?
The concepts embraced in the principles of proportionate,
determinate sanctions following prodf of the commission of an offence
are indeed alien to the "welfare model". Underlying such principles
are notions of desert, and freewill and responsibility, as well as an
implicit denial that intervention may be justified on grounds other
than proof of the commission of an offence. This denial is frequently
accompanied by a plea for a removal of legal sanctions from all forms
of behaviour that do not constitute offences when committed by adults,
for example: running away, use of alcohol and cigarettes, consensual
sexual behaviour and so on. Underlying such a plea are the very same
6. Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules (Statutory Instruments 1971
No.492 (S.60)), 17, 3.
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notions of freewill and responsibility with the associated assumption
of the individuals in control of their own behaviour and able to make
all decisions concerning their own lives. Regardless of the
legitimacy of these principles with respect to adults, they seem quite
inapplicable with respect to most (not necessarily all) children. As
Tutt points out, the law at present certainly does not uphold this view
of children. The age of criminal responsibility is 10 years in
England and Wales, 8 years in Scotland (which certainly has the nearest
to a pure welfare model in practice within the United Kingdom), 10 years
in Ireland and 15 years in Scandinavia and several other European
countries. Morris and Giller et al recommend that the age of criminal
responsibility be retained at 10 years of age. They carefully avoid
discussion of what is to happen in cases of offending by those under
the minimum age. Should it be ignored or regarded as a symptom of
need? The former seems quite unacceptable and if the latter, then why
cannot this approach be extended to older children? The authors
themselves admit:
"... although the current age of criminal
responsibility (10) was arbitrarily chosen, it
represents the age at which it is generally felt
that legal accountability can be imposed ..." (7)
This is hardly a convincing argument. Moreover the second half of the
book (mainly by Szwed and Geach) deals with children in need of care
and recommends the setting up of a Family Court to this end. The
authors would seem to be weakening their own position here. Once it
is (quite rightly) recognized that some children may be in need of care,
7. A. Morris, H. Giller et al., op.cit., p.66.
it seems absurd to deny that at least a number of these may come
to the attention of the authorities through offending. How can it be
argued that dispositions should be made on the criterion of need for
the first category and not for the second? Pursuing these principles
to their logical conclusion would mean that a ten year old child found
abandoned by both parents would be referred to a Family Court, whilst
the same child arrested for breaking school windows would have to be
referred both to the Juvenile Court and on discovering its home
circumstances to the Family Court. Moreover since home circumstances
are to be viewed as irrelevant in the court setting for:
"Certain criteria should be statutorily excluded:
for example, the social and family characteristics
of the child" (8)
it is not even clear how one might plead mitigating circumstances on
grounds of abandonment in the offence proceedings. Of course it
might be argued that such cases would be rare in practice, but recent
studies like that of Rushforth cited above (p.87), indicate exactly
the reverse, namely that the backgrounds of offenders and non-offenders
in given residential institutions are indistinguishable, hence either
both groups or neither group must be in need of care. It therefore
seems arbitrary to treat them as distinct. This is precisely the kind
of argument underlying the Kilbrandon Report and the White Paper
Children in Trouble.* There may be a residual category of 'pure'
8. A. Morris, H. Giller etal., op.cit., p.63»
Footnote: *Children in Trouble Cmnd.3601, HMSO (1968) was one of a
series of White Papers brought out by the Labour Party on
children and the criminal law.
221.
offenders and it may indeed be appropriate to deal with these on a
different basis, but the "justice model" cannot (and does not) rest
its case on a small minority, but rather on the whole category of
juvenile offenders. Underlying this model is the child-
libertarian view of children's rights, but unlike the child-
libertarians, the advocates of this model are quite unprepared to
extend this theory of rights into all areas of concern for children.
The resulting confusions and contradictions are well-exemplified in
(9)
the Black Report on Northern Ireland. The report recommends that
offences by juveniles should be regarded as sufficient justification for
instituting a distinct set of legal proceedings. However it also
regards children as less competent than adults to make decisions
affecting their own lives. It states (paragraph ^.53) that it might
be advisable for the law to be made more flexible to allow those between
13 and 16 years to be employed to a greater degree than at present, out
of school hours and during school holidays, but there are no suggestions
for changing the age of compulsory school attendance. It recommends
the retention of the age of criminal responsibility at 10 years with
certain qualifications until l*f years of age (paragraph 5*17 (b)).
However children should neither leave school, nor vote, nor marry until
well after this age. Moreover there are to be separate courts for
children with powers of committal to separate institutions and stringent
reporting restrictions throughout for all proceedings. The underlying
philosophy of the report and indeed of most advocates of the "justice
model" is clearly not that of the child-libertarians. Moreover in
9. Report of the Children and Young Persons Review Group, (HMSO,
Belfast, 1979) referred to hereafter as the Black Report.
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addressing the problems of children in need of care, they all openly
acknowledge the appropriateness of a modified protectionism, that is
of according to children a special view as children and not as mini-
adults. In other words, it is generally recognised and regarded as
just that children (like adults) come face to face with the law for
things they have done, but unlike adults, also become the subject of
legal proceedings for things done to them. Where does the
disagreement lie or is there perhaps no disagreement after all?
The stumbling blocks in reconciling the apparently opposing views
would seem to centre round two factors: firstly, arguments concerning
the relevance of punishment and secondly, empirical observations on the
perceptions of children. Begarding the former, the Black Beport for
example states of young offenders:
"... they have by their actions come into conflict
with society and society claims the right to
exercise reasonable restraint over those who
offend against it ..." (10)
Even Kilbrandon acknowledges that punishment may be an appropriate
response in some circumstancesi
"... punishment might be good treatment for the
particular person concerned in his particular
circumstances ..." (ll)
Once punishment is viewed as the appropriate response, then the
principles of proportionate determinate sanctions, following proof of
10. Black Beport, paragraph 5»35»
11. Kilbrandon Beport, paragraph 53»
the commission of an offence are indeed highly relevant, for notions
of just punishment (analysed by Hart, * for example) are constituted by
these elements. Advocates of welfarism could thus readily concur in
their relevance. But what such arguments frequently ignore is that
many children appearing before courts and at children's hearings have
already been punished. In the debate on the Children and Young Persons
Bill reported in Hansard in 1969» Gordon Qakes, M.P. spoke as follows:
"If an offending child is disciplined by its parents,
does that not count for something? If an offending
child is disciplined by its teachers at school, does
that not count for something? If a probation
officer spends hours with that child, is that to be
dismissed because no court has been involved? If
police rely on advice and caution as they often do ...
is that to be set aside because there have been no
court proceedings? I cannot accept that if an
offending child does not appear before the court, he
gets off scotfree". (12)
It seems extraordinary that nowhere in the literature I have encountered
on the opposing models of juvenile justice is any mention made of the
fact that children can be and frequently are, punished in their own
homes and at school without any recourse to the law, be it to due
process or appeal procedures. In my experience on children's hearings,
children have on many occasions been severely punished by their parents
for relatively minor offences. They have had their pocket money
stopped, been kept indoors for considerable time periods, been banned
from television for days on end and been belted. Many of these
12. Hansard : Commons 1968-9, Vol.779, p.123^.
Footnote: *H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Clarendon,
Oxford, 1968). The first chapter is particularly relevant
here.
penalties are far more severe than any court would, could or even
should impose. It surely is not asking too much of officials to
explain in the relevant circumstances that no further action will be
necessary, because the only action deemed appropriate (namely
punishment) has already been taken. Whether such an explanation is
given by a policeman or in a juvenile court or at a children's hearing
does not seem to be very significant. The relevance of punishment in
other situations will be discussed further below. What of the second
bar to a consensus on juvenile justice, namely the perceptions of the
young person?
The supporters of the "justice model" seem to rest their arguments
in this area on the following kind of case: a young offender deemed to
be in need of care finds himself in front of the authorities and is sent
away from home against his will for an indefinite period. He may well
be told that this is not punishment but rather action in his "best
interests". Nevertheless, it is a curtailment of his liberty and quite
contrary to his own wishes, so to him it is quite indistinguishable from
punishment and given the indeterminate nature of the disposal, unfair
punishment at that. If on arriving at the residential establishment he
encounters other young offenders who have in fact been sentenced to spend
a specific time there because of offences committed, this will only serve
to compound the initial impression that he is being punished and
moreover, punished unjustly. Consider also that to most children (and
possibly adults too) courts are places where people accused of breaking
the law stand trial and that in England and Wales it is the court that
makes decisions concerning both child offenders and children said to be
in need of care. Given all these facts it is hardly surprising that many
children fail to grasp the philosophical niceties between so-called
needs-based treatment and offence-based punishment. On the evidence
of the following statement by Lord Donaldson, it is not at all clear
whether or not members of the House of Lords all understand the
distinction either:
"One has to admit that treatment may include painful
methods such as a ruler on the knuckles or a cane ..." (13)
However having observed all these anomalies and accurately reflected
that they offend very basic conceptions of justice, many critics make
the further, quite unacceptable move, to the conclusion that all forms
of compulsion are punishment, if only because they are perceived as such
by those deprived of liberty. This move is made by Morris and Giller.
It will suffice here to point out that there certainly are situations
where one can give meaning to the notion of "compulsory treatment". In
the medical sphere, a distinction might be made between conditions which
a patient may choose to neglect or to have treated for example
rheumatism and bronchitis and those where no such choice is accorded,
such as typhoid or smallpox. Whatever the patient's views on the
matter, it seems strange to suggest that the latter is a punitive
measure. Perhaps more appropriately in the present context one might
once again consider three children put to bed: one because s/he could no
longer keep his/her eyes open, one because s/he was running a temperature
and the third as a punishment. As stated in the Introduction (p.12) it
is only in the third instance, that any unpleasantness involved is
13. Hansard : Lords, 1969, Vol.302, p.116.
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intrinsic to the aims of the action. Where do these observations
lead?
It is recognised here that particularly among older children,
punishment may be an appropriate response to some offending. The
arguments in favour may rest on principles of retribution, deterrence
or reform or some combination of the three. It is similarly
acknowledged that some children coming to the attention of the authorities
as a result of their offences are in need of some kind of measures of care,
because, for example, they are being neglected or abused by their parents
or perhaps are not receiving any form of education. In speaking for the
Children and Young Persons Bill, Elystan Morgan implicitly recognised
these two responses to young offenders:
"The Bill seeks to strike a balance between the need
to control unacceptable behaviour on the one hand,
and the duty, on the other, to offer help to those
who need it, while, at the same time, preserving
judicial safeguards which are necessary for the
freedom of the individual". (1*0
What emerges from all the confusion is that fairness would seem to
demand that once punishment in any form and for whatever reason is
being meted out by an institution constituted for this purpose under
law, it must be strictly divorced from any and all other compulsory
measures imposed in the interests of children. It seems apparent
that the mixture of care and control which characterises much of the
behaviour towards children in the environments of home and school
cannot be achieved fairly in a legal context whose sole function is
1*+. Hansard : Commons, op.cit., p.1292.
precisely to provide such care and control, although there is no
question that at least in some cases the imposition of measures of
control is the outcome of the same genuine concern for the children
that is reflected in measures of care. It cannot be sufficiently
stressed that the view stated here is quite different from that
expressed in the Black Report, which regards the commission of an
offence as sufficient justification for instituting a distinct set of
legal proceedings. What is being proposed is that in situations where,
for whatever reasons, punishment is considered the most appropriate
response, referrals should be made to an agency, be it a juvenile court,
tribunal or whatever, that remains quite distinct from any group
concerned with measures of care. It would also follow from this
approach that in situations where a custodial sentence is the chosen
disposal, children cannot justly be held in exactly the same
institutions as those deemed to be in need of care. Most radically of
all, with reference to the Scottish system in particular and other
systems in general, there is a need to abolish all offence referrals to
agencies of whatever kind, constituted to carry out care proceedings.
It is hardly surprising if a young person attending a hearing because
s/he is thought to be in need of compulsory measures of care, thinks
s/he is 'on trial', when the proceedings begin with a detailed account
of an offence, followed by questions concerning its accuracy. It is in
this area that proponents of the "justice model" stand on very firm
ground. Accommodating their views in this area within a system based
primarily on considerations of welfare, would constitute a very real
step towards achieving justice for children.
To recapitulate, the "justice model" focuses on the offence as
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the criterion for legal intervention, any just disposals must
therefore rest on notions of desert and hence on the principles of
culpability, proportionality and determinacy. The "welfare model"
views the offence as a possible indicator of need, but the offence qua
offence cannot be the ground for legitimate intervention on welfare
principles. It is the retention of offence referrals within the
hearing system together with what appears to be a tariff of available
disposals, that gives strength to the criticisms made by the Justice
for Children movement. The tariff system has already been mentioned
briefly in the Introduction (p.15) It is suggested here that the
abolition of offence referrals and modification of the alleged tariff,
would not only silence the critics but would also strengthen the system
by making it truer to its own principles.
Injustice Within the System
It has already been pointed out that even where the principles
underlying a particular system of justice are accepted without
qualification, the scope for injustice within the system will
nevertheless remain. Many practices and disposals may (and do)
violate the principles and aims according to which particular systems
operate. The Scottish Children's Hearing system is certainly not immune
from such criticism. There would seem to be two main areas of concern.
First (rather less interestingly) it is very clear that there is
considerable procedural laxity in the conduct of many hearings. Second,
actual decisions may not be taken on the basis of the child's interests
and needs but rather according to quite different criteria: societal
interests, legal requirements or on the basis of desert. Such
decisions are unjust within the framework of a welfare ideology.
These issues will be discussed in turn.
Several writers, particularly Martin, Fox and Murray,
have documented the way in which a large number of hearings fail to
enforce the regulations laid down by statute as the formal
requirements of any properly conducted hearing. These include not
only such features as identifying the child and ascertaining its age,
but more importantly, explaining the grounds of referral to the child
and malting sure that they have been understood and accepted by the
child and the parents. In addition the family has a right to know the
substance of any report and the reasons for any decisions as well as
the right to appeal against all such decisions. These and all the
other procedural requirements set down in Part III of the Social Work
(Scotland) Act 1968 and the Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules 1971»
afford no discretion in the relevant areas, although many of them are
clearly viewed as discretionary guidelines in the actual conduct of
hearings. Martin, Fox and Murray summarised the findings of 3d
observed hearings. The highest possible score for adhering to the
statutory procedural requirements was 8. Of the total number observed,
only 87 scored 6 or more. It is not suggested here that failure to
ascertain a child's age, for example, necessarily leads to an injustice.
But there is often an unspoken assumption that if one is there to help
a child, then formalities do not really matter and when this extends to
persuading a child to accept the grounds of referral in the manner
vividly documented by Paul Brown, the possibility of injustice is rather
less remote:
15. F.M. Martin, S.J. Fox and Kathleen Murray Children Out of Court
(Scottish Academic Press, 1981) Chapter 7.
230
"Brian is 12 ... He is accused of 'acting with'
other boys on seven counts, including theft of
£l*f from a phone box, packets of crisps from a
school and other similar incidents. He ... is
asked if he accepts that he did them. He replies:
•No, I was there but I only watched'. The
reporter ... explains that he can be accused of
'acting with' someone even if he didn't do anything ...
from the boy's point of view one might as well
accuse a passenger of breaking the speed limit ..." (l
In this narrative, four offences were eventually accepted, whilst
the other three were struck off the list. The subsequent discussion
centred on quite different topics, in particular behaviour at school.
Pressure is also often put on children to accept the grounds of
referral by informing them that if the grounds are denied, the case
will have to be sent to the Sheriff for proof. However, admitting
the impropriety of such practices seems to do no more than on the one
hand, strengthen the case for abolishing offence referrals and on the
other, for ensuring that the statutory requirements are properly
upheld. Possible ways of achieving this end will be discussed in the
concluding chapter. What of practices and disposals that do not
appear to be based on the criteria of interests and needs and sometimes
even seem to be in direct conflict with them?
The discussion can now turn back to the actual cases presented
in Chapter k. The decisions in Category I are unproblematic and just
within the context of a needs-based and interests-oriented system.
It is those decisions falling in the second and third categories that
16. P.D. Brown and T. Bloomfield (eds.) Legality and Community
(Aberdeen People's Press, Aberdeen, 1979) p.2. -
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are problematic. Category II in particular would seem to be quite
inconsistent with the declared aims of the system. Decision F (a
residential order for a 15 year old truant excluded from his day
school) was made solely because of the law regarding school
attendance. Decision G (placement in a secure unit for a 15 year
old offender found guilty of multiple thefts) was clearly made in the
light of societal needs. It is not suggested that these decisions
were necessarily wrong (it will become apparent that I view the first
as wrong and the second as probably right), but that they have no
place within the framework of a system based on individual interests
and needs. Both examples can be taken as typical of their kind and
will be discussed in turn.
The issue of school attendance was discussed in some depth in
Chapter 5« It was held there that basic and intrinsic interests may
either accord or conflict with legally defined interests. The area
of truancy becomes more problematic the older the child. Thus while
one might wish to argue that any twelve year old has an intrinsic
interest in attending school, that is that there is no conflict here
between intrinsic and legally defined interests, this becomes
increasingly difficult as the child approaches school-leaving age.
It is an uncomfortable fact that the truant may well have assessed
his/her interests in this area correctly. Many schools have little to
offer the non-certificate 15 year old. In addition there is some
evidence * that truants fare no worse" than non-truants in the
*
Footnote: See in particular: J. Gray, A.F. McPherson and D. Raffe,
Reconstructions of Secondary Education, RKP, London, 1983,
Chapter 11.
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search, for jobs and as already shown, a great deal of evidence that
residential placements frequently have harmful consequences. In the
long-run, changes in school provision and/or the law in this area may
eradicate the conflict. But while the conflict persists it would
seem that, at least in cases where school is unable or (as in Frank*s
case) unwilling to offer anything to a child, the hearing system is
being co-opted into becoming a law enforcement agency. Such co-option
detracts from its real aims and objectives and gives weight to those
critics who claim that the welfare ideology simply offers alternative
methods of control and is no more concerned with the interests of the
individual than the system it replaces:
"To speak of punishment versus treatment is basically
misleading because the change that has taken place
involves simply a gradual movement from one kind of
control in the direction of another". (17)
As Paul Brown points out, in many hearings concerned with truancy:
"... there was a strong tendency to see school as
something that must be gone through, hated perhaps
but put up with at all costs ..." (l8)
He concludes:
"... the attitude of the panel was a norm-enforcing
one: encourage school attendance because it is
required rather than questioning that requirement". (19)




The argument here should not be taken as a denial that many schools
have much to offer children but rather to argue that where the only
reason for enforcing school attendance is that it is a legal
requirement, hearings should refrain from so doing. If a hearing
concludes that a child, for whatever reason, has nothing to gain from
going to school, then it should do no more than inform the child that
it is breaking the law and possibly the education department that it
is failing in its duty to make adequate provision for certain children.
Whether or not other agencies take up the case is an entirely separate
matter. This will undoubtedly give rise to accusations of
"irresponsibility" and exclamations of "How can you do nothing?" The
uncomfortable fact is that at least in some situations, given the
nature of certain institutions, there is nothing to be done or at least
nothing that can be done at the level of individual interests. To
equate interests in such instances with the requirements of the law is
to reduce the concept of interest to a level at which it no longer
serves as an independent criterion of intervention. In such cases,
and in such cases alone, Paul Brown's critique has considerable force:
"... the needs of the child have ... been limited to
changing his mind, rather than the social situation ..." (20)
Action in such cases may have harmful effects on the very individual
it is aimed to help and is no more than a conscience-salving exercise
for the decision-makers. Some persistent offenders present similar
problems for welfare systems in general and the hearing system in
particular.
20. P.D. Brown and T. Bloomfield, op.cit., p.20.
Some children appear before hearings again and again on
offence grounds. Of these, many will have problems amenable to
social work intervention and the resolution of such problems may be
worthwhile even where the offending continues. However, as has been
made clear in the first part of this chapter, the offence qua offence
is not regarded as a valid criterion of intervention on welfare grounds.
It is not a legitimate aim of a hearing simply to put a stop to a
child's offending, particularly when the only known methods of
guaranteeing such an end (placement in a secure unit) have been shown
to have seriously damaging effects on individual development. Once
again, there may be instances where such disposals are the only
appropriate ones, but such cases must be referred to the courts or any
other agency which, though not necessarily indifferent to individual
interests and needs, has a prior commitment to law enforcement.
Hearings have no role to play in this area and in sometimes taking over
such a role they weaken the case for their own independent
contribution and become indistinguishable from punitive institutions.
The reasoning behind such residential disposals by heairings has been
well revealed:
"We do not know in what way residing in X may benefit
your child. We cannot even be sure that it may not
be harmful ... But it is obvious that something
requires to be done. We feel that we cannot do
nothing, the public expects us to act, and this is
the only remedy that has not yet been tried". (21)
To admit to impotence and even failure in some cases is not an
indictment of the whole system. If in particular instances there is
21. P.D. Brown and T. Bloomfield, op.cit., p.^0.
no clear assessment of where an individual child's interests might
lie, and if it is not possible to make such an assessment, then
referrals should either be sent to the appropriate agency or
discharged altogether. Any other course of action will remain an
injustice within the framework of a welfare system.
CHAPTER 7
From Theory to Action : Practical Implications
The preceding chapters have attempted to provide a theoretical
justification of modified protectionism and its underlying principles
as offering the most appropriate framework for action towards children
who are subject to legal intervention. Arguments have been illustrated
throughout by reference to actual systems of juvenile justice, in
particular to the Scottish Children's Hearing System, which is seen as
an attempt to put many of the principles examined here into practice.
The thesis has been presented on the basic assumption that much theory
is enriched when informed by actual empirical examples. Legal theory,
divorced from any reference to actual legal systems, would seem to
offer little prospect of an increased understanding of the nature of
law and the role it plays in our lives. In addition, as explained in
the Introduction (p.19) a coherence of theory and practice is viewed
here as a necessary condition of achieving justice for children. In
this concluding chapter, the procedure adopted so far will be reversed.
Instead of elucidating and refining concepts and principles by
reference to practice, the discussion will examine the practical
implications of the theoretical conclusions. These practical
implications are presented not merely as policy recommendations
(although they are that too) but rather as a final 'testing' of the
theoretical conclusions, showing how their adoption would 'square'
with the principles advocated and hence would serve to reach an
equilibrium in the manner explained in the concluding section of the
Introduction. There are two possible lines of approach. One can
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either start from scratch and provide an account of an ideal system
of juvenile justice, a 'blue-print for action', or the starting point
could be an actual system in operation. The second approach is
adopted here for three reasons. First, despite all its shortcomings,
the Scottish system certainly seems to provide one possible framework
for the application of the principles advocated here. Second, the
Scottish system is illustrative of the fact that new policies often
give rise to quite unintended and unforeseen consequences and situations.
It would therefore seem more fruitful to offer remedies for current
shortcomings rather than a Utopian scheme which would inevitably
generate a new set of problems. Finally (purely pragmatically) it is
much more likely that some of the proposals will be implemented if they
involve reforms within an existing framework, rather than a total
rejection of present institutions. However, each individual
recommendation also has implications of a wider nature for any system
of juvenile justice and these will be explored as well; first, a brief
explanatory paragraph on the Scottish system.
The Scottish system of juvenile justice is often taken as
comprising only children's hearings. This is misleading, for as already
indicated in Chapter 2, a minority of young offenders still appears in
court on a discretionary basis, whilst others are required to do so.
This is in accordance with the recommendations of the Kilbrandon Report
which proposed both that juveniles accused of "the gravest crimes" such
as murder and rape should be subject to criminal procedure at the
discretion of the Lord Advocate and that all disputed questions of fact
1. Kilbrandon Report, paragraphs 2k and 26.
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(2)"should be decided by a court of law". Both recommendations were
adopted in principle in the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. The
Lord Advocate has the power to determine which children shall be
prosecuted for any offences and it is laid down by him in a Crown
Office circular ^ that certain cases will automatically be referred
to the courts and not to children's hearings, in particular the
offences of murder, rape and treason, and with the discretion of the
Procurators Fiscal, where children aire involved in a crime with an adult,
where there may be a need to confiscate weapons (a hearing does not have
the power to make such an order) and in certain motor vehicle offences.
There are still considerable regional variations in the proportion of
child offenders appearing before courts in Scotland. In addition, in
any cases of a denial of the grounds of referral to a hearing, the case
may be sent to the Sheriff for proof. The Scottish system of juvenile
justice is thus broadly constituted by the hearing system with its remit
to act on behalf of any children deemed to be in need of compulsory
measures of care and by the courts which retain jurisdiction over some
juvenile offenders, as well as in cases of disputed custody in
matrimonial proceedings and in appeal cases concerning the assumption
of parental rights by the local authority. In addition the courts and
not the panel have jurisdiction with respect to adoption and
guardianship proceedings, financial provision for children and in some
areas relating to the education of children. There has been a great
2. Kilbrandon Report, op.cit., paragraph 97.
3. Crown Office Circular 1971.
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deal of discussion recently regarding a proposal by the Hughes
(if)
Committee that issues of custody should be referred to hearings
for disposal. However, this proposal has been rejected for the
(5)
moment from both within and outwith the hearing system and nowhere
has it been suggested that hearings and courts should cease to work
side by side in making determinations with respect to legal
intervention in the lives of children. The courts as well as the
hearings play an integral role in the current system of juvenile
justice in Scotland. It is with this in mind that the practical
implications and recommendations presented here should be considered.
Eight points will be presented for consideration.
I : No offence referrals to hearings
It has been repeatedly argued that there should be an abolition
of all offence referrals to children's hearings. At present most
child offenders are referred to the reporter in the first instance and
only after initial investigations indicate a possible need for
compulsory measures of care are they referred to a hearing. Thus:
"Where it appears to the reporter that the child is
in need of compulsory measures of care, he shall
arrange a children's hearing ..." (6)
The evidence for the need for such measures is rarely, if ever, the
offence itself but rather a whole range of other factors related to
Royal Commission on Legal Services in Scotland (Hughes Committee,
1980) Crand.78^6, Chapter 10.
5. See for example the report 'Aspects of Care and Custody' in
The Hearing, 8 (1983).
6. Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, III, 39 (3).
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home, school, leisure activities, general behaviour and so on.
Reporters do on occasion use hearings to administer a warning,
assuming that the referral will be discharged (a teenage boy who
operated slot-machines requiring 50p coins with lOp coins 'treated1
with tinfoil comes to mind!) but this is not the function of hearings
and could be (and often is) carried out at least as effectively by a
police caution. In the vast majority of cases reaching a hearing,
the offence is, or at least should be, no more than a peripheral factor
which brought the child to the attention of the authorities. It is at
most only a partial reason for calling a hearing and sometimes not even
that. Offence referrals often serve to cloud the real issues and can
on occasion be a bar to achieving the very ends the hearing is called
to secure. This has damaging effects on the credibility of the system
as well as on the child and even those offering help. An extreme
example will illustrate all the problems inherent in such cases, but the
aim here is primarily to show how presenting an offence as the grounds
of referral can distort the whole proceedings and result in an
unsatisfactory outcome.
The Case
A girl of 1^4- was referred to a hearing on grounds of theft.
Investigation revealed that there had long been concern
about the girl's welfare because of her relationship with
her stepfather. The social background report indicated
that there was considerable evidence pointing to cruelty.
The girl was thought to have been locked up for days and
beaten. In addition it appeared that she remained unaware
of the identity of her natural father.
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The Hearing
At the hearing the grounds of referral were put and the
girl denied stealing the jacket in question. She did
admit to being in the company of a friend who had stolen
the jacket and to knowing that it was stolen. Discussion
followed about 'being there', 'being an accomplice' and so
on and it was eventually ruled that she had indeed accepted
the grounds of referral. The stepfather was extremely
aggressive and demanded that she be taught a lesson. The
hearing continued with general statements about the
possibility of her needing help and support to sort out
her problems and she was eventually put on supervision.
Not one panel member (myself included) referred in any way
to that part of the background report that was the real
reason for the order. Everyone present was anxious to
avoid an open confrontation with the man who was the root
of the trouble.
Discussion
This is a very extreme example of a recurring pattern. Ignoring
for present purposes that the conduct of the hearing was in direct
violation of The Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules and also freely
admitting that the reporter who brought the case and the hearing
members who conducted it all acted in good faith, it must be said that
hearings such as this are not only a charade but do little to serve
the interests of the children involved. The course of events would
be quite different if the actual reason for the hearing rather than
the 'presenting problem' formed the grounds of referral. Arguments
against such a policy hinge round the problem of providing proof in
court in cases of denial. An offence is often easier to prove than
cruelty for which the only witnesses are usually members of the
family. A most distinguished reporter made the following off-the-
record admission to a group of panel members, regarding cases of
suspected cruelty:
"I always look at their school attendance and
hope to get them that way".
The motives are admirable, the resulting confusion often destructive.
Adoption of the recommendation under discussion would have had the
following consequences for this case: the grounds of referral would
have been "lack of parental care ... likely to cause unnecessary
suffering". (This is a statutory ground under Part III Section 32(2)
(b) and (c) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968). The grounds
would almost certainly have been denied and gone to the Sheriff for
proof. Assuming first that the grounds were upheld, there would have
been a stormy hearing but no possibility of covering up the material
issues that underlay the decision taken. The following points would
have been gained. First the child and her parents would have known
from the outset why the hearing was called. Second it would not have
been left to the discretion of hearing members to bring up "sensitive
issues", they would have constituted the whole basis of the discussion,
having been sent to the family in advance. Third it would have
assisted the social worker assigned to the case in offering the relevant
form of supervision. As things in fact happened, the first task of the
social worker xvas to attempt to explain to the family that despite the
grounds of referral, and everything said during the hearing, the
supervision requirement was made to try and modify parental behaviour
and not that of the child - a fairly tall order in the circumstances.
In the terminology of the theoretical part of this thesis, the child's
legal right to adequate care was being violated. Proceedings were
instituted to identify her interests and to make provision to secure
them more adequately. It has been stressed repeatedly that the
identification of such interests must necessarily take account of
the child's views of the matter. In the case described here, this
was impossible given the parameters of the discussion at the hearing.
Had the girl realised that hearing members knew of her predicament,
she might even have requested a period away from home. As it was,
the hearing might well have failed to act in her best interests by
failing to identify them. The discussion centred round the recognised
values regarding law-breaking and only minimally round those concerning
family life and violence towards children, however the latter more than
any other, formed the basis of the decision. The hearing was
procedurally unjust in failing to abide by the statutory regulations of
the system, substantively unjust in that it is not at all clear that
the outcome was in the child's interest and almost certainly unjust in
the eyes of the child as it involved drastic intervention following a
trivial offence. Putting the alternative grounds of referral could
have achieved justice at all three levels. Before turning to further
recommendations there is a need to discuss two additional points.
First the alternative strategy proposed for the case outlined above
will inevitably provoke the question of what would happen were the
Sheriff to rule that the grounds could not be established and to
discharge the referral. Second the significance of this
recommendation for other systems of juvenile justice must be explored.
These questions will be examined in turn.
It has already been explained that the justification for bringing
a child to a hearing on one set of grounds and making the decision in
respect of quite different criteria, lies in part in the difficulties of
proving the actual grounds for the disposal in a manner that will
satisfy a court of law. It is argued that, where the grounds cannot
be proved, the child will be excluded from help and remain at risk.
There are two immediate kinds of response. First it is not at all
clear that children are helped in the kind of situations described
above, except minimally by enabling a social worker to keep an eye on
the child. However, since contact is rarely more than once a week and
often only once a fortnight, this task could be carried out far more
effectively in other ways. The school might be alerted to the
concerns surrounding the child. The RSSPCC has great expertise in these
areas and even the local police are better equipped to monitor such
situations than a social worker. If the child were in real danger,
these agencies could present the evidence to the reporter and another
hearing would be arranged. A supervision order on dubious grounds is
little more than a conscience-saving exercise for the hearing system.
Once again it stems from an unspoken belief that one must do something.
The fact is that the risks of letting some children 'slip through the
net' seem minimal in comparison with the abuses which occur by spreading
the net in a way that precludes giving genuine support to those in need
of care. It seems far preferable to offer genuine support to a lesser
number than a pretence of help to a greater. The second kind of response
to those who speak of the risks of excluding children from help by
bringing cases on grounds of cruelty is to point out that there is
always a possibility that the hearsay evidence provided by background
reports and forming the basis of some decision, is in fact false. It
should therefore be presented in such a way that it is open to challenge
by those whom it condemns,in the particular instance cited, the
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stepfather. Any alternative course is in direct violation of the
well established legal presumption of innocence.* What of the
implications for other systems of juvenile justice?
The extension of this recommendation to alternative systems,
can only be put in the most general terms. It is at its most basic
level a demand for a distinction between the 'presenting problem*
which brings a child to the attention of the authorities and the actual
problems that provide the rationale for legal intervention. There will
of course be many instances where these two are identical, for example,
where apparent abuse and neglect are the factors leading to an initial
investigation, these factors (if proven) will be the justifying grounds
for any decision taken. Similarly where (for whatever reason)
punishment is considered the appropriate response, the offence committed
will be the central element in deciding on a disposal. Confusion, and
hence in many cases injustice, occurs where the grounds for bringing a
case to a tribunal or court or welfare board and the grounds for any
disposal in the form of compulsory measures, be they for care, education
or punishment are quite different. In such situations the reasoning
* Two of the earliest commentators on the Scottish system expressed
serious concern about the lack of regard with respect to "the
canons of natural justice" on the part of some professionals.
When cases go to appeal, both social enquiry and school reports
are seen by the Sheriff:
"Sheriffs and lawyers have often been horrified
by the lack of evidence provided by professionals
to substantiate their opinions. One Sheriff
reported to us that he had read reports which were
'venomous' and 'slanderous'".
(N. 3ruce and J. Spencer, Face to Face with Families, (Macdonald,
Loanhead (1976), p.117)).
The fifth recommendation returns to this theme.
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moves from a publicly-stated premiss to a conclusion based on quite
different (usually hidden) premisses. As such it not only fails to
make sense to the people involved, but inhibits the exercise of any
right of appeal. In the context of the UK it is also in violation
of the statutory right to reasoned decisions under the Tribunals and
Inquiries Act 1958. The first recommendation is thus that with
respect to the Scottish system, offence referrals to children's hearings
should be abolished, whilst with respect to any system, the reason or
reasons for instituting the proceedings should be the factor or factors
underlying any compulsory measures imposed. Any alternative course of
action will almost certainly constitute a violation of the child's
rights and will (barring unlikely accidents) necessarily involve a
failure to identify the child's interests.
II : Separate proceedings for 'pure' offence referrals
The discussion will centre primarily round the Scottish system since
it seems difficult to make recommendations divorced from a specific
context. It has been asserted throughout the discussion that there may
well be some juvenile offenders for whom the offence itself is the most
appropriate or even sole ground for legal intervention. Such cases fall
into two broad categories. First those where punishment is seen as the
best measure for the child on educative or reformist grounds and second
where the public interest requires a punitive disposal as in some
instances of arson, for example. The Kilbrandon Report recognised
that there might be situations:
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"... in which major issues of public interest
must necessarily arise ..." (7)
Here the principles of prevention and deterrence are the main
justificatory ground for action. It can be argued that under the
first category, punishment may be quite consistent with and even
constitutive of the child's welfare and therefore not in conflict with
the principles of the hearing system. But it has already been stressed
that although there are no theoretical objections to including
punishment among the disposals available to a hearing, it does not seem
to work in practice. The principles of just punishment are broadly
speaking: the principles of the commission of an offence, of
proportionality of sanctions and of determinate sentences. These
principles are well established in courts and quite alien to children's
hearings. In addition, even though it might be possible to incorporate
them within the panel system, there would still be a need to remit those
cases where punishment was considered to be required in the public
interest, irrespective of the child's interest, to another legally
constituted tribunal or court, for children's hearings have no remit to
deal with such cases. It would be far simpler and less confusing to
the subjects of intervention to propose that in any situation where
punishment is deemed to be appropriate, the cases be remitted to the.
courts for adjudication and disposal or discharge. The courts already
have a statutory right to remit cases to hearings for advice and/or -
disposal (Social Work (Scotland) Act III 57(l)), and it would only
require a minor amendment to give hearings a similar power to send
Kilbrandon Beport, paragraph 125.
cases to the court. All the cases listed under Category II in
Chapter k might have been best dealt with in this manner. It is
hard to state this recommendation in more general terms of wider
applicability, but perhaps it is worth stating that the Scottish
experience suggests that despite the theoretical possibility of a
single tribunal or court making decisions both on the basis of needs
and of deeds, in practice, it would seem that such a dual role is open
to abuse and can be a source of legitimate confusion to those subject
to the different disposals. It therefore seems that wherever
possible, the roles should be institutionally separated. Wherever an
offence is both the ground and basis of legal intervention rather than
an indicator of a possible need for intervention, there should be
separate proceedings.
Ill : Separate measures of care and of punishment
The third recommendation is an obvious extension of the second.
Measures of punishment and other compulsory measures solely to promote
welfare, should wherever possible be quite distinct. It was pointed
out in an earlier analogy that children may be sent to bed either when
tired or when ill or for punishment and that in the first two instances
one might 'sugar the pill' (a legitimate use of medical analogy) by
telling a story or having a game for example. However, it is difficul
to imagine what form the 'sugar' might take in an institutional context
Granting certain privileges to one group of children to go on outings
or extra home-leave would be a constant source of friction and tension •
between the two groups, by creating 'second class citizens'. In
addition where the only wish children have is to 'go home', those under
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sentence may still be regarded as the privileged group, so that
any 'sugar' will only serve to cause bitterness. In the Scottish
context, this means that children should not be sent to List D schools
both by hearings on residential supervision orders subject to annual
review, and by courts under sentence. This recommendation gains
support not only from the theoretical arguments presented here but also
from the findings cited in Chapter 3 showing that the backgrounds and
histories of "court boys" and "panel boys" in one study, were almost
indistinguishable making different disposals for the two groups quite
arbitrary:
"... the background of the two sets of boys was very
similar, both in terms of family situation and
delinquent career". (8)
In such circumstances, it makes very little sense to use the same
institution as both a punitive and a non-punitive disposal. In more
general terms, if there is a need, for whatever reason, to impose
sentences of any kind on juvenile offenders, then the institutional
setting in which such sentences are carried out, or more colloquially
in which 'time is spent' must be different from that to which children
are committed for indefinite periods on quite different grounds.
This is not a plea for an increase in juvenile penal institutions, there
are (at least in the UK) already an alarming number of secure units for
young people. The recommendation only points to the need to
differentiate sharply between penal sanctions ana measures of care.
This leaves quite open the question of when and even whether penal
sanctions are ever appropriate.
3. As cited in Chapter 3» P*
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IV : Written reasons for all decisions
This recommendation relates to the problems that inevitably
arise within a system that depends heavily on the discretion of its
appointees. It is often asserted that discretionary justice may
lapse into arbitrariness where it remains free from any form of check
or control. One way of securing controls and checks is to exclude
secrecy. It would therefore seem essential that there should be no
discretion at all with respect to the giving of reasons for any
decision. K.C. Davis asserts:
"Openness is the natural enemy of arbitrariness ..." (9)
At least one way of guaranteeing "openness" is a statutory requirement
to state reasons in writing wherever possible. This proposal is in
accordance with a recommendation of the Franks Committee that:
"Decisions should be reasoned, as full as possible
and made available to the parties in writing ..." (10)
Within the Scottish context, this will involve at least two
innovations. First a statutory requirement on reporters to give
reasons for their decisions and second a new procedural requirement
for hearings to provide written reasons for the family, for any
decisions taken. At present some reporters' departments do in fact
provide written reasons, whilst hearings are required to give a copy
of the written reasons to families on request. The first should no
9. K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice : A Preliminary Inquiry
(Illinois, Chicago, 197SJ p. 98.
10. Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and
Enquiries (Franks Committee 195?) Cmnd.2l8, HMSO k2.
longer be a discretionary matter, whilst the second should be made
obligatory by statute. The implications for other systems are
clear: there should be no discretion at all with respect to the
giving of reasons. In a context where disposals are necessarily
'individualised', the giving of reasons is an essential condition of
just decision-making.
V : Availability of all reports to families
This is a further extension of the points raised under IV above.
It has already been noted that the Hearing Rules state:
"The chairman shall inform the child and his parent
of the substance of any reports, documents and
information ... if it appears to him that this is
material to the manner in which the case of the
child should be disposed of and that its disclosure
would not be detrimental to the interests of the
child". (11)
In practice this leaves far too much discretion to hearing members.
The families concerned should automatically be given a copy of the
social background report and the school reports which provide the
grounds for the majority of the decisions. There may be a need to
establish an area of discretion with respect to children, especially
younger ones, regarding this recommendation but parents should see
the reports as of right. This will lead to the exclusion of much
hearsay evidence which is regarded here as entirely beneficial.
Unsubstantiated rumours and guesses should not form the basis of any
legal decision. The extension of this proposal to other systems is
11. Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules (Statutory Instruments 1971»
No.M a, 3.
quite plain: families should have automatic access to all the
material that forms the grounds of any decisions made.* Once
again this is viewed as constitutive of the "openness" that is a
crucial safeguard against arbitrary decision-making.
VI : Statements of aims, objectives and content of supervision
It is only in very rare cases that a hearing will make an
explicit statement concerning the precise nature of any supervision
imposed. The Social Work (Scotland) Act confers powers to impose
special conditions as follows: a supervision requirement may require
the child:
"to submit to supervision in accordance with such
conditions as they (the hearing members) may
impose ..." (12)
But in practice the form any supervision requirement takes is usually
regarded as the domain of the professionals in the system. This
12. Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, III, M+(l)(a).
Footnote: *It is interesting to speculate whether the great
reluctance on the part of both social workers and
teachers to let families read the reports submitted to
hearings, stems from a further misapplication of a
medical analogy (in addition to those indicated in the
Introduction). Doctors' records are generally regarded
as notes for the profession, either as aide-memoires for
the writer or to provide information for colleagues who
may meet the patients at a future date. They might
contain speculation at the significance of certain
symptoms, as well as documentation of any prescribed
course of treatment. If doctors were required to show
patients such records, as they might be in some settings,
their content would presumably change quite dramatically.
In a setting where the aim is to reach a decision with the
family, rather than to do something to a patient,
withholding information can only have damaging effects.
appears to be another area where discretion should be subject to
checks and controls if it is not to give way to arbitrariness.
This is important both from the child's and the family's point of
view and from that of the supervisor. The point has been well
stated by T.D. Campbell:
"Where there are no recognised standards of social
work care for children in trouble then the rights
of children whose cases are disposed of by a children's
hearing can get no practical foothold. Thus we need
to know what is the minimum that can be expected of a
social work department where a child is under
supervision ... partly in order to make rational
decisions about whether or not to put a child under
compulsory care ... partly in order to protect social
workers from criticisms ... (and) to give meaning to
the idea of children's rights. For only where the
child ... can refer to such recognised standards to
formulate a claim that the duties of a social work
department have not been carried out, can we say that
the child has effective rights within the system ..."
A general statement outlining the aim and objectives of a specific
supervision order is a necessary condition of assessing the
effectiveness of that order ana hence in deciding whether or not
to continue it. Wherever children are subjected to legal
intervention 'for their own good', it is necessary to make explicit
which 'good' or which interest or interests are to be furthered, so
that the success or failure of any prescribed course of action can
be evaluated by both supervisors and supervisees. This
recommendation is in line with recent suggestions that social work
13. T.D. Campbell, 'Discretion and Bights Within the Children's
Hearing System' in D. Houston (ed) Social Work in the
Children's Hearing System (Glasgow/Edinburgh Joint Committee
for Further and Advanced Training 1975) pp.25-26.
intervention should be target-oriented if it is to achieve change.
It has been pointed out that social work and social services
departments:
"... try to take on everything with the inevitable
result that they take on nothing effectively ... in
order to achieve change they must work towards a
clearly defined target and very rigorously maintain
a narrow, specific focus on their work". (1*+)
This observation holds for whoever takes on a compulsory,
supervisory role: social workers, teachers, foster parents, youth
workers or residential staff. It is therefore relevant to any
juvenile jurisdiction. The grounds and purposes of statutory
intervention must be clearly defined, so that they can be challenged
and where necessary discontinued or changed.
VII : Representatives for children
This recommendation is made with great uncertainty as to how it
might best be put into effect. However, there is no hesitation at
all in recommending that representatives should b'e made available for
children coming before any court, tribunal or hearing. Parents and
children have the right to bring a representative under paragraph 11
of the Hearing Rules, but this right is rarely exercised and in the
terminology of Chapter 2 it is a right of non-interference, rather
than a right of performance. The recommendation for representation
is much stronger and in the Scottish context involves at very least
1^. D.H. Thorpe, P. Smith, C.J. Green and J.H. Paley, Out of Care :
The Community Support of Juvenile Offenders (Allen and Unwin,
London, 19^0) p.39«
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the implementation of Section 66 of the Children Act 1975 which
makes provision for the appointment of a person to represent the
child's interests:
"... because there is or may be a conflict, on any
matter relevant to the proceedings between the
interests of the child and those of his parent ..." (15)
This section of the Act has never been implemented although there
have recently been extensive discussions about its implementation.
The question which immediately arises is that of identifying suitable
individuals to act as child representatives. The legal and social
work professions have a claim, so too do teachers and possibly even
retired panel members. These problems are not peculiar to Scotland
but will occur in a similar form in any juvenile jurisdiction. The
disadvantages of competing claims will be discussed briefly. The
arguments against employing lawyers focus on two main areas. Firstly
it is often pointed out that lawyers simply do not have the relevant
training to work in a setting which attempts to achieve co-operation
between the various parties. Lawyers do not usually operate in a
context which has no winners and losers. Where welfare agencies are
mistaken in their appraisals and actions, a lawyer may well help to
combat them but as was recently pointed out:
"Where there really is some deep psychological or
behavioural problem, it has to be recognised that the
intervention of a lawyer might make things worse.
Situations can slide into a position where lawyers and
client come perilously close to collusion in obscuring
the vision of the welfare agencies. There may be no
option to this and the benefits may well outweigh the
disadvantages but it is nevertheless a consideration
that must be borne in mind". (16)
15. Children Act 1975» 66 (i).
In. R. Smith, 'Children and their Lawyers in the Juvenile Court' in
M. King (ed), Childhood, Welfare and Justice (Batsford, London,
1981) p.L2.
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The second area which gives rise to reservations as to the
appropriateness of legal representatives, arises from observations
of what actually happens when lawyers are present. Stewart Asquith
writes:
"In all the cases where a child was represented
legally, the child himself made no actual
contribution to the discussion, the greater part of
which, in all but one of the cases, was accounted
for by the participation of the lawyer ..." (17)
This is exactly the converse of what hearings and indeed any system
of individualised justice should strive to achieve. It may well be
that any adult representative would have a similarly inhibiting
effect on children, in which case the argument for representation as
a means of more adequately securing the interests of children, would
be severely weakened. However, the following observation would still
be valid:
"It is almost as if everyone involved in the system
which may ultimately interfere with liberty is
trained for their role, except for the parents and
children". (l3)
There are situations where children clearly do need representatives.
These include cases where parents refuse to attend hearings, where
parental rights have been assumed by the local authority and in some
cases of neglect and abuse. It is also often hard for families to
challenge hearing members effectively, for although the panel is
17. Stewart Asquith, Children and Justice (Edinburgh 1933),
pp.l99-2CO.
18. Joan Cooper, Children's Hearings : More or Less?
Unpublished conference paper (1983) p.5.
composed of lay members, in the context of a hearing, members are
often presented and present themselves as 'experts'. Social workers
are also possible candidates for representatives. They do indeed
have the relevant training but it is hard to imagine how they might
be regarded as an independent voice on behalf of the children.
Social workers are already required to attend hearings and often see
themselves as acting for the child. However in cases where they seem
to be acting in the interests of the Social Work Department for example,
or where a child feels unfairly treated by a supervisor, it is not
clear how a second social worker might resolve the tensions. The
appearance of collusion would be overwhelming. Teachers might
provide the answer in some cases, but once again in the many instances
where problems are school-based, the appearance of collusion might be
entirely counterproductive. A proposal to appoint former panel
members has some attractions, but the reversal of roles might be very
difficult to achieve in practice. It might even be possible to train
some young adults who had come through the system and regarded the
experience as valuable: the Paul Camerons of the world. An
immediate objection is that such "successes" are relatively few and
the number who might be willing and able to take on such a task, even
fewer. The solution might be to have a panel of people (quite
distinct from the existing panels) prepared to act in this capacity
and trained for it, who would be available on request and would operate
quite independently of the hearings, perhaps in a Children's Advice
Centre. Children about to participate in legal proceedings should be
advised beforehand that they could discuss issues in total confidence
and that anything they said -would only be reported on their instructions.
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The majority of cases might well not require such measures, but
situations where children perhaps want to leave home might well come
to light more easily than at present under such a procedure.
Complaints against individual social workers could perhaps also be
voiced more effectively. In any juvenile jurisdiction, the
availability of child representatives can be seen as an important
counterbalance to the weight that children and families sometimes find
pitted against them.
VIII : Uniform application of all procedural regulations
The final recommendation comes in the form of a 'package' or
'cluster* of proposals all related to a single aim: the strict
enforcement of procedural justice within any system of juvenile justice.
The exact form in which this might be implemented will depend heavily
on the statutory framework and setting within which decisions are
taken. The discussion will once again relate to the Scottish system,
but the wider implications are clear. The findings of Martin, Fox
and Murray with respect to procedural laxity at hearings have already
been cited (p. 229). It was suggested that severe disregard of the
procedural requirements could result in substantive injustice in some
cases. Remedies for many of the deficiencies observed in the study
of 501 hearings have already been proposed in the previous
recommendations. By eliminating certain areas of discretion,
implementation of the fourth and fifth recommendations would bring
about an immediate improvement in at least two respects. The right
to receive written reasons was indicated in only of the observed
hearings and the reasons were stated explicitly in only 58%. The
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social background report was referred to in 35% of the cases, the
school report in 60$. Since under the recommendations listed all
families would receive copies of all reports as well as the written
reasons, such omissions could no longer occur. But there would
still be considerable scope for infringing the rules, in particular
those relating to the establishment of the grounds of referral at the
start of a hearing. Moreover since a mere 6$ of over 900 panel
members questioned in the "Out of Court" study thought that the
observance of procedural requirements 'was an important aspect of the
hearing, there is clearly a need for some kind of reform. John Grant
writes:
"Panel members think of the procedural rules as
something alien to the system of juvenile justice
they are operating, as an undue formality, as an
impediment to their work ... For the future they
ought to be made aware, in the clearest terms, that
procedural rules are an integral part of the children's
hearing system ... The basic responsibility for
ensuring compliance with the law in the hearing is
placed squarely on the chairman ... The belief that
all panel members are able to chair a hearing flies in
the face of reality". (19)
It is proposed that certain panel members should be selected to
become permanent chairmen. This is one possible solution and there
may be others, but they ail point to the need for specific training
prior to taking the chair. This is already provided very
conscientiously in some areas. But at the other extreme, there are
19« John Grant 'The Pole of the Haring: Procedural Aspects' in
P.M. Martin and Kathleen Murray (eds) The Sco ttish Juvenile
Justice System (Scottish Academic Press, 1982) pp.65-66.
stories (perhaps apocryphal) concerning areas where the last panel
member to enter the room automatically chairs the session. Such
practices may serve as a source of amusement for those with fertile
imaginations but have little else to recommend them. This brings
the discussion to another aspect of what can be broadly termed
"procedural fairness". It seems inevitable that in a system of
individualised justice, there will be considerable regional variations
with respect to disposals that appear to relate to essentially similar
cases. Even in an ideal system, resources cannot be equally accessible
to all those who may need to use them. Residential schools, for
example, will not always be within a distance that permits weekend
visits home and this may be a factor in determining whether or not to
place a particular child there. Substantive justice in this area does
not necessarily seem to require the elimination of regional differences.
Procedural justice on the other hand, seems to be quite inconsistent
with regional variations. At present, there is little uniformity of
practice with respect to who chairs hearings or how they are conducted.
Discretion in this area can only serve to detract from, rather than
contribute to, the course of justice. Any policies implemented to
overcome the failures highlighted by the research findings should be
implemented nationally and not regionally. This leaves open the
exact form that such policies might take. ■ Here it need only be
stressed that even in a welfare -based system there is a need for strict
adherence to the rules which form the framework within which
discretionary decisions are made. It is primarily because of the
absence of such a rigorous framework in certain contexts, that the
critics cited throughout this thesis have insisted on the inevitability
of a conflict between welfare and justice, particularly with respect
to legal intervention in the lives of children. The aim of the
thesis has been to argue that the conflict is rather between two
competing theories of justice and that at least with respect to
children, it is the ideals of welfare within a legally constituted
system, that offer the most coherent set of principles and policies
for achieving justice.
CONCLUSION
The practical implications have been presented primarily as a
final 'testing' of the conclusions of the foregoing chapters, with
those conclusions assuming the status of "provisional fixed points".
There could be all kinds of objections on the part of policy¬
makers to the eight recommendations discussed above. There are
financial considerations, particularly with reference to the provision
of representatives. The first recommendation (for the abolition of
offence referrals to hearings) could be politically unacceptable and so
on. But from the point of view of the normative theory presented here,
they are regarded as unexceptional. The theoretical arguments have
shown throughout that legal intervention in the lives of chili-en is
and ought to be on the basis of both interests or needs and desert or
deeds. The most crucial difference between the competing theories of
juvenile justice lies in their radically different approaches to the
problem of accommodating the two sets of criteria. The rhetoric of
the "justice" view states that legal intervention on the basis of needs
should at all times be quite distinct from that on the basis of deeds,
even though the same children may sometimes be subject to both types
of intervention. 3y contrast, the rhetoric of the "welfare"
view subsumes deeds under needs and calls wherever possible for one
type of proceeding for all juveniles who may be subject to legal
intervention. The first view is regarded as incoherent. In
recognising the legitimacy of legal action on the basis of interests
and needs, it implicitly acknowledges that there are relevant
differences between children and adults, which can justify such
intervention on behalf of the former and not of the latter. However,
in articulating principles for intervention on the basis of deeds,
these differences suddenly appear to be largely irrelevant. The
principles of proportionate, determinate sentencing are to apply to
children almost exactly as they apply to adults. The fact that
children can be (and are) punished in extra-legal contexts is totally
ignored. The interests freely recognised in the case of the abused
and neglected are no longer to be the paramount consideration. An
offence can render such interests at least partially forfeitable.
Such an extreme position is defensible, if it is defensible at all,
only with respect to the small minority of young offenders whose
actions pose a genuine threat to the public interest. In all other
cases the "welfare" view seems to offer more coherent and consistent
guidelines for action in respect of children. But reality is far
more complex than the rhetoric would seem to indicate.
The "welfare" view allows "deeds" to slip in by the back door
and hence exposes itself to valid criticisms. Once it is recognised
that in certain situations needs or interests may include action on the
basis of deeds, the relevance of determinate, proportionate disposals
cannot be denied 'without a serious contravention of the principles of
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formal justice. Moreover since the very same factors which are
regarded as indicative of a need for increased intervention on the
criterion of interests, are often those presented as evidence in
mitigation and hence a need for less intervention, where disposals are
to be on the basis of deeds, it is essential to state openly from the
outset which set of criteria are regarded as relevant in any decision¬
making process. It is in failing to make the reasoning process
explicit and in allowing it to move, for example, from premisses
concerning alleged offences, to disposals related to quite different
criteria, that injustices occur. Implementation of the
recommendations is seen as the means of avoiding such pitfalls.
However, these problems are far less significant in the pursuit of
justice for juveniles, than the complexities encountered in actual
reasoning about interests; complexities which remain unrecognised in
much of the literature. A recent analysis of interests states:
"Every assessment of real interests is mediated through
the way of life of those making the assessment, and
as a result such judgements promise to remain
controversial to some degree ..." (20)
Reasoning about interests is necessarily open to dispute, for as
shown in Chapter 3i the concept of interest is partially want-
regarding and partially ideal-regarding. However, the contestable
nature of any disposals on the basis of interests, does not render
them arbitrary as the critics claim, it rather underlines the
20. Wm. E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Heath and
Co., Boston, 197^J p.73.
indispensable requirement of complete openness, of making explicit
the recognised values as well as the factual basis of any decisions
taken. Once again, implementation of the recommendations would be
a way of meeting this requirement. Here, and not in any return to
legalism, lies the possibility of achieving justice for children.
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